The thesis investigates how the historical analogy to mercantile companies, privateers, and pirates between the 16th and 19th century can elucidate the relationship between non-state actors and states in cyber(in-)security, and how such an application changes our understanding of cyber(in-)security. It contributes to a better integration of non-state actors into the study of cyber(in-)security and international security by clarifying the political challenges raised by the interaction between these players and states. Drawing on the literature of non-state armed actors, the thesis defines a spectrum of state proximity to develop an analytical framework categorizing actors as state, semi-state, and non-state. The historical investigation utilizes primary and secondary sources to explore three periods in British naval history: the late 16th, late 17th, and mid-19th centuries. A comparison of the two security domains - the sea and cyberspace - identifies the pre-18th century periods as the most useful analogues for cyber(in-)security. The thesis evaluates the analogy by conducting empirical case studies. First, the case of the attacks against Estonia (2007) and three criminal court cases against Russian hackers (2014/2017) examine the analogy to pirates and privateers. Second, the analogy to mercantile companies focuses on the attacks against Google (2009), the attacks against Sony Pictures Entertainment (2014), and the collaboration between large technology companies and Five-Eyes signals intelligence agencies. The thesis makes three main claims: first, the analogy to piracy and privateering provides a new understanding of how state proximity is used politically by attackers and defenders, and offers lessons for understanding attribution in cyberspace. Second, the longevity of historical privateering sheds light on the long-term risks and rewards of state collaboration with cyber criminals, and offers insight into the political constitution of cyber(in-)security. Third, the mercantile company lens improves our understanding of how cooperative and conflictive relations between large technology companies and states influence cyber(in-)security.

O presente artigo tem por objetivo demonstrar a importância do meio físico como variável explicativa fundamental para o estudo da ciberguerra. O argumento central desenvolvido afirma que o transporte efetivo de informações no ciberespaço durante a guerra depende da posse de ativos estratégicos que garantam a interconexão entre dispositivos eletrônicos por meio de redes resilientes e seguras, e que a posse, a localização e o controle desses ativos é condição prévia e necessária para a consecução de uma estratégia de defesa cibernética. A partir de um arcabouço teórico clausewitziano e de uma análise de redes em camadas, esse artigo conclui que tanto no plano estratégico (ativos nacionais) quanto no plano operacional e tático (redes militares críticas) o acesso e a livre movimentação no ciberespaço é fortemente dependente do meio físico. / This paper aims to demonstrate the importance of the physical medium as a key explanatory variable for the study of cyberwar. The central argument defends that the effective transport of information in cyberspace during war depends on the possession of strategic assets to ensure the connection between electronic devices via resilient and secure networks, and that the ownership, location and control of these assets is a prior and necessary condition to the achievement of a cyber defense strategy. From a Clausewitzian theoretical framework, and through an analysis of layered network architecture, this paper concludes that in both strategic (domestic assets) and operational and tactical (critical military networks) levels the access and unrestricted movement in cyberspace depends greatly on the physical medium.

O presente artigo tem por objetivo demonstrar a importância do meio físico como variável explicativa fundamental para o estudo da ciberguerra. O argumento central desenvolvido afirma que o transporte efetivo de informações no ciberespaço durante a guerra depende da posse de ativos estratégicos que garantam a interconexão entre dispositivos eletrônicos por meio de redes resilientes e seguras, e que a posse, a localização e o controle desses ativos é condição prévia e necessária para a consecução de uma estratégia de defesa cibernética. A partir de um arcabouço teórico clausewitziano e de uma análise de redes em camadas, esse artigo conclui que tanto no plano estratégico (ativos nacionais) quanto no plano operacional e tático (redes militares críticas) o acesso e a livre movimentação no ciberespaço é fortemente dependente do meio físico. / This paper aims to demonstrate the importance of the physical medium as a key explanatory variable for the study of cyberwar. The central argument defends that the effective transport of information in cyberspace during war depends on the possession of strategic assets to ensure the connection between electronic devices via resilient and secure networks, and that the ownership, location and control of these assets is a prior and necessary condition to the achievement of a cyber defense strategy. From a Clausewitzian theoretical framework, and through an analysis of layered network architecture, this paper concludes that in both strategic (domestic assets) and operational and tactical (critical military networks) levels the access and unrestricted movement in cyberspace depends greatly on the physical medium.

O presente artigo tem por objetivo demonstrar a importância do meio físico como variável explicativa fundamental para o estudo da ciberguerra. O argumento central desenvolvido afirma que o transporte efetivo de informações no ciberespaço durante a guerra depende da posse de ativos estratégicos que garantam a interconexão entre dispositivos eletrônicos por meio de redes resilientes e seguras, e que a posse, a localização e o controle desses ativos é condição prévia e necessária para a consecução de uma estratégia de defesa cibernética. A partir de um arcabouço teórico clausewitziano e de uma análise de redes em camadas, esse artigo conclui que tanto no plano estratégico (ativos nacionais) quanto no plano operacional e tático (redes militares críticas) o acesso e a livre movimentação no ciberespaço é fortemente dependente do meio físico. / This paper aims to demonstrate the importance of the physical medium as a key explanatory variable for the study of cyberwar. The central argument defends that the effective transport of information in cyberspace during war depends on the possession of strategic assets to ensure the connection between electronic devices via resilient and secure networks, and that the ownership, location and control of these assets is a prior and necessary condition to the achievement of a cyber defense strategy. From a Clausewitzian theoretical framework, and through an analysis of layered network architecture, this paper concludes that in both strategic (domestic assets) and operational and tactical (critical military networks) levels the access and unrestricted movement in cyberspace depends greatly on the physical medium.

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In the 21st century, cyber operations have become the modern manifestation of political warfare between great powers. Many states have made considerable efforts to build up their respective cyber commands. Contrary, or as a complement to this, some states choses to rely upon actors detached from the state for conducting their operations online. What incentives explain this strategy? There are inherent risks with employing proxies and states nowadays have an ability to conduct cyber operations from central military commands. This presents a puzzle. By using a comparative case study approach, this thesis provides a portrait of how two leading cyber actors, Russia and The United States employ different strategies in the digital domain. To understand the motivations behind state delegation of cyber conflict, this thesis applies Principal-Agent theory to explain the relationships states cultivate with non-state actors. I propose a framework containing three hypotheses that ought to affect the decision to delegate; cyber proxies offer states a possibility to enhance their capabilities, save cost and evade accountability. Through analysing the cases, I find that the use of cyber proxies could partly be explained by my hypotheses rooted in the PA theory. Lower internal cyber capability and the desire to save costs may explain why states choses to use proxies in the digital domain. However, the empirical evidence is not strong enough to suggest that cyber proxies offer states a possibility to evade accountability. Rather, it is the cyber domain itself that complicates attribution efforts. Consequently, the findings do not confirm the hypothesis that cyber proxies provide enhanced plausible deniability benefits compared to government agents. In spite of that, this thesis concludes that cyber proxies together with their implications for escalatory dynamics will probably remain challenging in the foreseeable future.

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In 2010, the discovery of the malicious computer worm Stuxnet shocked the world by its sophistication and unpredictability. Stuxnet was deemed as the world’s first cyber weapon and started discussions concerning offensive cyber operations – often called “cyber warfare” – globally. Due to Stuxnet, rapid digitalisation and evolving technology, it became vital for decision makers in the US to consider formal norms such as laws, agreements, and policy decisions regarding cyber security. Yet, to obtain a holistic understanding of cyber security, this thesis uses constructivism as its theoretical framework to understand changing informal norms and social factors including the ideas and morals of the US society regarding offensive cyber operations. This thesis critically analyses the discourse of three of the largest US newspapers by circulation: the New York Times, the Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal. A significant shift was discovered in the US media’s publications and in informal norms regarding offensive cyber operations and the use of cyber weapons in just one decade, by comparing the discourses relating to Stuxnet in 2010 and the US presidential election in 2020. This thesis concludes that it is equally important to consider ideas and morals when researching a technical field such as cyber security by arguing that informal norms guide the choices actors make when developing formal norms at the international level. The findings of this thesis are intended to provoke a normative, urgent, and focused discussion about cyber security. The findings are also intended to shift attention to how language is used in discussions about the cyber sphere, offensive cyber operations and cyber weapons as components of the traditional battlefield.