published_or_final_version / Philosophy / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

The project consists of a defense of the reductivist program generally and an application of the program to the theory of epistemic justification. Chapter One sets out the problem of reducing justification to other terms and defends the legitimacy of this problem against attacks by Quine in particular and supervenience theorists generally. Chapter Two is an explication and refutation of all possible theories which reduce justification-facts to facts about the reliability of cognitive processes. All such theories founder due to their insensitivity to the perspectival component of thought. Chapter Three argues that this perspectival component is non-truth-theoretic and hence that the connection between justification and truth is much less important than has been generally supposed. Chapter Four lays out the structure of epistemic justification and proposes a reductive thesis entailing this structure. It is argued that essential elements of both coherence theories of justification and foundations theories of justification are present in rational thought and that this is explicable in terms of the teleology of human cognition. Chapter Five explicates and defends the theory constructed in Chapter Four.

Li King Wai. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 165-167). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1. --- Introduction / "Desire, reason, and motivation" / Chapter I. --- The Issue --- p.1 / Chapter II. --- Desires and Motives --- p.2 / Chapter III. --- "Reason，Reasoning, and Practical Reason" --- p.7 / Chapter IV. --- The Question of the Gap --- p.8 / Chapter V. --- The Motivational Problem --- p.11 / Chapter VI. --- The Motivational Problem: A factual inquiry or a normative inquiry? --- p.16 / Chapter VII. --- Motivational Priority: Reason or desire? --- p.19 / Chapter VIII. --- An Overview of the Following Chapters --- p.21 / Chapter 2. --- Cognitivist Motivational Internalism / Kosgaard's attempt / Chapter I. --- Introduction --- p.27 / Chapter II. --- Internalism Requirement (IR) --- p.30 / Chapter III. --- Condition of being Practically Rational (CPR) --- p.31 / Chapter IV. --- What IR Implies and Doesn't Imply --- p.36 / Chapter V. --- Motivational Skepticism Assumes Content Skepticism --- p.41 / Chapter VI. --- A Humean Conception of Practical Reason --- p.47 / Chapter VII. --- Kosgaard vs. Williams on the Proper Interpretation of IR --- p.52 / Chapter 3. --- Varieties of Humeanism / "Arguments for the principle of desire-in, desire-out" / Chapter I. --- Introduction --- p.57 / Chapter II. --- Comprehensive Humeanism: An overview --- p.61 / Chapter III. --- Bald Instrumentalism --- p.64 / Chapter IV. --- Argument from Direction of Fit --- p.68 / Chapter V. --- Partial Humeanism (PH) --- p.86 / Chapter VI. --- Looking Backward and Looking Forward --- p.91 / Chapter 4. --- Quasi-Humeanism / Backgrounding PDIO / Chapter I. --- Introduction --- p.93 / Chapter II. --- Strict Background View of Desire --- p.94 / Chapter III. --- Background Desire as an Enabling Condition --- p.119 / Chapter IV. --- Concluding Remarks --- p.123 / Chapter 5. --- Fusionist Alternative / Dissolving the reason/ desire dichotomy / Chapter I. --- Introduction --- p.125 / Chapter II. --- Setting the Stage: The status of the debate without the fusionist alternative --- p.126 / Chapter III. --- Challenges to Humeanism: Motivation for a fusionist alternative --- p.129 / Chapter IV. --- The Fusionist Alternative --- p.133 / Chapter V. --- Three Merits of the Fusionist Account --- p.144 / Chapter VI. --- Conclusion --- p.151 / Chapter 6. --- Conclusion / Chapter I. --- Introduction --- p.154 / Chapter II. --- Seeing the Point of a Rational Consideration and Being Motivated --- p.155 / Chapter III. --- The Inadequacies of CMI? --- p.159 / Chapter IV. --- The Dilemma of a Humean Conception of Desire --- p.160 / Chapter V. --- PDIO: Is it exclusively reserved for Humeanism? --- p.162 / Chapter VI. --- Conclusion: Groping in the dark --- p.163 / Bibliography --- p.165

The expression, "Realizing Reason in History," has at least two senses, both of which Hegel tries to bring out in his philosophy of history. The first suggests that there. is reason in history. That is, the task of the philosopher is to show how reason has developed itself through history. The second sense suggests that, not only does history show us that reason has developed over time, but the task of history is precisely to develop or realize reason in time. There is reason in history because that is what history brings about. Thus, the "realization" of reason in history is both something that is recognized and something that must be done. This "realization" is accomplished, willy-nilly, through the doings and sufferings of concrete human beings. Hegel wants to show that history is not a cold, anonymous process which simply sweeps up human lives and never looks back. Indeed, his philosophy of history is primarily concerned with the concrete doings and sufferings of human beings, and wishes to rescue from meaninglessness all those ephemeral human lives which populate the historical process. That, according to Hegel, is what the philosophy of history is all about.

Texte remanié de : Thesis : Salzburg : 1990. / Bibliogr., notes bibliogr.

published_or_final_version / abstract / toc / Education / Master / Master of Education

No description available.

My thesis deals with religion, democracy and differences. My interests are primarily philosophical and theoretical, and I intend to contextualize my research with reference to Canadian issues and debates. This thesis addresses the challenges posed to the normative ideal of multiculturalism. In particular, I intend to discuss the difficulties of adopting normative ideals that meet the democratic principles of political equality and inclusiveness while at the same time promoting tolerance toward minorities in order to sustain their distinctiveness. In dealing with the complex relationship between religion, democracy and differences. I highlight the limitations of multiculturalism and propose a theory of liberation of reason, entitled the theory of Daf’ (Repel), in order to address the myriad challenges spawned by this complex intermingling of political and cultural identities within liberal democratic societies. The theory of Daf’ in the context of a deliberative model of democracy complements the normative ideal of multiculturalism.

In this thesis I aim to answer two questions: Are alternatives for choice ever incomparable? and, In what ways can items be compared? I argue that there is no incomparability among bearers of value and that the ways in which items can be compared are richer and more varied than commonly supposed. The two questions are closely related; in arguing against incomparability a positive picture of comparability emerges. The case against incomparability is a case for a new conception of comparability more capacious than has been traditionally conceived. This 'broad' conception of comparability has three distinctive features: it distinguishes incomparability from noncomparability, it includes the possibility of 'emphatic' comparability, or comparisons between 'higher' and 'lower' goods; and it makes logical space for a fourth generic value relation - what I shall call 'on a par' - beyond the standard trichotomy of relations of 'better than', 'worse than', and 'equally good'. Each of these features arises out of defects of certain incomparabilist arguments. Indeed, the approach to the broad conception of comparability via examination of incomparabilist arguments makes clear that much of the intuitive pull of incomparability depends on a narrow and impoverished conception of comparability. Investigation of comparability and incomparability is motivated by a proposed substantive account of practical justification according to which there can be no justified choice without the comparability of the alternatives. The existence of widespread incomparability, then, undermines the rationality of practical life. This thesis' argument against incomparability and for a broad conception of comparability serves to vindicate the role of practical reason in choice.

Abridgment of Thesis (Ph. D.)--New York University, 1936. / Bibliography: p. 14-16.