This thesis defends the claim that reason-giving is a discrete type of speech act (of an expressive kind) that has a distinctive value. It further argues that this value is best understood in terms of recognition, rather than justification, and that it is intrinsic to reason-giving. Its main aim is to argue against the commonly-held view that the main, sometimes the only, value to reason-giving lies in its capacity to provide justification (and in the related claim that if reasons cannot justify, then reason-giving has no value). The argument presented is intended to support that recognition (of a certain type) is a value that reason-giving has independently from any other value that it might or might not have – including justification; and hence, that reason-giving has a certain distinctive value that is not predicated upon a capacity for actually achieving justification. In particular, this thesis argues, based on speech act theory and on the concept of recognition, that this value is best understood as consisting in the expression of a particular type of recognition for the other. To establish this claim, in chapter one, it begins by setting out the standard view: that the value of reason-giving lies in its capacity to justify, and analyses some of the moves that have been made in the literature when the connection between reason-giving and justification breaks down. In chapters two to four, it uses speech act theory to analyse the acts of arguing and reason-giving, and to argue that reason-giving is a discrete speech act that has features in common with but is not reducible to arguing. Finally, in chapter five, it defends the claim that reason-giving has an intrinsic value, and that this value is best understood as an expressive value: namely, the expression of recognition for the other as a rational being (which is a valuable feature of the other’s humanity); and that it has this value regardless of whether the reasons in question are “good” from a justificatory standpoint.

O presente estudo propõe que a atual compreensão sobre interpretação judicial influencia no modo de ver a tutela dos direitos. Para isso, parte-se do entendimento de que trabalhar com o direito não é trabalhar com um objeto pronto antes da interpretação, mas com indeterminação. Isso conduz à conclusão de que a interpretação jurídica é um caminho que se percorre por meio de escolhas. Com o reconhecimento de que interpretar envolve escolher, realça-se o papel da justificação das decisões judiciais como ponto fundamental da atividade jurisdicional. Dado que a finalidade do processo civil é a tutela dos direitos, a justificação da decisão abre espaço para a tutela dos direitos em duas perspectivas. De um lado, considerando-se que no processo a interpretação tem o fim de decidir um caso, estrutura-se o discurso da motivação voltado à obtenção de uma decisão justa para as partes, o que corresponde a um meio de colaborar para a tutela dos direitos numa perspectiva particular. De outro, considerando-se que por meio da resolução do caso reduz-se a sua indeterminabilidade, estrutura-se o discurso do precedente voltado à tutela dos direitos numa perspectiva geral por duas frentes: promove-se um tratamento isonômico das pessoas e cria-se um ambiente mais seguro para o desenvolvimento da vida social. / This study proposes that the current understanding of judicial interpretation influences the way we understant the protection of rights. In order to achieve this conclusion, we start from the understanding that dealing with the law does not means to deal with a given object finished before the interpretation process, but with indeterminacy. This leads to the conclusion that legal interpretation is a path that runs by making choices. With the recognition that interpretation involves choosing, it is emphasized the role of the justification of judicial decisions as a key point of judicial activity. Given that the purpose of civil proceedings is the protection of rights, the justification of the decision opens the way for the protection of rights in two perspectives. On the one hand, considering that in the judicial process the interpretation happens for the function of dispute resolutions, it is possible to oganize a discourse of the judicial reason giving aiming to achieve a fair decision for the parties, which corresponds to a means to colaborate for the protection of rights in a particular perspective. On the other hand, considering that through the resolution of the case the indeterminacy of the law is reduced, it is possible to organize a discourse of the judicial precedent aiming to achieve the protection of rights in a broad perspective by two fronts: promoting a isonomic treatment of people and creating a safer enviroment for the development of social life.

O presente estudo propõe que a atual compreensão sobre interpretação judicial influencia no modo de ver a tutela dos direitos. Para isso, parte-se do entendimento de que trabalhar com o direito não é trabalhar com um objeto pronto antes da interpretação, mas com indeterminação. Isso conduz à conclusão de que a interpretação jurídica é um caminho que se percorre por meio de escolhas. Com o reconhecimento de que interpretar envolve escolher, realça-se o papel da justificação das decisões judiciais como ponto fundamental da atividade jurisdicional. Dado que a finalidade do processo civil é a tutela dos direitos, a justificação da decisão abre espaço para a tutela dos direitos em duas perspectivas. De um lado, considerando-se que no processo a interpretação tem o fim de decidir um caso, estrutura-se o discurso da motivação voltado à obtenção de uma decisão justa para as partes, o que corresponde a um meio de colaborar para a tutela dos direitos numa perspectiva particular. De outro, considerando-se que por meio da resolução do caso reduz-se a sua indeterminabilidade, estrutura-se o discurso do precedente voltado à tutela dos direitos numa perspectiva geral por duas frentes: promove-se um tratamento isonômico das pessoas e cria-se um ambiente mais seguro para o desenvolvimento da vida social. / This study proposes that the current understanding of judicial interpretation influences the way we understant the protection of rights. In order to achieve this conclusion, we start from the understanding that dealing with the law does not means to deal with a given object finished before the interpretation process, but with indeterminacy. This leads to the conclusion that legal interpretation is a path that runs by making choices. With the recognition that interpretation involves choosing, it is emphasized the role of the justification of judicial decisions as a key point of judicial activity. Given that the purpose of civil proceedings is the protection of rights, the justification of the decision opens the way for the protection of rights in two perspectives. On the one hand, considering that in the judicial process the interpretation happens for the function of dispute resolutions, it is possible to oganize a discourse of the judicial reason giving aiming to achieve a fair decision for the parties, which corresponds to a means to colaborate for the protection of rights in a particular perspective. On the other hand, considering that through the resolution of the case the indeterminacy of the law is reduced, it is possible to organize a discourse of the judicial precedent aiming to achieve the protection of rights in a broad perspective by two fronts: promoting a isonomic treatment of people and creating a safer enviroment for the development of social life.