Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Santa Cruz. / Photocopy of typescript. Bibliography: leaves 234-243.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--UCLA, 2008. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 112-125).

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Theories of how individuals reason, and how they experience emotion abound in the psychological literature; yet, despite the common lay-theories of how emotions might affect a person’s reasoning, very little empirical work has been conducted on this relationship. The current thesis addresses this knowledge-gap by first distilling from the literature two classes of emotion theory; Information, and Load; and then systematically testing the explanatory power of these theories. A dual-process framework is employed in order to define low (Type One) and high effort (Type Two) strategies. Information theories predict that negative emotion cues more analytic processing relative to positive emotion, whereas load theories predict both positive and negative emotion to suppress use of high-effort strategies. Thus the two theories are compared by varying incidental and integral emotion across syllogistic reasoning, conditional reasoning, and the ratio-bias task, and assessing the engagement of Type One and Type Two processes across positive emotion, negative emotion, and control conditions. The findings suggest that emotion effects in syllogistic reasoning do not consistently support either Load or Information theories (Experiments 1-4). Emotion effects are found to be typically larger for integral than incidental emotion (Experiment 5), and most frequently serve as Information in verbal (Experiments 6 and 7) and visual conditional reasoning tasks (Experiment 8). Furthermore, these effects are to a large extent dependent on task properties such as the number of alternative antecedents (Experiments 9 and 10), and are greater on more difficult tasks (Experiments 11 and 12). These findings suggest that emotion has a greater impact on Type Two than Type One processes. A range of methodological and theoretical implications which will inform future work in this area are also discussed in the closing chapter.

The use of electroencephalography (EEG) to exam the electrical brain activity associated with reasoning provides an opportunity to quantify the functional and temporal aspects of this uniquely human capability, and at the same time expand our knowledge about what a given event-related potential (ERP) might measure. The question of what form of mental representation and transformational processes underlie human reasoning has been a central theme in cognitive psychology since its inception (Chomsky, 1957; McCarthy, 1955; Miller, 1956; Newell, Shaw, Simon, 1958). Two prominent, but competing views remain at the forefront of the discussion, one positing that human inference making is principally syntactic (Braine & O'Brien, 1998; Fodor, 1975; Pylyshyn, 1984; Rips, 1994), and the other that it is, fundamentally, semantic in nature (Gentner & Stevens, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1983). The purpose of the proposed study is to investigate the neurophysiology of mental model (MM) and mental rule (MR) reasoning using high-density electroencephalography (EEG), with the goal of providing a characterization of the time course and a general estimate of the spatial dimensions of the brain activations correlated with these specific instances of two classic views of reasoning. The research is motivated by two questions: 1) Will violations of expectancy established by the devised MM and MR reasoning strategies evoke the N400 and P600 ERPs, respectively, and 2) Will topographical scalp distributions associated with each reasoning strategy suggest distinct psychological representations and processes? A finding of a N400 response in the MM condition suggests that reasoning about the relations between entities in the type of problems presented engages a network of cortical areas previously shown to be involved in processing violations of semantic expectancies in studies of language comprehension. By comparison, incongruent events in the MR condition are expected to evoke a bilateral anterior P600, a component previously associated with recognizing and restructuring syntactic anomalies or incongruities in sentence comprehension. If the hypothesized results are obtained they would provide potentially insightful information about the chronometry of mental processes associated with the different representations and inference making mechanisms postulated to support each mode of reasoning, and as well, broaden our understanding of the neural functionality associated with the N400 and P600 ERP.

In my dissertation, I advance and defend a broad account of reasoning, including both the nature of inference and the structure of our reasoning systems. With respect to inference, I argue that we have good reason to consider a unified account of the cognitive transitions through which we attempt to figure things out. This view turns out to be highly inflationary relative to previous philosophical accounts of inference, which, I argue, fail to accommodate many instances of everyday reasoning. I argue that a cognitive transition’s status as an inference, in this broad sense, depends on the subject’s taking the conclusion of the inference— a new, revised, or supposed belief— to be the output of a rational thought process. Furthermore, taking such a belief to be the output of a rational thought process consists in its accompaniment by the feeling of correctness to the subject, which I call the assent affect. With respect to the structure of our reasoning systems, I defend a dual process model of reasoning by addressing certain alleged deficiencies with such accounts. I argue that the assent affect— or more precisely its absence— is a strong candidate to serve as the triggering condition of our more deliberate type 2 reasoning processes. That is, a subject’s more effortful reasoning processes engage with a problem when the output of a type 1 intuition is not accompanied by the assent affect. A subject will think harder about a problem, in other words, when they do not feel confident that they have gotten to the bottom of it. This account, I argue, fits well with both empirical and theoretical claims about the interaction of dual reasoning processes. In this dissertation, I use the assent affect to solve puzzles about both the nature of inferences and the structure of our reasoning systems. Puzzles in rationality become easier to solve when our intellectual feelings are not excluded from the picture.

This dissertation identified and addressed four of the unresolved issues pertaining to the proposition that nonabsolute/ relativistic (N/R) thinking is one of the possible unifying commonalities underlying the selected models of postformal reasoning, namely Problem Finding, Dialectical Reasoning, Relativistic Operations and Reflective Judgment. A total of 254 participants aged 10 to 48 and attending Grade 5 to doctoral studies were involved. Each participant was administered eight tests in pencil-and-paper format to measure eight different constructs of thinking. Different specific hypotheses were evaluated through different statistical approaches. The four identified issues were addressed as follows: Firstly, nonabsolute/ relativistic thinking was reconceptualized and operationally defined as a multidimensional and multilevel construct. Two dimensions were proposed: the basic form and the epistemic view. Within the basic form dimension, two levels were proposed: the formal and the postformal forms. Secondly, a battery of three tests was specifically designed by Arlin and the author to measure the different dimensions and levels of nonabsolute/ relativistic thinking. Thirdly, strong empirical evidence was obtained supporting the general hypothesis that nonabsolute/ relativistic thinking is a possible unifying commonality underlying the four selected postformal models. Within the construct of nonabsolute/ relativistic thinking, two dimensions, the basic form and the epistemic view, can be differentiated as hypothesized. Fourthly, empirical evidence was also obtained supporting the general hypothesis that nonabsolute/ relativistic thinking is an instance of both formal and postformal reasoning. Specifically within the basic form dimension, two qualitatively different forms, the formal and the postformal, can be differentiated as hypothesized. Findings also suggested that the development of a nonabsolute epistemic view might play a crucial role in the development of the postformal form. Therefore, the emergence of the postformal form can be explained by a paradigm shift from an absolute to a nonabsolute epistemic view. Performances in the tests of the postformal form and of the epistemic view in combination were found to be good predictors of performances in the selected postformal tests. Significant implications of the findings are that nonabsolute/ relativistic thinking represents a form of metamorphosis from closed-system to open-system thinking and it might serve as a potential springboard in the development of higher order thinking.

The purpose of this study was the assessment of physics reasoning on the basis of students' understanding of motion on an inclined plane. Subjects were presented with a video tape showing a motion experiment in steps and were asked to formulate hypotheses and design an experiment to test these. Subjects thought aloud while specifying the designs and goals of an experiment. Protocols were analyzed by an original method using schema representation techniques. Adequancy of subjects' reasoning was evaluated by comparison to a composite model built from physics domain principles. As more information was presented to subjects, processing differences were observed. Using a hierarchy of processes from recognition to generation, five groups of subjects were defined. Subjects differed in recognition and inclusion processes, use of incoming information, ability to generate experimental designs, and responses to falsification. Concepts of average velocity and differences in directionality of reasoning were analyzed.