Submitted by Guilherme Scotto Sassi (sassi.guilherme@hotmail.com) on 2013-03-06T15:02:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_de_dissertação_Guilherme_Sassi.docx: 298615 bytes, checksum: a45422de56487eef92103c248862e385 (MD5) / Rejected by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br), reason: Prezado Guilherme, Arquivo em PDF e ano da apresentação 2013 e não 2012. Att. Suzi 3799-7876 on 2013-03-06T15:25:30Z (GMT) / Submitted by Guilherme Scotto Sassi (sassi.guilherme@hotmail.com) on 2013-03-06T15:29:35Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_de_dissertação_Guilherme_Sassi.pdf: 759311 bytes, checksum: 9605a3c55746dc8f6262b47b5b6b1dde (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2013-03-06T18:15:04Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_de_dissertação_Guilherme_Sassi.pdf: 759311 bytes, checksum: 9605a3c55746dc8f6262b47b5b6b1dde (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-03-06T18:20:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_de_dissertação_Guilherme_Sassi.pdf: 759311 bytes, checksum: 9605a3c55746dc8f6262b47b5b6b1dde (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-02-04 / Economists have argued that regulation is the appropriate approach to maintain output in its economically efficient level in a natural monopoly, and that can be achieved by submitting these companies to regulatory agencies’ decisions. The autonomous agencies are, however, not free in an absolute sense, and it is important to ask what the priorities of the new administration are. One answer is that it is designed to give leeway and powers of discretion to unbiased professionals with expertise in their field. In practice, however, professional experts might often be politically motivated. The objective of this study is to investigate whether political nominations to the presidency of regulatory agencies, rather than technical appointments, affect the level of regulatory risk. In order to achieve this purpose, an event study was performed, where the regulatory risk in a political nomination will be compared to a technical nomination, in terms of abnormal return.

Bakgrund: I Sverige ska de statligt ägda bolagen från och med den första januari 2008, upprätta en hållbarhetsredovisning. Motsvarande skyldighet finns inte för icke-reglerade bolag, dessa kan dock frivilligt välja att presentera hållbarhetsinformation. Institutionell teori menar att organisationer inom en institution efterliknar varandra som ett reslutat av samhällets påtryckningar. Regeringens riktlinjer gällande en obligatorisk hållbarhetsredovisning för statliga bolag skulle på så sätt kunna resultera i en indirekt reglering av de icke-reglerade företagen. De undersökta bolagen i denna studie är det statliga bolaget Vattenfall AB samt de icke-reglerade bolagen E.ON Sverige AB, Tekniska Verken i Linköping AB och Mälarenergi AB. Syfte: Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka huruvida de fyra undersökningsföretagen kan ha påverkats av Regeringens riktlinjer för en obligatorisk hållbarhetsredovisning för statliga bolag. Avsikten är även att utifrån de tre icke-reglerade bolagen synliggöra situationer där riktlinjerna indirekt skulle kunna påverka. Metod: Uppsatsen är en kvalitativ tvärsnittsstudie av de fyra bolagen. En litteraturstudie av företagens hållbarhetsredovisningar och kvalitativa semistrukturerade intervjuer har genomförts. Slutsats: Vattenfall har genom en tvingande isomorfi blivit direkt reglerade då de valt att samtycka till Regeringens riktlinjer. Uppsatsens insamlade empiri indikerar att det finns två eventuella situationer där Regeringens riktlinjer indirekt skulle kunna påverka de icke-reglerade bolagens hållbarhetsredovisningar; (1) genom en ökad mediebelysning av publicering av Regeringens riktlinjer och (2) genom benchmarking gentemot andra företag. / Background: In Sweden the state-owned companies are as of January 1st 2008 directly bounded to establish a sustainability report. There is no equivalent legislation available for the non-regulated companies, they may however voluntarily choose to present sustainability information. Institutional theory argues that organizations within an institution resemble each other as a result of the society’s social pressure. The Government’s guidelines regarding a mandatory sustainability report for state-owned companies could result in an indirect regulation of the non-regulated companies. The companies featured in this study is the state-owned company Vattenfall AB and the three non-regulated companies E.ON Sverige AB, Tekniska Verken i Linköping AB and Mälarenergi AB. Purpose: The aim of this paper is to examine whether there is a possibility that the four chosen companies can have been affected by the Government’s guidelines. The purpose is also to highlight possible situations where the guidelines indirect could affect the non-regulated companies.Method: This essay is a qualitative cross-sectional study of the four companies. A literature review of the companies’ sustainability reports and qualitative semi-structured interviews has been conducted. Results: Vattenfall has through a coercive isomorphism become directly regulated, because they have chosen to acquiescence to the Governments guidelines. The study’s empirical data indicates two possible situations where the guidelines could indirect affect the non-regulated companies; (1) through increased media attention of the publication of the Guidelines and (2) through impact through benchmarking.