The aim of this paper which is called "Competition in Regulation: Implementation of BASEL II in Canada" is to analyze the introduction of Basel Rules in the banking sector in Canada. The goal is to prove that the economical stability, high concentration of the banking sector and a simple system of regulation and supervision can be a competitive advantage for a banking market. The analysis is based on the comparison of the implementation of BASEL II in Canada, the USA and the European Union.

This thesis proposes to determine the role of regulation that promotes competition in the telecommunications market in Chile. Regulation has been used in the telecommunications sector at different points in time to fulfil various market needs. Before liberalisation of the telecommunications market, regulation established the parameters of the state-owned telecommunications company. Later, regulations specified the rights and duties of the incumbent. Hypothetically, a higher degree of regulation is necessary to develop new markets, and once progress has been made, a lesser degree of rules is required. This heavier regulation has been called 'regulation for competition', ‘regulatory competition law’ or 'synthetic competition'. Instead, this research proposes the concept of ‘emulated competition’, which is useful to clarify the role of regulation as a mechanism to promote competition. To build the concept of ‘emulated competition’, the thesis reviews the relationship between sectoral regulation and competition law from a theoretical viewpoint. Subsequently, the thesis carries out a comparative analysis between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) regarding the treatment of certain abuse of dominance cases, particularly with regard to ‘margin squeeze’. To study the Chilean model, the research reviews the constitutional framework of economic regulation and competition law, examining the evolution of pro-competition regulatory tools since the beginning of privatisation. Furthermore, the thesis analyses the case law and regulation issued by the Chilean competition authority in the same period. The analysed topic allows a review of how emulated competition operates in Chile. To sum up, competition law alone is not the best way to introduce competition in the telecommunications market. Therefore, sector-specific regulation has been used to promote competition. In some jurisdictions, it works together with competition law, such as in the EU and Chile. In others, they are incompatible, such as the US. Emulated competition rules could have a higher impact on competition law when they are complements. The research also proposes a model for considering non-economic objectives in competition law matters, and it is a breakthrough in the debate of how to incorporate them in such situations. Finally, the emulated competition concept provides a systematic way of dealing with the intended and unintended effects of pro-competition regulatory tools. The concept itself summarises the contribution to the literature.

The graduation thesis "Legal Matters of the Electronic Communications Market" maps the complete system of the economic, historic and particularly the legal consequences of the contemporary conception of the regulation of the e-communications market. It is focused primarily on the relationship between the ex ante regulation and the ex post remedy of the market failure, it monitors the development of how the public interest in providing these services has developed with the reference to the universal service, and it provides a detailed analysis of the new European regulatory framework of the e-communications market that has been accepted in November 2009.

Airport regulation regimes are under revision in many countries. The decision about the extent of airport regulation is based on an economic analysis of market power, which is done in two steps. The first step involves defining the relevant markets the airport is operating on. This in turn is based on an economic analysis of the particular circumstances of the airport, and must be compatible with competition law. The second step consists of the evaluation of the airport's competitive position in all identified markets. Due to industry particularities, many diverse issues must be taken into account in this process, such as questions of upstream and downstream market interaction, airport congestion, peak-load pricing, or offsetting bargaining power. Many of these questions have been theoretically analyzed in the industrial organization literature, but have only rarely been applied in practical competition analysis with respect to airports. This paper builds a bridge between the theoretical insights and their practical application to airport regulation policy. We derive the principles for a sound economic analysis of the market power of airports, given the time and data constraints encountered in practice by the regulatory authorities and other involved parties, and propose a general framework for the analysis of market power of airports. We focus on hub airports, as the analysis of these gateways covers all the relevant issues, including countervailing power of the hub operator.

Submitted by Cristiane Shirayama (cristiane.shirayama@fgv.br) on 2011-08-20T18:31:28Z No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE_MARCELO JOSE RANIERI CARDOSO.pdf: 1849424 bytes, checksum: 45715ba0069ac749c323de7081febcba (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel (gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-08-22T12:13:19Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE_MARCELO JOSE RANIERI CARDOSO.pdf: 1849424 bytes, checksum: 45715ba0069ac749c323de7081febcba (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel (gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-08-22T12:25:41Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE_MARCELO JOSE RANIERI CARDOSO.pdf: 1849424 bytes, checksum: 45715ba0069ac749c323de7081febcba (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-08-22T13:57:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE_MARCELO JOSE RANIERI CARDOSO.pdf: 1849424 bytes, checksum: 45715ba0069ac749c323de7081febcba (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-23 / Maintaining a healthy banking system and with levels of competition to stimulate the supply of financial products that meets society's needs is a desirable goal, but very difficult to be achieved. A major existing difficulty is the fact competes in the same area of regulatory issues topics related to stability and competition issues - A trade-off that is not a consensus. Clearly, the banking systems are essential in the capital flows processing and in the administration of the intermediation between credit savers and borrowers (Freixas and Roche, 2007). This activity has a strong characteristic of solvency risk (Diammond and Dybvig, 1983) but yet there is no reasonable agreement about the causes and way to regulate it (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). On these issues, we developed a historical and institutional analysis in order to contextualize the current condition in Brazil. It is worth noting that in the banking sector, there is no consensus on how to measure some important variables for the Literature of Industrial Organization, such as Market Power and Competition Level. In due to contribute to the methodological discussion about the databases and models of competition, tests were carried out with the models Bresnahan and Lau (1982), Panzar and Rosse (1987) and Boone (2008), besides the usual measures of concentration Cn and HHI, evaluating the banking sector by Units Banks (CNPJ) and the Financial Conglomerates. The tests show there is statistical differences in the use of these bases from 2004. Another existent gap is the lack of models for the simulation of variations in supply of credit promoted by changes in the structure or in competition mode. This work also includes contributions to understanding of relationships of Market Power and the Level of Competition of the Banking Loan Market Brazil's. For this purpose, we performed tests on a structure of production function, where the results confirmed the classical hypotheses regarding the use of market power unilaterally and scale efficiency, in the level of the conglomerate banking. / A manutenção de um sistema bancário hígido e com níveis de concorrência que estimulem a oferta de produtos financeiros que atendam à sociedade é um objetivo desejável, porém difícil de ser atingido. A dificuldade resine no trade-off, ainda não consensual, entre questões ligadas à estabilidade sistêmica e questões concorrenciais. Claramente, os sistemas bancários são indispensáveis no processamento de fluxo de capitais e na administração da intermediação entre poupadores e tomadores de crédito (Freixas e Roche, 2007). Essa atividade tem a característica marcante de risco de solvência (Diammond e Dybvig, 1983), mas, ainda assim, não há conformidade de motivo e forma de regulá-la (Dewatripont e Tirole, 1994). Sobre estas questões desenvolvemos uma análise histórico-institucional com o objetivo de contextualizar o estado atual no Brasil. Vale notar que, no setor bancário, também não há consenso sobre as formas de mensurar variáveis importantes para a literatura de Organização Industrial, como Poder de Mercado e Nível de Concorrência. Para contribuir com a discussão metodológica quanto às bases de dados e aos modelos de competição, foram realizados testes com os modelos Bresnahan e Lau (1982), Panzar e Rosse (1987) e Boone (2008), além das medidas usuais de concentração Cn e HHI, avaliando o setor bancário pelas unidades bancárias (CNPJ) e pelos Conglomerados Financeiros. Os testes apontam diferença estatística no uso destas bases a partir de 2004. Outra lacuna existente na literatura é a ausência de modelos para a simulação das variações da oferta de crédito provenientes de variações na estrutura ou modo de competição. Este trabalho também traz contribuições no entendimento das relações de Poder de Mercado e Nível de Competição no Mercado de Empréstimos Bancário brasileiro. Para tanto, são realizados testes, sobre uma estrutura de função de produção, onde os resultados confirmam as hipóteses clássicas quanto ao uso de poder de mercado de forma unilateral e à eficiência de escala, no nível do conglomerado bancário.