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Yes / This chapter evaluates the consistency of the United Kingdom (UK) regulatory framework on shale gas with Commission Recommendation 2014/70/EU on minimum principles for the exploration and production of unconventional oil and gas. In the absence of European-wide legislation, European Union (EU) Member States have the right to determine the conditions for exploiting their unconventional energy sources. However, due to the environmental and human health risks associated with hydraulic fracturing, the EU has expressed its interest in ensuring adequate protection of the environment and to creating clear and transparent common standards for the benefit of operators, investors and the public while promoting the interests of those Member States which are currently exploring unconventional energy. It can be argued that the UK regime has been designed to address the environmental risks arising from hydraulic fracturing operations and as such it sets a high environmental threshold for operations. In fact, the UK legislation appears to be more comprehensive than in many other jurisdictions commercially exploiting shale gas, and therefore it has a potential to inform the content of any future harmonising measures on the exploration and extraction of such resources at the EU level.

Submitted by ANDRÉ LUÍS SCANTIMBURGO null (andre_luis907@yahoo.com.br) on 2016-10-11T00:17:40Z No. of bitstreams: 1 scantimburgo_al_do_mar.pdf: 2861208 bytes, checksum: 6ecd86448bef8c732620dde22a8ed880 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Juliano Benedito Ferreira (julianoferreira@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-10-17T17:56:03Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 scantimburgo_al_dr_mar.pdf: 2861208 bytes, checksum: 6ecd86448bef8c732620dde22a8ed880 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-10-17T17:56:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 scantimburgo_al_dr_mar.pdf: 2861208 bytes, checksum: 6ecd86448bef8c732620dde22a8ed880 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-08-25 / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) / As agências reguladoras são consequências da Reforma do Estado realizada nos anos 1990 e de acordo com seus formuladores elas possuem a função de estabelecer regras e fiscalizar serviços e atividades econômicas que não mais seriam exercidas exclusivamente pelo Estado. Nesse contexto foi formulada a Agência Nacional de Águas (ANA), vinculada ao Ministério do Meio Ambiente e estabelecida através da lei 9.984 de julho de 2000. A criação de uma agência reguladora para o setor de águas, que passou ser a responsável pelas concessões de outorga e por coordenar a cobrança pelo uso da água em âmbito federal, complementou a lei 9.433/97 que estabeleceu a Política Nacional de Recursos Hídricos (PNRH). Assim, nosso objetivo geral é analisar a atuação da ANA frente aos diversos interesses que surgem em torno do controle dos recursos hídricos e entender qual seu papel diante dos conflitos que emanam dos usos múltiplos da água, para em seguida questionar qual sua real independência em relação às pressões e interesses a que ela está suscetível. A água é cada vez mais um recurso indispensável para os processos de acumulação e reprodução do capital, seja em setores usuários industriais, agrícolas, serviços, mineração ou geração de energia. Dessa maneira, a intenção aqui foi demonstrar que o regime regulatório do setor de recursos hídricos, ao atuar no sentido de tentar impor uma política hegemônica que trata a água em grande medida como um recurso econômico a ser gerido de forma instrumental, não se comprometeu em resguardar os interesses públicos no acesso a esse bem vital, ou mesmo apresentar soluções viáveis para os quadros de degradação e conflitos socioambientais. É nesse sentido que entendemos que a ANA, bem como toda a nova estrutura legal para o setor que se estabeleceu a partir da PNRH, embora assumisse um discurso de modernização, preocupação ambiental e gestão democrática, não foi capaz de alterar o controle das águas historicamente estabelecido no país, e desse modo, se sobrepôs às distintas formas de apropriação da natureza que não se enquadram dentro dos perfis capitalistas hegemônicos. / Regulatory agencies are consequences for State Reform held in the 1990s, and according to its authors they have to establish rules and oversee services and economic activities that would no longer be exercised exclusively by the state. In this context was formulated the National Water Agency (ANA), attached the Ministry of the Environment, established by Law 9984 of July 2000. The creation of a regulatory agency for the water sector, responsible for concessions and for coordinating charging for water use at federal level, complemented the law 9.433 / 97 which established the National water Resources Policy (PNRH). Thus, the general objective is to analyze the performance of ANA front of diverse interests that arise around the control of water resources, and understand your their role in relation to the conflicts emanating from the multiple uses of water, and then question their real independence in relation to pressures and interests to which it is susceptible. Water is increasingly an indispensable resource for the processes of accumulation and reproduction of capital, be in industrial, agriculture, services, mining or power generation. Therefore, the intention here was to demonstrate that the regulatory regime of the water sector, imposes a hegemonic way of management that treats water largely as an economic resource. Withal, the water policies they are managed in instrumental form, and not commits to protect the public interest in access to this vital resource, or present viable solutions for degradation of environment and environmental conflicts. It is in this sense that we understand that the ANA, and all the new legal framework for the sector that was established from the PNRH although assume a discourse of modernization, environmental concern and democratic management, was not able to change the water control historically established in the country, and ignored the various forms of appropriation of nature that do not fall within the hegemonic capitalist profiles. / FAPESP: 2013/14016-6