This paper looks at the difference in disclosure requirements between the foreign earnings that companies plan to repatriate back to the United States and those that companies plan to permanently reinvest abroad. The concepts of transparency and compliance are addressed as issues related to the current disclosure requirements surrounding permanently reinvested earnings and the associated unrecognized deferred tax liability. The resulting implications on investors as well as the effects of tax holidays will also be discussed. Overall, this paper aims to prove the need for modification of the current disclosure requirements regarding foreign earnings labeled as permanently reinvested earnings as well as stricter regulation of these requirements in order to increase company compliance.

In recent years, the impact of the permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) assertion on the financial reporting environment has grown tremendously. Under Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 740, a firm making the PRE assertion is able to avoid recognizing residual U.S. taxes on earnings of its foreign subsidiaries so long as it reinvests those earnings outside of the U.S. Suboptimal reinvestment is a potential consequence for PRE-asserting firms due to limited reinvestment opportunities abroad. Suboptimal foreign reinvestment, typically high amounts of reinvestment in financial assets, may be viewed negatively by financial statement users, particularly those users concerned with the default risk of a firm. The disclosure of PRE-related information varies substantially and the actual degree of compliance with this accounting standard has been questioned by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). While firms may believe it is advantageous to obscure their PRE-related activity due to media or political concerns, recent academic literature has highlighted a negative relation between disclosure quality in financial statements and credit risk. The purpose of this study is to examine the relations among foreign reinvestment strategy, PRE disclosure, and long-term credit ratings. First, I examine the direct effect of a firm's reinvestment strategy on its long-term credit rating. Second, I investigate the relation between a firm's reinvestment strategy and its choice to disclose PRE-related information. Third, I study the relation between a firm's choice to disclose PRE-related information and its long-term credit rating. Finally, I examine the potential attenuating effect of the PRE disclosure on the negative relation between financial reinvestment and credit ratings. Using hand collected PRE data for Fortune 500 firms from 1997-2010, I find a negative relation between the intensity of a firm's reinvestment in financial assets and its (1) long-term credit rating and (2) choice to disclose PRE-related information. Furthermore, I find a positive relation between a firm's choice to disclose PRE and its credit rating. / Ph. D. / In recent years, U.S. multinational companies (MNCs) have been criticized by politicians and media members for using accounting and tax rules to avoid recognizing and paying substantial amounts of tax. Under U.S. accounting rules, U.S. MNCs include the earnings of both domestic and foreign subsidiaries in their net income for financial statement reporting purposes. Furthermore, companies are required to recognize income tax expense on the earnings from both domestic and foreign subsidiaries; this income tax expense recognition lowers companies’ net income. However, companies may make the permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) assertion, allowing them to avoid recognizing income tax expense on the income earned from foreign subsidiaries so long as they reinvest those earnings outside the U.S. Therefore, companies making the PRE assertion capture the income earned from foreign subsidiaries without the penalty of recognizing income tax expense. In order to make the PRE assertion, companies must (1) have a foreign reinvestment plan or strategy and (2) disclose required PRErelated information in the footnotes to their financial statements. One consequence of making the PRE assertion is suboptimal foreign reinvestment in financial assets (cash hoarding, financial investments with low returns, etc.). This may be viewed negatively by financial statement users, particularly those users concerned with the credit risk of a company. I investigate the relations among the effects of making the PRE assertion, (1) company reinvestment strategy and (2) financial statement disclosure quality, and the perception of a company’s credit risk. First, I find that companies more heavily reinvested in financial assets than operating assets (buildings, equipment, etc.) are (1) viewed negatively by credit rating analysts and (2) less likely to disclose PRE-related information. Second, I find that companies disclosing PRE-related information are viewed more favorably by credit rating analysts. Collectively, the results of this study indicate that (1) a company’s reinvestment strategy and its PRE disclosure quality are viewed as risk relevant by credit rating analysts and (2) a company with a reinvestment strategy focused on financial assets is less likely to disclose PRE-related information.

Segundo a teoria da firma, uma empresa é um nexo de relações contratuais entre os seus diversos participantes. Nessas relações contratuais, que não são perfeitas, surgem os problemas de agência, decorridos da assimetria informacional e dos conflitos de interesses entre o contratado e o contratante, no caso, agente e principal. Neste caso, quando se tem a intenção de alinhar os interesses entre eles, aparece a governança corporativa, atuando como um meio de minimizar os conflitos e diferenças existentes e corrigir as falhas presentes no processo de comunicação e informação das firmas. No Brasil, diante da fraca proteção legal aos acionistas minoritários, da alta concentração de propriedade nas empresas e da separação dos acionistas entre ordinários e preferenciais, algumas medidas institucionais e governamentais têm sido tomadas ao longo dos anos com o objetivo de contribuir com a evolução das práticas de governança corporativa no país. Uma dessas iniciativas foi a criação em 2000 do segmento Novo Mercado pela Bovespa, composto por regras e exigências crescentes em relação às boas práticas de governança. Nesse sentido, é coerente pensar que a política de dividendos, antes influenciada pela necessidade de atuar também como instrumento de redução de conflitos entre os acionistas, passou a ser decidida a partir de um foco preponderantemente gerencial pelas companhias deste segmento, ou seja, tomada do ponto de vista financeiro de maximização da riqueza dos acionistas. Para testar esta suposição, adotou-se o modelo conceitual da Teoria Residual dos Dividendos, estabelecidos pioneiramente por Modigliani e Miller (1961) e revisitado por Jensen (1986) na Teoria Free Cash Flow. Assim, conduziu-se um levantamento do Fluxo de Caixa Livre do Acionista (FCLA) para todas as companhias listadas no Novo Mercado da BM&FBovespa desde a sua criação até o ano de 2011. O objetivo foi investigar o perfil da política de dividendos dessas empresas, a partir da avaliação de como elas administram o FCLA. Além disso, foi testado se as decisões sobre a destinação do saldo de FCLA impactaram na rentabilidade do acionista, expressa pela Taxa de Retorno da Ação (TRA). Como proposta secundária, foram pesquisados também os fluxos de reinvestimento dos lucros destas companhias, buscando verificar se os acionistas são recompensados por maiores ganhos de capital em contrapartida pelo não recebimento de dividendos e, também, onde são alocados os lucros reinvestidos. Como resultado, constatou-se que grande parte das companhias apresentaram elevados níveis de sobreinvestimento no período, provocado pela retenção do FCLA, e que este problema pode ter sido a causa de uma Taxa de Retorno da Ação menor em alguns setores. Adicionalmente, foi observado que as empresas que mais retiveram lucro, ao longo do tempo, foram também as que proporcionaram os maiores retornos de ganhos de capital aos seus acionistas. Por fim, detectou-se que os lucros retidos pelas companhias foram reaplicados, em sua grande maioria, em investimentos relacionados à expansão ou manutenção de suas capacidades produtivas (capital fixo), embora a maior parcela deles acabasse não sendo identificada em nenhum dos ativos expressos pelo balanço patrimonial contábil. / According to the theory of the firm, the firm is a nexus of contractual relationships between its various participants. Such contractual relations, which are not perfect, agency problems arise, elapsed the information asymmetry and conflicts of interest between the engaged and the contractor, where, agent and principal. In this case, when it is intended to align the interests between them, appears to corporate governance, acting as a means to minimize conflicts and differences existing and correct the faults present in the process of communication and information firms. In Brazil, due to the weak legal protection for minority shareholders, the high concentration of ownership in firms and the separation between common and preferred shareholders, some institutional and government measures have been taken over the years in order to contribute to the evolution of corporate governance practices in the country. One such initiative was the creation in 2000 of the Novo Mercado segment by the Bovespa, composed of rules and increasing requirements in relation to good governance practices. Therefore, it is coherent to think that the dividend policy before influenced by the need to act as an instrument for reducing conflicts between shareholders, has to be decided from a managerial focus by companies in this segment, that is, the financial point of view of maximizing shareholder wealth. To test this assumption, we adopted the conceptual model of the Residual Theory of Dividends, established pioneered by Modigliani and Miller (1961) and revisited by Jensen (1986) in the Free Cash Flow Theory. Thus, we conducted a survey of Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE) for all companies listed on the Novo Mercado of the BM&FBovespa since its inception until the year 2011. The aim was to investigate the profile of the dividend policy of these companies, based on the evaluation of how they manage the FCFE. Furthermore, was tested whether if decisions on the allocation of the balance of FCFE impacted the profitability of the shareholder, expressed by the Rate of Stock Return (RSR). As proposed secondary, were surveyed the flows of reinvestment of profits these companies, seeking first check whether the shareholders are rewarded by higher capital gains in return for non-receipt of dividends, and also where they are allocated reinvested earnings. As a result, it was found that most companies had high levels of overinvestment during the period, caused by retention of FCFE and that this problem may have been the cause of a Rate of Stock Return lower in some sectors. Additionally, it was observed that companies that retained earnings, over time, were also the ones that provided the highest returns of capital gains to its shareholders. Finally, it was found that profits retained by the companies were reapplied mostly in investments related to the expansion or maintenance of their productive capacity (capital assets), while the largest portion of them end up not being identified in any of the assets of the balance sheet accounting.

Segundo a teoria da firma, uma empresa é um nexo de relações contratuais entre os seus diversos participantes. Nessas relações contratuais, que não são perfeitas, surgem os problemas de agência, decorridos da assimetria informacional e dos conflitos de interesses entre o contratado e o contratante, no caso, agente e principal. Neste caso, quando se tem a intenção de alinhar os interesses entre eles, aparece a governança corporativa, atuando como um meio de minimizar os conflitos e diferenças existentes e corrigir as falhas presentes no processo de comunicação e informação das firmas. No Brasil, diante da fraca proteção legal aos acionistas minoritários, da alta concentração de propriedade nas empresas e da separação dos acionistas entre ordinários e preferenciais, algumas medidas institucionais e governamentais têm sido tomadas ao longo dos anos com o objetivo de contribuir com a evolução das práticas de governança corporativa no país. Uma dessas iniciativas foi a criação em 2000 do segmento Novo Mercado pela Bovespa, composto por regras e exigências crescentes em relação às boas práticas de governança. Nesse sentido, é coerente pensar que a política de dividendos, antes influenciada pela necessidade de atuar também como instrumento de redução de conflitos entre os acionistas, passou a ser decidida a partir de um foco preponderantemente gerencial pelas companhias deste segmento, ou seja, tomada do ponto de vista financeiro de maximização da riqueza dos acionistas. Para testar esta suposição, adotou-se o modelo conceitual da Teoria Residual dos Dividendos, estabelecidos pioneiramente por Modigliani e Miller (1961) e revisitado por Jensen (1986) na Teoria Free Cash Flow. Assim, conduziu-se um levantamento do Fluxo de Caixa Livre do Acionista (FCLA) para todas as companhias listadas no Novo Mercado da BM&FBovespa desde a sua criação até o ano de 2011. O objetivo foi investigar o perfil da política de dividendos dessas empresas, a partir da avaliação de como elas administram o FCLA. Além disso, foi testado se as decisões sobre a destinação do saldo de FCLA impactaram na rentabilidade do acionista, expressa pela Taxa de Retorno da Ação (TRA). Como proposta secundária, foram pesquisados também os fluxos de reinvestimento dos lucros destas companhias, buscando verificar se os acionistas são recompensados por maiores ganhos de capital em contrapartida pelo não recebimento de dividendos e, também, onde são alocados os lucros reinvestidos. Como resultado, constatou-se que grande parte das companhias apresentaram elevados níveis de sobreinvestimento no período, provocado pela retenção do FCLA, e que este problema pode ter sido a causa de uma Taxa de Retorno da Ação menor em alguns setores. Adicionalmente, foi observado que as empresas que mais retiveram lucro, ao longo do tempo, foram também as que proporcionaram os maiores retornos de ganhos de capital aos seus acionistas. Por fim, detectou-se que os lucros retidos pelas companhias foram reaplicados, em sua grande maioria, em investimentos relacionados à expansão ou manutenção de suas capacidades produtivas (capital fixo), embora a maior parcela deles acabasse não sendo identificada em nenhum dos ativos expressos pelo balanço patrimonial contábil. / According to the theory of the firm, the firm is a nexus of contractual relationships between its various participants. Such contractual relations, which are not perfect, agency problems arise, elapsed the information asymmetry and conflicts of interest between the engaged and the contractor, where, agent and principal. In this case, when it is intended to align the interests between them, appears to corporate governance, acting as a means to minimize conflicts and differences existing and correct the faults present in the process of communication and information firms. In Brazil, due to the weak legal protection for minority shareholders, the high concentration of ownership in firms and the separation between common and preferred shareholders, some institutional and government measures have been taken over the years in order to contribute to the evolution of corporate governance practices in the country. One such initiative was the creation in 2000 of the Novo Mercado segment by the Bovespa, composed of rules and increasing requirements in relation to good governance practices. Therefore, it is coherent to think that the dividend policy before influenced by the need to act as an instrument for reducing conflicts between shareholders, has to be decided from a managerial focus by companies in this segment, that is, the financial point of view of maximizing shareholder wealth. To test this assumption, we adopted the conceptual model of the Residual Theory of Dividends, established pioneered by Modigliani and Miller (1961) and revisited by Jensen (1986) in the Free Cash Flow Theory. Thus, we conducted a survey of Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE) for all companies listed on the Novo Mercado of the BM&FBovespa since its inception until the year 2011. The aim was to investigate the profile of the dividend policy of these companies, based on the evaluation of how they manage the FCFE. Furthermore, was tested whether if decisions on the allocation of the balance of FCFE impacted the profitability of the shareholder, expressed by the Rate of Stock Return (RSR). As proposed secondary, were surveyed the flows of reinvestment of profits these companies, seeking first check whether the shareholders are rewarded by higher capital gains in return for non-receipt of dividends, and also where they are allocated reinvested earnings. As a result, it was found that most companies had high levels of overinvestment during the period, caused by retention of FCFE and that this problem may have been the cause of a Rate of Stock Return lower in some sectors. Additionally, it was observed that companies that retained earnings, over time, were also the ones that provided the highest returns of capital gains to its shareholders. Finally, it was found that profits retained by the companies were reapplied mostly in investments related to the expansion or maintenance of their productive capacity (capital assets), while the largest portion of them end up not being identified in any of the assets of the balance sheet accounting.