In 2003 a panic was created about the introduction of a new model of sex education in South Australia known as the Sexual Health and Relationships Education (SHARE) project. This thesis explores the particular circumstances and conditions that enabled the SHARE project to emerge as a public problem in South Australia in 2003. It does this through analyzing the similarities and differences between the campaign against SHARE and others that have taken place against sex education in Australia and the US since the 1980s in terms of the organisations involved, the strategies used and the fears/moral panics invoked and evoked. I use the controversy created against the SHARE project as a starting point, not only to produce an historical account of a particular event in sex education in Australia but also to contribute to an understanding of the power dynamics that govern sexuality locally and in a broader global context. The methodological approach used in this thesis includes an analysis of ‘local discursivities’ relating to the SHARE project and the genealogy of those discourses. Following Foucault and queer and feminist applications of his work, the thesis particularly explores how discourses relating to ‘homosexuality’ and ‘child abuse’ were deployed in the campaign against the SHARE project. The thesis then identifies alternative discourses and approaches that can strengthen sex education programs in Australia based on the lessons learnt from the campaign against the SHARE project. To assist my analysis of the controversy about the SHARE project interviews were conducted with other educators who have produced sex education resources in Australia. These revealed that while there has been some opposition to sex education in Australia over the last 20 years this has not been well organised or sustained. The campaign against the SHARE project therefore represents a unique event in the history of sex education in Australia. The thesis argues that one major contributing factor to this event is the strengthening of the relationship between conservative political parties and evangelical activist groups in Australia and their use of tactics and materials developed by Christian Right groups in the United States. The thesis analyses the implications of this religious activism within the context of current Australian politics and assesses whether the ‘family values’ discourse, which was central to the controversy created about the SHARE project, is positioned any differently as a result of the recent changes in political leadership in Australia and the United States. / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Social Sciences, 2010

La liberté religieuse est une liberté fondamentale reconnue dans les démocraties. Elle est invoquée devant la Cour européenne par des religions mais aussi par des individus. Les nouveaux cultes et leurs adeptes acquièrent des droits collectifs et individuels plus étendus. En France, des principes fondamentaux conduisent le législateur et le juge à consacrer et garantir le pluralisme religieux : toutes les croyances ont la même valeur. Chacun est libre de pratiquer sa religion en public ou en privé, notamment dans sa famille. Le juge garantit le respect de la conscience de l’individu lorsqu’il est saisi. Mais la libre pratique religieuse des membres de la famille connait certaines limites qui sont purement objectives et non fonction du type d’appartenance religieuse. Pourtant, la perception du phénomène religieux par les autorités n’est pas toujours égalitaire. Le traitement politique, social et judiciaire des religions minoritaires notamment, remet parfois en cause le pluralisme. Si l’appréciation in concreto des situations par le juge est le principe, le manque d’homogénéité de la jurisprudence, qui met en exergue certains préjugés, ajouté aux réticences des juges du droit à contrôler plus avant les motivations des juges du fonds, entament la garantie du pluralisme. Les condamnations de la Cour européenne le montrent. Les difficultés concernent notamment les questions de l’appréciation de la faute, cause de divorce, ou de l’intérêt de l’enfant. La référence à un standard, étalon d’une bonne pratique religieuse, est parfois latente. En la matière, l’analyse souveraine des juges du fond est souvent sacralisée, ce qui peut poser des difficultés, tout comme le manque d’ouverture de certains experts qui rendent des avis qui peuvent, in fine, avoir un impact fort sur le juge. L’absence de pré-majorité religieuse et l’application stricte du principe de laïcité à l’école posent aussi certains problèmes. Les solutions étrangères sont intéressantes sur ces questions. / Religious freedom is a fundamental freedom recognised by democracies. Not only religious groups, but also individuals, bring it up before the European Court. New religious groups and their members are granted more collective and individual rights. In France, fundamental principles bring legislators and judges to define and guarantee religious pluralism: all beliefs are equal. Everyone is free to practice his or her religion in public or in private, especially within the family. Judges referred to guarantee that the individual conscience will be respected. Nevertheless, the free religious practice of family members has objective limits, regardless of the religion one belongs to. Still, the way the authorities view the religious practice is not always the same. The political, social and legal treatment of minority religions in particular puts sometimes religious pluralism in question. Even if usually the judge appreciates situations in concreto, pluralism sometimes fails to be guaranteed due to a lack of homogeneity in the jurisprudence, tainted with prejudice, as well as the reticences of the ordinary judges to check more in depth the motivations of the trial judges. The condemnations of the European Courts are proof to this. The difficulties concern for the most part the appreciation of the fault, cause for divorce, or of the interest of the child. The reference to a standard of good religious practice is sometimes latent. In this matter, the expertise of the trial judges is often considered as sacred, and this can lead to some difficulties, as well as the lack of open-mindness of some experts who give opinions that can, in fine, influence the judge. The absence of religious age pre-majority and the strict application of the principle of secularism at school also pose some problems. Foreign solutions on this matter are interesting.