Since the start of the financial crisis in 2008, the Federal Reserve has been engaging in quantitative easing. Quantitative easing is a form of open market operation in which the Federal Reserve buys long-term U.S. government and other securities, versus traditional open market operations that occur through the short-term Treasury bill market. At the same time, the shadow bank system, which is a system of financial intermediaries that perform unregulated credit intermediation outside of traditional banks, has contracted significantly. Some argue that this contraction is due to a collateral crunch induced by quantitative easing in the shadow bank system—a crunch that occurred when the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing program took high-quality collateral off the market. I will focus specifically on repurchase agreements, an instrument within the shadow banking that uses the same types of securities that the Federal Reserve has been buying during quantitative easing as collateral, to determine whether quantitative easing has led to a contraction of the repurchase agreement market. I find that increases in Federal Reserve asset holdings from 2005-2013, and specifically during QE1, are associated with decreases in primary dealer repurchase agreements. This shows that under certain circumstances, Federal Reserve asset purchases lead to contractions in the shadow bank system. This paper aims to increase understanding of how monetary policy affects shadow banking and understanding of the unintended consequences of monetary policy, such as decreased shadow bank lending caused by quantitative easing.

Vi undersöker tillgångsrecognition vid återköpsavtal med garanterade restvärden, och hur köpare kan redovisa transaktionen för en materiell anläggningstillgång när avtalet innehåller en återköpsoption. Studien behandlar frågan om kontroll över tillgångar, konsekvenser av koherens respektive inkoherens för finansiella rapporters användbarhet, samt huruvida redovisningen reflekterar återköpsavtals ekonomiska substans. Vi genomför en innehållsanalys för att systematiskt kartlägga köparens olika redovisningsalternativ. Vidare används typfall för att möjliggöra analys av identifierade standarder och riktlinjers tillämpning. Vi finner att IFRS saknar transaktionsspecifika riktlinjer som riktar sig mot köparen. De standarder och riktlinjer som i det principbaserade redovisningssystemet finns tillgängliga för tolkning är vaga, i den bemärkelse att de lämnar utrymme för olikheter i bedömningar, vilket i sin tur har en negativ effekt på finansiella rapporter jämförbarhet och användbarhet. Vidare identifierar studien bristen på tydliga riktlinjer som en risk för medveten manipulation och förekomst av earnings management. / We examine asset recognition for repurchase agreements with guaranteed residual values, and how buyers can account for the transaction for a tangible fixed asset when the contract contains a repurchase option. The study deals with the issue of control over the asset, the consequences of symmetry and asymmetry for the usefulness of financial reports and whether the accounting reflects the financial substance of repurchase agreements. We conduct a content analysis to systematically map out the buyer's different accounting options. Furthermore, typical cases are used to enable analysis of identified standards and guidelines. We find that IFRS lacks transaction-specific guidelines that target the buyer. The standards and guidelines that are available for interpretation in the principle-based accounting system are vague in that they leave room for differences in assessments, which in turn have a negative effect on comparability and usefulness in financial reports. Furthermore, the study identifies the lack of clear guidelines as a risk of deliberate manipulation and the occurrence of earnings management.This paper is written in Swedish.

i Abstract Recent financial crisis resulting in global financial instability pointed at the importance of growing shadow banking. Shadow banking activities are gen- erally defined as banking-like activities outside of regulated banking. In this thesis, we study theoretical background of shadow banking, its regulation and supervision. Despite the data availability problem, a qualitative analysis is performed to estimate the volume of the European and the U.S. shadow bank- ing sectors from 2006 until 2013 Q2. European shadow banking system hit its bottom of EUR 8.3 trillion (19% of total European bank assets) in 2008 Q4. Nowadays, it equals to EUR 9.3 trillion (21% of total European bank assets). U.S. shadow banking sector attained its maximum of USD 20.7 trillion (163% of total U.S. bank assets) in 2008 Q1. Nowadays, it equals to USD 15.6 tril- lion which also equals to total U.S. bank assets. Moreover, we concentrate on Chinese money market funds and French and UK repo markets, since these represent an important part of shadow banking. Quantitative analysis studies relationships among traditional banking, shadow banking and economy itself in France and UK. Results show that if repo transactions, GDP and government debt increase, total bank assets increase. Furthermore, if money market fund assets decrease and...

Les contrats civils appliqués aux actions ont pour finalité le transfert, souvent provisoire, des différents droits politiques et financiers inhérents à ces titres : les droits politiques convoités sont le droit de vote et la qualité d’actionnaire afin de devenir administrateur, si les statuts l’imposent ; les droits financiers permettent quant à eux de transmettre l’entreprise et d’utiliser les actions comme garantie. Pour opérer ces transferts, les praticiens utilisent des contrats classiques, souvent issus du Code civil, mais aussi des contrats d’inspiration civiliste qui emploient des techniques civilistes, leur empruntent une partie de leurs régimes juridiques et poursuivent les mêmes finalités. Toutefois, ces contrats ne donnent pas entière satisfaction : les uns ont un régime juridique souple mais n’offrent pas une sécurité juridique suffisante ; les autres sont au contraire fiables mais affligés d’un régime juridique contraignant. Le législateur, en instituant la fiducie, pouvait remédier à ces inconvénients. Mais si la fiducie offre une grande sécurité juridique, c’est toujours au détriment de la liberté contractuelle. Une nouvelle réforme de la fiducie est donc indispensable. / Civilian contracts applied to shares are intended to transfer, often temporary, different political and financial rights inherent to these shares : the coveted political rights include the right to vote and the share holder to become a director, if the corporation charter so require ; the financial rights allow to enable them to transfer the business and use the shares as guarantee. In making such transfers,practitioners use standard contracts, often from the Civil Code, but also contracts inspired by civiliantechniques who employ techniques civilians, borrow some of their legal systems and pursue the same aims. However, these contracts are not entirely satisfactory : some have a flexible legal system but do not offer sufficient legal certainty, the others are reliable but afflicted by a binding legal regime. The legislator, in establishing the trust, could overcome these drawbacks. But if the trust provides greater legal certainty, it is always at the expense of the freedom of contract. A new reform of the trust isessential.