Semiconductor industry, especially IC manafacture has been one of the most important high-tech industries in Taiwan since 1970¡¦s. The first professional wafer Fab, called ¡§wafer labor¡¨, was build up in Taiwan and has currently gained more than 60% market share in the wafer market of the world. This kind of industry is usually characterized as ¡§capital intensity¡¨, ¡§technology intensity¡¨ and ¡§short productive life cycle¡¨. Along with the innovation of technology and the internationalization of industry, more and more enterprises have been engaged in the fierce and intensive competition in all senses. Consequently, all of them have to possibly renew and modify their products, facilities and technologies with their limited resources so as to find their own way of making profits constantly. A correct investment decision not only contributes to the constant growth of enterprises, but also helps push up the industrial competitive capacity. Therefore, in the current project, I will try to work out an appropriate method for making investment policy. My concern will basically focuses on the distribution proportion of capital by arguing that the capacity expansion expenditures and research & development expenses are supposed to be included in the capital expenditures of wafer labor industry. However, with regard to the appropriateness of this project, I will also take the so-called ¡§dynamic complexity¡¨ into consideration, which is usually characterized by the phenomena of ¡§Information feedback¡¨, ¡§Time delay¡¨ and ¡§Non-linearity¡¨. If the capital is limited, the relationship between capacity expansion expenditures and research & development expenses are supposed to be definied as a ¡§trade-off¡¨ relationship. The increase of one side will lead to the decrease of the other side and finally leads to in the reduction in profits. Due to the capacity of System Dynamics for sloving the problem of dynamic complexity (Forrester, 1961), I will adopt System Dynamics as the main research method in the current project and to work out an appropriate method for making wafer labor industrial policy. By taking the capital distribution into consideration, I will try to construct a possibly appropriate investment model and herewith make some remarks or suggestions for the investment policy. Some research results will be displayed in the current project: 1. In any case, there is a certain distribution proportion which optimizes the entire profits. The task is to simulate an appropriate one respectively for different scenarios. 2. The increase in the proportion of research & development expenses might lead to the reduction of profits. 3. By using this model, the enterprise can find out the most appropriate policy for distributing the capital and achieving their maximal profit.

本研究透過不同股權結構來探討傳統代理問題與核心代理問題對於研發支出投入程度之影響。 本研究將具有金字塔結構或交叉持股結構之企業分類為股權集中之企業，而將不具有金字塔結構或交叉持股結構之企業分類為股權分散之企業。實證分析顯示，在股權分散情況下，傳統代理問題的降低有助於研發支出之提升。其中，董事長兼任總經理、經理人持股比率、董監事持股比率、大股東持股比率、法人持股比率及獨立董事席次比率皆對研發支出之投入有正相關影響。在股權集中情況下，核心代理問題的降低也有助於研發支出之投入。 此外，相較於股權分散之企業，股權集中之企業有著較高的研發支出投入，代表股權集中之企業較有辦法投入較多資源於研發支出上。而透過交乘項之實證分析後，發現相對於股權集中之企業，若股權分散之企業的傳統代理問題能降低，那麼會更有效地提高研發支出以提升企業經營績效。同理也得知，在相對於股權分散之企業，股權集中之企業之核心代理問題若能降低，那麼會更有效地提高研發支出以提升公司價值。 / Based on ownership structures, this study investigates the effects of type I and type II agency problem on R&D expenses for innovation investments. This study classifies both pyramid ownership structure and cross-holding ownership structure as ownership-concentrated structure while others ownership-dispersed structure. The empirical results indicate that under ownership-dispersed structure, the reduction in type I agency problems increases research and development (R&D) expenses in innovation investments. The ways that reduce type I agency problem and boost innovation investments include CEO duality, executive ownership, corporate ownership, block ownership, institutional ownership, and the percentage of board seats held by independent directors. Under the case of ownership-concentrated structure, reduction in type II agency problems lead to increase in R&D expenses for innovation investments. Moreover, comparing with ownership dispersed firms, the ownership concentrated firms spend more in R&D expenses. However, if the dispersed ownership firms can decrease type I agency problems then they spend more in R&D relative to the ownership concentrated firms. By the same token, comparing with ownership-dispersed firms, the reduction in type II agency problems of ownership-concentrated firms will more effectively increase R&D expenses to raise the company value.