Experiences of disorientation can be common and powerful parts of moral agents‘ lives, yet they have not been characterized by mainstream Western philosophers, and their effects have not been adequately recognized by ethicists. In this dissertation, I remedy these gaps by providing an account of disorientations as multi-dimensional experiences and by fleshing out a more nuanced analysis of disorientation within the framework of experienced agency. I argue that, contra the philosophical tradition, disorientations are not always bad for moral agency. This thesis has two main aims: first, to introduce a philosophical framework to clarify experiences of disorientation and their effects; and second, to clarify the relation between disorientation and moral agency, showing how responsible action can both require and produce disorientation. In chapter one, I introduce disorientations as complex experiences of unease, discomfort, and uncertainty which vary in degree and in effects. In chapters two to four, I characterize disorientations on three axes: corporeal, affective, and epistemological. I argue that disorientations always involve all three dimensions of bodily, emotional, and cognitive experience and that shifts in body, affect, and knowledge can trigger experiences of disorientation. I draw on examples of how agents can become disoriented in periods of illness, trauma, grief, self-doubt, and education. In chapter five, I draw two lines of connection between disorientation and moral agency: experiences of disorientation can help us act more responsibly, and acting responsibly can be disorienting. In chapter six, I consider the political promise of disorientations, focusing on the way individuals‘ disorientations in response to a hate crime in their community prompted the creation of less harmful norms, and thereby a better place for individuals to live. In chapter seven, I conclude by outlining implications of my view for how we should face disorientations and what kinds of conditions should be in place to support those who are disoriented. Disorientations do not always enable moral agency. Given that moral philosophers are better versed in the ways disorientations can harm, my project is to distinguish the ways they can help, contesting the assumption that moral agency is always better the more oriented we are.

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Philosophy, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references.

This paper can be used as a basic material comparing current conditionsat internal accounting and external accounting, it defines different kinds of external accounting for various companies and it searches for possibilities of application for a particular company. The aim is to find out suitability of external accounting for observed subject.

In this thesis I explore the relation in Buber's and Levinas's understanding. Both of these Jew philosophers endeavoured to describe an essence of genuine dialogue and both saw in dialogue the word that turns to a Thou, the primal deed of spirit. Nevertheless in spite of these similarities there are also a differences in their understanding of a dynamics within the genuine dialogue. Whereas Buber talks about a reciprocity in such a relation Levinas asserts that there is an asymmetry there and therefore he radicalizes Buber's conception and responsibility towards the other. In the first part of my thesis I focus on important influences on Buber's and Levinas' lives and introduce a "poetics" of their understanding of a genuine dialogue based particularly on their main piece of work: Buber's I and Thou and Levinas's Totality and Infinity. Although there was a communication between these two thinkers according to some philosophers it often exhibited a lack of dialogue and a failure to understand each other. Therefore I outline the similarities and differences in detail in the final chapters. Keywords Buber, Levinas, Rosenzweig, I - Thou relationship, face, reciprocity, asymmetry, responsibility, ethics, infinity

Nous sommes devenus insoutenables. Il faut organiser une responsabilité globale pour prendre soin deseffets systémiques planétaires de l’action collective. La Responsabilité Sociale peut être le modèlepratique de cette responsabilité au niveau des organisations. Mais il faut pouvoir fonder éthiquementcette nouvelle responsabilité collective, sans auteur, prospective, et qui n’impute plus tant les actes enles attribuant à des sujets que les impacts des actes en créant des collectifs solidaires. C’est ce que nousfaisons dans cette thèse, en fondant une éthique à trois dimensions : vertu, justice, soutenabilité ; et enreformulant la Responsabilité Sociale des Sciences comme celle des Entreprises sous l’égide d’uneéthique de la discussion. Sur ces fondements éthiques, la Responsabilité Sociale ne peut plus êtreconçue comme engagement volontaire mais comme devoir à institutionnaliser par régulation hybridede notre coresponsabilité / We have become unsustainable. We have to organize a global responsibility to take care of theplanetary side-effects of human action. Social Responsibility may be the practical model of thisresponsibility for the various organizations. But we must found ethically this new collective,anonymous and prospective responsibility, which is not imputing acts to somebody any longer, butcreates united groups to take care of the impacts of people’s acts. In this philosophical thesis, we definea 3D ethic: virtue, justice, sustainability. We reformulate Corporate Social Responsibility andScientific Social Responsibility under the aegis of the discourse ethics (Apel, Habermas). Because ofthis ethical foundation, Social Responsibility can no longer be conceived as a voluntary commitmentbut as a duty that has to be institutionalized by a hybrid regulation of our shared responsibility / Nos hemos vuelto insostenibles. Hay que organizar una responsabilidad global para cuidar de losefectos sistémicos planetarios de la acción colectiva. La responsabilidad social puede ser el modelopráctico de esta responsabilidad en las organizaciones. Pero hay que poder fundamentar éticamenteesta nueva responsabilidad colectiva, sin autor, prospectiva, y que, en lugar de imputar actos a sujetos,imputa más bien impactos de los actos creando colectivos solidarios. Es lo que hacemos en esta tesis,fundamentando una ética en tres dimensiones: virtud, justicia, sostenibilidad; y reformulando laresponsabilidad social científica tanto como empresarial en términos de ética del discurso. Sobre estosfundamentos éticos, ya no se puede seguir concibiendo la responsabilidad social como compromisovoluntario facultativo, sino como deber a institucionalizar mediante una regulación híbrida de nuestracorresponsabilidad