Proefschrift--Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, 2005. / Résumé en anglais. Bibliogr. p. 255-285.

What is forgetfulness? How does it show? Is it a part of memory or can it be considered on its own? In the philosophical discourse forgetfulness is limited and the phenomenon is mostly portrayed as a pathological or obscure counterpart of memory. This portraying of forgetfulness can be seen as traditional way of describing it, but there is some philosophers who has spoken of forgetfulness in more fruitful ways. These ways are not to be interpreted as aspirations to decouple forgetfulness from memory, rather they are to be seen as attempts to interpret this relation on another basis. This basis has also led this essay towards an interpretation of forgetfulness' relation to truth. The aim of this essay is thereby to examine forgetfulness as phenomenon and its relation to truth. To approach these subject-matters I've taken Paul Ricoeur's Memory, History, Forgetting and Martin Heidegger's Being and Time to my help. In Memory, History, Forgetting Ricoeur tries to portray forgetfulness as an essential part of human life that's not a deficiency, but nor is it intended to be seen as an incentive to forget. We are rather encouraged to remember, thereof his watchword “the obligation to remember” which is also linked to “the truth status of memory”. Heidegger too considers forgetfulness in Being and Time as an essential part of the human life, or as he writes, of everydayness. Remarkably, Heidegger's translations of the greek words lēthē and its privation alētheia are translatable by him as the words for forgetfulness (concealment) and truth (unconcealment). This opens up a view on forgetfulness and truth as radically different from Ricoeur's and thereof the traditional. The disparity between the two philosophers allows this relation to point beyond the two of them as a possibility and a necessity to make room for forgetfulness as a multifaceted phenomenon in the philosophical discourse.

This thesis explores the question of what it means to be a critical being, and how we can cultivate and enact a critical orientation through the ancient Aristotelian notion of phronesis. I begin by defending the claim that the familiar traditions and methods of rhetoric and hermeneutics have their practical, experiential and critical origins in a fundamental and constitutive human desire to express and understand ourselves and others through the most primary of human capabilities: listening, speaking, interpreting and understanding. This way of describing hermeneutics and rhetoric gives us a sense of their origins in lived experience. It also reminds us that rhetorical expression and hermeneutic understanding are not to be thought of as merely ‘systematized disciplines’, ‘instruments’ or ‘methods’ that we can be indifferent to, but part of our participatory linguistic experience. I argue that once the interpenetrating relation of rhetorical expression and hermeneutic understanding is made apparent, an implicit critical-thinking dimension in experience also becomes visible. This ‘critical dimension’ is not discovered in static theory, procedure or method, but, rather, something that is enacted over time with and among others. It is Aristotle’s concept of phronesis, and his understanding of insight and practical reasoning that best captures the emergence and enactment of critical thinking-being. Phronesis is a mode of practical reasoning that is always in motion, always challenging and interrogating the relation between the particular circumstances we find ourselves in, and the historical traditions, general rules, laws or procedures that form our normative background. I allow this argument for a critical hermeneutics through phronesis to be challenged by Jürgen Habermas’s critical sociological approach. I conclude, firstly, that Habermas’s critical theory relies for its critical thrust on a hermeneutical reflective tradition of immanent critique and insights about communication that can be grasped through phronetic reasoning, tradition and concrete embodied linguistic practices. Secondly, I argue that critical hermeneutics enacted through practical reasoning and phronesis describes a way of thinking-acting-desiring being that is more congruent with our actual experience, and therefore capable of meeting the personal, occupational, moral and political exigencies of a complex and diverse contemporary world.

This thesis analyses those differences In interpretation which occur when separate literary-theoretical approaches are applied to biblical texts. Hans Frei suggests that the biblical texts describe the world in a way which he calls "realistic narrative". Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutic recognises the disclosive power of the text and translates the subject matter of the text into a "way-of- being-in-the-world". Thus, the primary identity disclosed by the biblical narratives differs. For Frei, it is the identity of Jesus which is disclosed; for Ricoeur, it is "our common human Christian identity". These two thinkers have usually been compared theologically. However, I contend that the theological investigations of both Frei and Ricoeur have been influenced by the literary approaches which guide their theological work. I give an exposition of this relationship in chapter one. In chapter two, I sketch out the implications of this relationship, focusing on the issue of narrative identity. In the final chapter, critiques of both systems are investigated as I attempt to deal with the force of these objections. This dissertation investigates Frei's and Ricoeur's construals of narrative identity (as constructed through the reading of Biblical texts). My working hypothesis is that the construals of identity formulated by Frei and Ricoeur rely upon formalist, narrative "interpretations". My thesis contends that in their respective approaches to the notion of narrative identity, neither thinker has completely abandoned his early literary-theoretical roots in his theological proposals.

Santrauka Holokausto atminties raida Lietuvoje neatitinka pasaulinės holokausto kultūros plėtros tendencijų dėl kelių priežasčių: 1) lietuvių holokausto atmintis po karo buvo sukliudyta, ką galima įvardinti kaip atminties trūkumą; 2) lietuvių holokausto atmintis po Nepriklausomybės atkūrimo pradėta smarkiai įtakoti iš išorės. Šios priežastys lemia holokausto atminties raidos problemiškumą svarbiausiuose holokausto kultūros plėtros sluoksniuose: istoriografijoje, valstybės politikoje, viešajame ir individualiame diskurse. / Zusammenfassung Die Entwicklung des Holocaustgedächtnises in Litauen entspricht nicht der weltweiten Tendenz der Holocaustkultur, undzwar aus folgenden Gründen: 1) Das Gedächtnis der Litauer an den Holocaust ist nach dem Krieg verhindert worden, was man eigentlich auch Gedächtnismangel nennen könnte; 2) Das litauische Holocaustgedächtnis wurde nach der Wiedererlangung der Unabhängigkeit stark von außen beeinflusst. Dies macht die Entwicklung des Holocaustgedächtnises in den für die Entwicklung der Holocaustkultur wichtigsten Schichten (in der Geschichtsschreibung, Staatspolitik, im öffentlichen und individuellen Diskurs) problematisch.

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Chicago--Divinity School. / Bibliogr. p. 153-158. Index.

Mémoire (M.A.)--Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, 2006. / Comprend des réf. bibliogr. : f. 148-157. Également disponible en format microfiche.

Akademisk avhandling--philosophie--Uppsala, 1999. / Résumé en allemand et abstract en anglais. Bibliogr. p. 296-302.

Zugl.: Louvain, Univ., Diss., 2007

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