Law is a means to an end. The state has always claimed it uses law as a tool to promote social order and progress (the Brazilian National Flag is an example). The use of law to force social change to facilitate capital accumulation for elites in society flies in the face of what the takings clause is supposed to stand for. This research examines the connection between economic development and public good. It focuses on takings because takings lie at the intersection between economics, politics, and social relations. Takings are justified by necessity and public good, but the claim isn’t genuine. Takings condone displacement and cause harm. State-authorized condemnation juxtaposes civic duty with social obligation, ownership with license and privilege. The thesis developed here is the state is pushing the law of takings toward the satisfaction of private interests. To that end the public use concept was expanded. Kelo v. City of New London (2005) holds economic development is a public use and in making that fallacious claim the case has ruptured takings law. Public use shouldn’t be about private gain. Property should be creative and is when it facilitates productivity, but it’s destructive if it erodes personal autonomy. The state claims it promotes social good when it reorders uses, but the claim is false. Instead the state achieves an air of legitimacy, offering a sound rationale for acts of displacement and uses law to support the claim it promotes public good. If an individual doesn’t want to part with her property she shouldn’t be forced to do so. Taking is use of state power to accomplish ends that can’t otherwise be achieved. Taking is a lawful means to displace to benefit private interests. The proof of this is in the pudding of the transformation of law between Berman v. Parker (1954) and Kelo v. City of New London (2005). Berman (1954) required blight. Kelo v. City of New London (2005) eliminated that requirement. This thesis explains how law and state are captured by private interests. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2015. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

This research examines the legal issues surrounding killing in defence of property in three selected jurisdictions: South Africa, Cameroon and the United States. The comparative analysis illustrates that although the right to protect one’s property is universal, this defence is interpreted differently in the various jurisdictions. Another issue considered in the study is the constitutional right to life in each jurisdiction and whether or not an unlawful attack against one’s property creates a legal entitlement for the attacked party to take the life of another in defence of his or her property. Private defence of property is available when a person uses force to defend an interest in property, for example; to prevent a would-be thief from taking his own, or another’s property, to prevent someone from damaging his own or another’s property, to prevent an intruder from entering his own or another’s property. When an accused pleads private defence, his claim is that his harm-causing conduct was, in the circumstances, lawful. The reasonable use of force (short of deadly force) in the private defence of property is not disputed. However, the use of deadly force in protection of property is controversial, especially in a constitutional state such as South Africa where life should be prized above property. One should however also consider that there is a close link between the private defence of defending life and of protecting property. In many cases, an assault on property also involves a threat on life. However, there are cases of private defence of property where no threat to bodily integrity exists. These situations will be examined in all three jurisdictions and measured against the various constitutional imperatives. Conclusions and recommendations are made as regards the legal framework on the defence of property in the criminal law of the various jurisdictions. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL. M.