In this research, I present critical facts about Land Tenure Systems and Poverty Reduction processes in Mafela Resettlement community. I focus mainly on the Post-Fast Track Land Reform (2004-2011) period and the interactive processes in this new resettlement area. The research - premised on the rights approach - sought to explore land tenure rights systems and poverty reduction mechanisms seen by the Mafela community to be improving their livelihoods; it also sought to find out if there is evidence linking tenure rights to poverty reduction and how land tenure rights governance systems affect their livelihoods. Suffice to say in both the animal kingdom and human world, territorial space and integrity, its demarcation as well as how resources are used within the space, given the area - calls for a - defined system of rights by the residents themselves. Whilst it is true that there is no one story about Zimbabwe's land reform (Scoones et al 2011), the contribution of this research towards insights emanating from the newly resettled farmers adds another invaluable contribution in the realm of rural development issues. / Magister Philosophiae (Land and Agrarian Studies) - MPhil(LAS)

On legal-philosophical grounds the constitutional protection of socio-economic rights has been the subject of much debate. The question is whether socio-economical rights should be protected by a constitution and, if so, to what extent. In this study a theological-ethical evaluation is done about socio-economical rights and the protection thereof. This is done by examining certain Biblical themes and parts of Scripture of the Old and New Testament. From this investigation it is clear that socioeconomical rights are very important human rights that must be protected as effectively as possible. Several points of view on the constitutional protection of socio-economical rights are investigated and evaluated. These points of view are based on legal-philosophical grounds and argue respectively against the constitutional protection of socioeconomical rights, the protection of socio-economical rights as directive principles and the protection of socio-economical rights as fundamental rights. From this investigation it is clear that in principle the constitutional protection of socioeconomical rights as fundamental rights is the most effective way to protect these rights. The current state of affairs with regard to socio-economical rights in the Constitution of South-Africa is also investigated and evaluated. From this investigation it is clear that the Constitution does protect certain socio-economic rights, but not all of them. The rights to labour, clothing and scientific progress do not occur in the Constitution. In principle the right to labour is a very important socio-economic right and it leads to the realization of other socio-economic rights. The Constitution of South Africa also has several measures in place to ensure the protection of socio-economic rights. In spite of these measures, the socio-economic rights in the Constitution remain little more than rights on paper. There state, private sector, church and each individual will still have to do a lot to ensure the protection of socio-economic rights in South-Africa. / Thesis (M.Th. (Ethics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2004.

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Limitations on the customizability of property rights (the numerus clausus principle) are a puzzling feature of the common law conception of property. An economic rationale, built upon 1) the pivotal role that rules of exclusion play in fostering user innovation, and 2) the role that psychological ownership plays in preventing recontracting around governance rules, is offered to explain the modern persistence of the doctrine. Application of the numerus clausus principle limits the proliferation of governance rules in the economy (governance), replacing them with rules of exclusion (exclusion). Exclusion unifies rights of use and possession in assets, while governance separates, to a greater or lesser degree, possession from use rights. Full user, sale and the policy against restraints on alienation are the paradigmatic examples of exclusion; while governance is exemplified by servitudes and contractually-burdened assets. Exclusion plays a critical role in user innovation because it allows the possessors of assets to unilaterally seek out new uses of those assets. Whenever the law replaces governance with exclusion, user innovation is more likely to occur because the possessors of assets can apply their unique, rival and nontransferable human capital inputs to tangible assets, generating outputs (the new uses) that move resources to their higher-value uses. This is how all innovation, both high-tech and low-tech, occurs. In addition to negatively impacting user innovation, governance hinders recontracting because both possession and legal entitlements (rights of use in an asset) give rise to feelings of psychological ownership, and individuals will not recontract over uses that they feel they already ‘own’. The user innovation theory’s focus on search, innovation and human capital explains why the numerus clausus principle remains most robust in the areas of personal and intellectual property (where users generate a significant amount of innovation), and why it has been somewhat attenuated in the area of real property (where we restrict search in order to facilitate coordination of land uses). It also explains why the law enforces the principle even when the cost of providing notice of governance rules is low.

<p>In this minithesis, I demonstrate that International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law are two distinct but related fields of law. First, the examination deals with the instance that the aim of both branches of law, the protection of human rights, is common, but the approach to reach this aim is different. In this regard, I show numerous points of divergence of both branches of law which have their origin in the fundamentally different historical developments of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. I give the main attention to the application of both sets of law, whereby the contractions and legal gaps of the protection of human rights become apparent. The proposals dealing with the solution of these issues are discussed. I argue that a new legal instrument for a comprehensive and compatible protection of human rights is necessary, especially in times of internal strife. Regarding the question as to whether International Humanitarian Law or International Human Rights Law should apply if both branches are applicable, I take the view to apply the roman principle of law lex specialis derogat legi generali in such a way that the more specific rule whenever they have a specific justification for dealing with specific problems is applicable. Both branches of law do not merge to one, but they converge to a harmonious relationship, where they complement each other and provide the highest protection of human rights.</p>