Yes / This paper provides a wide-ranging and up-to-date (1997-2016) review of the archival empirical risk-reporting literature. The reviewed papers are classified into two principal themes: the incentives for and/or informativeness of risk reporting. Our review demonstrates areas of significant divergence in the literature specifically: mandatory versus voluntary risk reporting, manual versus automated content analysis, within-country versus cross-country variations in risk reporting, and risk reporting in financial versus non-financial firms. Our paper identifies a number of issues which require further research. In particular we draw attention to two: first, a lack of clarity and consistency around the conceptualization of risk; and second, the potential costs and benefits of standard-setters’ involvement

The current study aims to investigate empirically the main incentives for mandatory and voluntary risk reporting (MRR and VRR) across the USA, the UK and Germany, each of which has a unique approach towards risk reporting. While the UK approach encourages more voluntary risk reporting above imposing risk rules, the German approach formally requires firms to provide risk information in a certain place in their annual report narratives. The US approach is a compromise between these two approaches; it obligates and encourages firms to provide more information about their risks mandatorily and/or voluntarily, respectively. Investigating the incentives for risk reporting in such set of countries answers the calls of some prior research (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Dobler, 2008; Dobler, Lajili and Zeghal, 2011) to deepen our understanding of what motivates firms to disclose their risks. To this end, computerised content analysis and multilevel analysis (MLA) on a large scale (compared with previous work e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007) are utilised. The results are produced in four cumulative contexts through Chapters Six to Nine. These results are consistent with managers’ incentives theories (discussed in Chapter Two) and prior risk reporting literature (discussed in Chapter Three and Chapter Four). Based on 15 firms in each country during 2007 and 2008, multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) results reveal significant differences between a firm’s risk levels and its risk disclosure levels across the USA, the UK and Germany. The correlation results indicate that these differences are statistically correlated, supporting the main argument of the current study that differences in a firm’s risk levels should be reflected in their risk reporting practices (Chapter Six). Based on 1160 firm-years of non-financial firms of the FTSE all share index over 2005-2008, linear mixed model (LMM) results document that firms with higher levels of systematic and financing risks are likely to exhibit significantly higher levels of aggregated and voluntary risk reporting, whereas firms with high variability of stock returns or lower levels of liquidity are likely to exhibit significantly lower levels of aggregated and voluntary risk reporting. The current study also finds, however, that MRR is associated significantly and positively with firm size rather than with risk levels. The results also indicate that managers of firms exhibiting greater compliance with UK risk reporting regulations have greater incentives to disclose voluntary risk information (Chapter Seven). When the study extends the scope to the other two countries, different patterns of relations are found. Based on 1270, 1410 and 1005 firm-year observations over 2005 to 2009 in the USA, the UK and Germany, respectively, repeated measures multilevel analysis (RMMLA) results suggest that, in the USA, MRR is more sensitive to firm risk levels (total, systematic and liquidity risks) than is VRR, which is more correlated to other firm characteristics. The UK results suggest that VRR is more sensitive to firm risk levels (systematic and liquidity risks) than is MRR, which is dominated by firm size, among other firm characteristics. In Germany, however, both MRR and VRR are significantly related to risk levels (total, systematic, un-systematic, financing and liquidity risks) (Chapter Eight). Based on 3685 firm-year observations during the period between 2005 and 2009, and concerning both firm- and country-level analyses, repeated measures multilevel analysis (RMMLA) results support that variations in MRR can be attributed to differences in the legal systems (country characteristics) and in firm size (firm characteristics). The variations in VRR are more associated with firm characteristics, especially a firm’s risk levels across the USA, the UK and Germany (Chapter Nine). These results have many implications and support the respective regulatory approach adopted within each country by interpreting the extent to which either MRR or VRR is more or less sensitive to underlying risks.

Tre tydliga svagheter kunde identifieras i den globala banksektorn under den stora finanskrisen år 2007. Dessa tre svagheter var brist på kapital av tillräcklig kvalitet för att kunna hantera förluster, en för tätt sammankopplad finansmarknad samt otillräcklig likviditetshantering och för små likviditetsbuffertar. I syfte att främja en banksektor med starkare motståndskraft togs regelverket Basel III fram för att reglera bland annat bankernas likviditet, kapitaltäckning och riskhantering. De nya kapitaltäckningskraven från Basel III innebär bland annat att kärnprimärkapitalrelationen ska uppgå till minst sju procent senast år 2019, Sverige och Storbritannien har dock valt att ställa högre krav på sina storbanker. Kärnprimärkapitalet är den del av primärkapitalet som håller högst kvalitet och har bäst förmåga att absorbera förluster. Europeiska bankmyndigheten (EBA) genomför årligen stresstester på bankerna inom Europeiska unionen (EU) med syfte att se hur bankerna kan hantera ogynnsamma scenarier. På liknande sätt genomför även Finansinspektionen stresstester på de svenska storbankerna.Syftet med denna studie är att ur ett internationellt perspektiv undersöka vilka resultat storbankerna i Sverige, Storbritannien och Tyskland uppnår i EBA:s stresstester för två olika år. Studien syftar även till att ur ett nationellt perspektiv studera hur de fyra svenska storbankerna Handelsbanken, SEB, Nordea och Swedbank klarar sig i Finansinspektionens egna stresstester över en fyraårsperiod. Slutligen syftar studien till att studera hur väl de fyra svenska storbankerna lever upp till de nya kraven som Basel III medför med avseende på kärnprimärkapitalrelation för åren 2006, 2011 och 2014 samt hur bankernas riskrapportering har förändrats sedan år 2011. För att besvara våra frågeställningar studerades tryckt material i form av bland annat årsredovisningar och vi genomförde även två intervjuer med en respondent från Finansinspektionen respektive två respondenter från Sveriges Riksbank.Studiens resultat för den internationella frågeställningen visar att det är de svenska storbankerna som har den lägsta genomsnittliga procentuella differensen mellan ett normalscenario och ett stressat scenario. Det är även de svenska storbankerna som har de högsta genomsnittliga kärnprimärkapitalrelationerna i EBA:s stresstester för åren 2011 respektive 2014. De brittiska och de tyska storbankerna uppnår lägre resultat än de svenska storbankerna. Det finns banker i dessa länder som det krävs ytterligare arbete ifrån för att de vid ett normalscenario ska uppnå Basel III:s grundkrav där kärnprimärkapitalrelationen ska uppgå till minst sju procent. Utifrån vår analys kan vi dra slutsatsen att de svenska storbankerna är de banker som klarar sig bäst med avseende på EBA:s stresstester och bankernas kärnprimärkapitalrelationer.Studiens resultat för den nationella frågeställningen visar att Handelsbanken och Swedbank är de svenska storbanker som klarar sig bäst i Finansinspektionens stresstester. SEB och Nordea däremot uppvisar något sämre resultat och vid något tillfälle når de inte upp till de formella eller de individuella kraven under ett mycket stressat scenario. Vid analys av bankernas årsredovisningar kan vi se en positiv utveckling av deras kärnprimärkapitalrelationer då samtliga svenska storbanker når upp till de strängare formella kraven på 10 respektive 12 procent och även når upp till Finansinspektionens strängare individuella krav för respektive storbank. Vi kan även se en positiv utveckling av de svenska storbankernas riskrapportering och vi kan se att många av bankerna offentliggör mer riskinformation än vad som krävs. Vi kan konstatera att de svenska storbankerna över lag är välkapitaliserade och har inga problem med att nå upp till de nya kraven i Basel III. / Three weaknesses were identified in the global banking sector during the great financial crisis in 2007. These three weaknesses were a lack of capital of sufficient quality to cope with losses, a too closely linked financial market and finally an insufficient liquidity management and too small liquidity buffers. In order to promote a banking sector with stronger resistance Basel III regulations was established to regulate the banks' liquidity, capital adequacy and risk management. The new capital requirements of Basel III means that the core Tier I capital ratio must at least reach seven percent by the year 2019, Sweden and the UK have, however, chosen to set higher standards for their largest banks. Core Tier I capital is the part of Tier I capital that keeps the highest quality and has the best ability to absorb losses. The European Banking Authority (EBA) conducts annual stress tests on banks in the European Union (EU) in order to study how banks can handle adverse scenarios. In a similar way, Finansinspektionen also conducts stress tests on the major Swedish banks.The purpose of this study is from an international perspective to examine what results the major banks in Sweden, the UK and Germany achieve in the EBA's stress test for two years. The study also aims to study from a national perspective how the four major Swedish banks, Handelsbanken, SEB, Nordea and Swedbank achieve in Finansinspektionens own stress tests over a four year period. Finally, the study aims to examine how well the four major Swedish banks live up to the new requirements under the Basel III, with regard to core Tier I capital ratio for the years 2006, 2011 and 2014, as well as how banks' risk reporting has changed since the year 2011. In order to answer our questions, printed material in the form of e.g. annual reports were studied and we also conducted two interviews with respondents from Finansinspektionen and Sveriges Riksbank (the Swedish national bank).The study's results of the international perspective shows that it is the major Swedish banks that have the lowest average percentage difference between a normal scenario and a stressed scenario. It is also the Swedish banks that have the highest average core tier 1 ratios in the EBAs' stress tests for the years 2011 and 2014. The British and German banks achieved lower results than the Swedish banks. There are banks in these countries where further work is needed in order for them at a normal scenario to reach a core Tier 1 capital ratio of at least seven percent. Based on our analysis, we can conclude that the major Swedish banks have the best results both regarding EBAs' stress tests and the banks' core Tier 1 capital ratio.The study's results of the national perspective shows that Handelsbanken and Swedbank are the major Swedish banks with the best results in Finansinspektionens stress tests. SEB and Nordea present slightly lower results and at some time during the test they do not reach the formal or individual requirements in a highly stressed scenario. In the analysis of banks' annual reports, we observe a positive development of their core tier 1 ratios and all major Swedish banks reach the stricter formal requirements of 10 and 12 percent. All the banks also reach Finansinspektionens stricter individual requirements for each major bank. We also observe a positive development of the Swedish banks' risk reporting and we can also see that many of the banks disclose more risk information than is required. We can conclude that the major Swedish banks are well capitalized and have no problems reaching up to the new requirements of Basel III.This essay is written in Swedish

This paper adopts and reviews discretionary disclosure and cheap talk models to analyze risk reporting incentives and their relation to regulation. Given its inherent discretion, risk reporting depends on disclosure incentives. To assess these incentives the analytical models consider risk reporting as an endogenous feature, thereby providing a benchmark to discuss regulatory attempts. Particularly, discretionary disclosure models refer to verified disclosure, e.g., on risk factors or risk management, whereas cheap talk models refer to unverified disclosure, like managerial forecasts on the impact of risk factors. This provides an analytically-based framework for discussion. Unlike prior literature focusing on disclosure cost, I argue that uncertainty of information endowment and issues of credible communication can explain restricted risk reporting observed empirically. Linking regulatory attempts to these restrictions implies that regulation may mitigate the incentives-driven restrictions to some extent, but can have adverse effects on risk reporting. I particularly discuss the link between effective risk monitoring and precision of risk reporting; the ex post assessment and usefulness of managerial forecasts on impacts of risk factors; the claimed decreasing cost of capital by mandatory risk reporting; and the threat of self-fulfilling prophecies. While the discussion has implications for both specific risk reporting requirements and empirical research, overall results suggests not to overestimate the informativeness of risk reporting even in a regulated environment.

Yes / Drawing on distinct German institutional characteristics related to cultural, legal, financial, and regulatory features, this paper investigates the extent to which environmental incentives influence German non-financial firms in revealing risk information in their annual report narratives. The paper also examines whether risk-related disclosure (aggregate risk reporting and the tone of news about risk) is useful by investigating its impact on market liquidity and investor-perceived risk. We find that the decision to provide or withhold such risk information is less likely to be significantly associated with environmental incentives. Among those incentives, we find that German firms are significantly influenced by their underlying risks rather than other factors including ownership structure, capital structure, external equity finance, and borrowing. The decision to disclose is likely to be influenced by the size of the firm and whether or not it produces lengthy annual reports. The results also suggest that the impact of aggregate risk reporting levels was not observable until a distinction was made between bad and good news about risk. Specifically, we find that the German market tends to positively (negatively) price good (bad) news about risk by either improving (worsening) market liquidity through removing (creating) information asymmetries, or reducing (increasing) investor-perceived risk.

No / This paper utilises computerised textual analysis to explore the extent to which both firm and country characteristics influence mandatory and voluntary risk reporting (MRR and VRR) variations both within and between non-financial firms across Germany, the UK and the US, over the period from 2005 to 2010. We find significant variations in MRR and VRR between firms across the three countries. Further, we find, on average, that German firms tend to disclose significantly higher (lower) levels of risk information mandatorily than UK (US) firms. German firms, on average, tend to reveal considerably higher (lower) levels of VRR than US (UK) firms. Our results document that MRR and VRR variations are significantly influenced by systematic risk, the legal system and cultural values. We also find that country and firm characteristics have higher explanatory power over the observed variations in MRR than over those in VRR.