<p>Operation Atalanta är en EU gemensam marin operation utanför Somalias kust som syftar till att skydda Word Food Program sjötransporter från piratattacker i området. Försvarsmaktens styrkebidrag till operationen består i huvudsak av Internationella Korvettstyrkan (IKS) som innehåller korvetterna HMS Stockholm, HMS Malmö och stödfartyget HMS Trossö. Förbandet transporterades till insatsområdet med strategisk sjötransport. Att transportera svenska örlogs-fartyg på detta sätt är tämligen nytt inom marinen. Strategiska sjötransporter kräver framförhållning då sjötransportresurserna i vissa fall kan vara svårt att få tillgängliga på den tid som önskas. Därför har denna uppsats inriktats på transportplaneringen av operation Atalanta.</p><p>Uppsatsen syftar till att undersöka och jämföra teori med praktik där kvalitativ textanalys har ställts mot kvalitativa intervjuer. Genom en undersökning av transportplaneringen under operation Atalanta som jämförts med <em>Handbok Försvarsmaktens Transporter Grunder (H FM Tp Grunder) </em>har skillnader identifieras. Dessa skillnader har senare värderas mot hur transportplanerings- processen följdes.</p><p>Processen har i denna uppsats begränsats till att undersöka de tre första delprocesserna, som författaren valt kalla för faser: <em>inhämtning, bedömning och upphandling.</em> Faserna används genomgående genom empirin där underaktiviteterna i respektive fas presenteras. Faktorer att beakta under planeringen är <em>kostnadseffektivitet, tid</em> och <em>kvalitet</em>. Dessa faktorers inverkan undersöks närmare i respektive fas.</p><p>Fallstudien visar att transportplaneringsprocessen inte följts enligt <em>H</em> <em>FM Tp Grunder</em>. Den främsta orsaken är tidsbrist som forcerat planeringen. Erfarenhet hos dem som varit involverade i planeringen har dock medgett att kontrollerade avsteg från processen kunnat göras.</p> / <p>Operation Atalanta is an EU combined maritime operation outside Somalia’s coasts. The main objective of the operation is to protect World Food Program sea transports in the area from pirate attacks. The Swedish Armed Forces has contributed with a maritime task force containing two corvettes and a supply ship. The ships were transported by a strategic sealift to area of operations. The knowledge of transporting Swedish naval vessels this way is limited due to lack of experience. Sea transports of this kind need to be planned with a long-term view due to the competitive situation on the sea transport market and the limitation of resources. </p><p>This essay is therefore focused on the planning process of the described transport where an investigation of theory and practice is done. The theory comes from an internal handbook which describes The Swedish Armed Forces planning process for military transports. This planning process will be compared to the case study, operation Atalanta in order to sort out differences. These differences will show how well the planning process was followed in this particular case.  </p><p>The author has limited the planning process to involve three different stages in the planning process, these are: <em>Information gathering, Assessment </em>and<em> Procurement</em> and hereafter called phases. The stages will in time be set from the political directive to a sea transport has been procured. Different aspects are to be considered during the planning process. These are cost efficiency, time and quality. These aspects will be examined in each phase in order to investigate how they have affected the planning process.    </p><p>The case study shows that the planning process has not been followed according to what the handbook describes. The main reason is the lack of time. The time has been a crucial factor which has driven the transport planning to make deviations. However this deviation has been done with good knowledge about the planning process thru experience.</p>

Operation Atalanta är en EU gemensam marin operation utanför Somalias kust som syftar till att skydda Word Food Program sjötransporter från piratattacker i området. Försvarsmaktens styrkebidrag till operationen består i huvudsak av Internationella Korvettstyrkan (IKS) som innehåller korvetterna HMS Stockholm, HMS Malmö och stödfartyget HMS Trossö. Förbandet transporterades till insatsområdet med strategisk sjötransport. Att transportera svenska örlogs-fartyg på detta sätt är tämligen nytt inom marinen. Strategiska sjötransporter kräver framförhållning då sjötransportresurserna i vissa fall kan vara svårt att få tillgängliga på den tid som önskas. Därför har denna uppsats inriktats på transportplaneringen av operation Atalanta. Uppsatsen syftar till att undersöka och jämföra teori med praktik där kvalitativ textanalys har ställts mot kvalitativa intervjuer. Genom en undersökning av transportplaneringen under operation Atalanta som jämförts med Handbok Försvarsmaktens Transporter Grunder (H FM Tp Grunder) har skillnader identifieras. Dessa skillnader har senare värderas mot hur transportplanerings- processen följdes. Processen har i denna uppsats begränsats till att undersöka de tre första delprocesserna, som författaren valt kalla för faser: inhämtning, bedömning och upphandling. Faserna används genomgående genom empirin där underaktiviteterna i respektive fas presenteras. Faktorer att beakta under planeringen är kostnadseffektivitet, tid och kvalitet. Dessa faktorers inverkan undersöks närmare i respektive fas. Fallstudien visar att transportplaneringsprocessen inte följts enligt H FM Tp Grunder. Den främsta orsaken är tidsbrist som forcerat planeringen. Erfarenhet hos dem som varit involverade i planeringen har dock medgett att kontrollerade avsteg från processen kunnat göras. / Operation Atalanta is an EU combined maritime operation outside Somalia’s coasts. The main objective of the operation is to protect World Food Program sea transports in the area from pirate attacks. The Swedish Armed Forces has contributed with a maritime task force containing two corvettes and a supply ship. The ships were transported by a strategic sealift to area of operations. The knowledge of transporting Swedish naval vessels this way is limited due to lack of experience. Sea transports of this kind need to be planned with a long-term view due to the competitive situation on the sea transport market and the limitation of resources.  This essay is therefore focused on the planning process of the described transport where an investigation of theory and practice is done. The theory comes from an internal handbook which describes The Swedish Armed Forces planning process for military transports. This planning process will be compared to the case study, operation Atalanta in order to sort out differences. These differences will show how well the planning process was followed in this particular case.   The author has limited the planning process to involve three different stages in the planning process, these are: Information gathering, Assessment and Procurement and hereafter called phases. The stages will in time be set from the political directive to a sea transport has been procured. Different aspects are to be considered during the planning process. These are cost efficiency, time and quality. These aspects will be examined in each phase in order to investigate how they have affected the planning process.     The case study shows that the planning process has not been followed according to what the handbook describes. The main reason is the lack of time. The time has been a crucial factor which has driven the transport planning to make deviations. However this deviation has been done with good knowledge about the planning process thru experience.

No description available.

This thesis is concerned with the selection and early career education of executive branch officers in the Royal Navy c1902-1939. The thesis attempts to place naval selection and educational policy in context by demonstrating how it was affected by changing naval requirements, external political interference and contemporary educational reform. It also explores the impact of the First World War and the Invergordon mutiny upon officer education. The thesis discusses the selection of potential executive officers, exploring what methods were used, why they were used and how they were developed over time. It discusses the increasing openness of the officer corps of the Royal Navy to boys of talent, irrespective of their background; and shows that this trend was driven by political demand, fuelled by the increasing number of well educated lower middle class boys, and welcomed by many in the Royal Navy. The thesis demonstrates that the Fisher-Selborne Scheme of officer education combined existing naval practice with recent educational developments to produce a unique and innovatory educational system. It shows how many of the assumptions on which the scheme was founded were subsequently proven to be wrong, and demonstrates its gradual dismantling through the inter-war years. The thesis considers the development of the Special Entry scheme, initially in response to a shortage of junior officers but later as a means of broadening entry to the officer corps. It contrasts the fortunes of the two schemes in the inter-war period, in which the educational side of the Special Entry scheme was largely unaltered. Overall the thesis seeks to place the development of the Royal Navy’s systems for the selection and early career education of executive officers in context by exploring how and why they were developed and their response to the changing fortunes and shape of the Royal Navy.

No description available.

This thesis will demonstrate that the British leaders saw the policy of non-intervention during the Spanish Civil War as the best option available under the circumstances, and will also focus on the role of the Royal Navy in carrying out that policy. Unpublished sources include Cabinet and Admiralty papers. Printed sources include the Documents on British Foreign Policy, newspaper and periodical articles, and memoirs. This thesis, covering the years 1936-37, is broken down into six chapters, each covering a time frame that reflected a change of policy or naval mission. The non-intervention policy was seen as the best available at the time, but it was shortsighted and ignored potentially serious long-term consequences.

This work presents a study of shipbuilding and timber management in the Royal Dockyards in the period 1750 – 1850, focusing on an archaeological investigation of ship timber marks. The first chapter outlines the concept of timber marking in shipbuilding contexts, stressing the multi-disciplinary approach to the study highlighted in the available archaeological and documentary evidence by which the practice of timber marking can be understood. Chapter two outlines the background to timber marking in the Georgian era and the development of the practice within the broader advances made in shipbuilding, technology and design prior to the end of the 17th century. Chapter three outlines the developments in shipbuilding and the introduction of systems to control and standardise the management of timber in the Royal Dockyards in the 18th century. In the latter half of the 18th century we will see the attempts of naval reformers to develop these systems of timber management and pave the way for the sweeping changes made at the beginning of the 19th century. Chapter four highlights these changes with the introduction of the Timber Masters and looks at the nature of timber management and the marking of timbers as identified in documentary sources. This evidence lays the foundation for the understanding of timber marking in the 19th century as witnessed in the archaeological record. The remaining chapters present the much more extensive archaeological evidence for timber marking among several high profile assemblages. The main assemblages presented in Chapters 5 to 9 show the diversity of timber marking practices and how they relate to the working processes of the Royal Dockyards. The research offers new insights into the understanding of shipbuilding and the management of timber in the Royal Dockyards between 1750 and 1850 and explores the possibilities for further avenues of study.

L’évolution du débat sur la pensée navale en Angleterre de la décennie 1880, suivant la fin d’une période d’intenses changements technologiques dans les marines de guerre est marquée par le déclin d’un mode de réflexion matériel et l’ascension, à partir des années 1885 et 1886, de l’école historique de John Knox Laughton. Selon la méthode matérielle, populaire au cours de la période de transformation technique, la guerre sur mer est entièrement tributaire du Progrès, tandis que, pour les tenants de la méthode historique, des principes et des leçons immuables la régissent. À travers l’évolution de ce débat, on constate l’introduction, par la Jeune École française, d’une perspective matérialiste et de la stratégie navale comme objet de réflexion, et son exploitation par l’école historique anglaise. L’émergence de la stratégie comme sujet de débat coïncide donc avec le triomphe de l’école historique. Croyant que la torpille allait démocratiser la puissance navale en empêchant le belligérant le plus puissant d’user de sa maîtrise des mers, la Jeune École connut un succès fulgurant qui déborda des côtes françaises et atteint l’Angleterre. Néanmoins, les matérialistes anglais, demeurant beaucoup plus modérés que les français, furent finalement marginalisés par une école historique utilisant les exagérations de la Jeune École, dont les insuffisances sont apparues lors des manœuvres de l’été 1886, pour disqualifier entièrement la méthode matérielle. Étudiant les débats du Royal United Service Institution Journal, ce mémoire démontre l’existence, en Angleterre, au cours de la décennie 1880, d’un débat polarisé au contraire d’une historiographie ne montrant que l’ascension des précurseurs de Mahan et de l’école historique. / Great Britain saw in the 1880s, at the end of a period of intense technical change and before the publication of Mahan’s classic on Sea Power, the decline of the material way of thinking about naval affairs and the rise, from the years 1885 and 1886, of the historical school of John Knox Laughton. Proponents of a material method established the idea that technological change altered naval warfare in a fundamentally way. They were, however, opposed by the partisans of a historical method who supported the idea that naval warfare is set on some timeless principles which can be discovered by the use of the methods of the new historical profession. Throughout the decade, the material method, successful in an era of rapid technological change, quickly subsumed to Mahan’s precursors. In a debate originally dominated by tactics, we observe the introduction of strategy by the French materialist Jeune École. Consequently, strategy became the core of the historical school and seems closely linked to the rise of strategy as a subject of reflection. The Jeune École believed that the torpedo would democratize Sea Power in making the powerful navies to use its mastery over the oceans. The Jeune École’s original success was so great, in France and abroad, that it influenced the English’s debate. Although materialists in Great Britain where more moderate than in France, they finally got marginalize by the historical school using the Jeune École’s wildest claims to disqualify the materialist point of view. Studying the debates through the Royal United Service Institution Journal, this thesis shows the existence, in Great Britain, of a debate centered on two method of thinking naval warfare and contributes to reassess current historiography which still focuses solely on the rise of Mahan’s precursors.

L’évolution du débat sur la pensée navale en Angleterre de la décennie 1880, suivant la fin d’une période d’intenses changements technologiques dans les marines de guerre est marquée par le déclin d’un mode de réflexion matériel et l’ascension, à partir des années 1885 et 1886, de l’école historique de John Knox Laughton. Selon la méthode matérielle, populaire au cours de la période de transformation technique, la guerre sur mer est entièrement tributaire du Progrès, tandis que, pour les tenants de la méthode historique, des principes et des leçons immuables la régissent. À travers l’évolution de ce débat, on constate l’introduction, par la Jeune École française, d’une perspective matérialiste et de la stratégie navale comme objet de réflexion, et son exploitation par l’école historique anglaise. L’émergence de la stratégie comme sujet de débat coïncide donc avec le triomphe de l’école historique. Croyant que la torpille allait démocratiser la puissance navale en empêchant le belligérant le plus puissant d’user de sa maîtrise des mers, la Jeune École connut un succès fulgurant qui déborda des côtes françaises et atteint l’Angleterre. Néanmoins, les matérialistes anglais, demeurant beaucoup plus modérés que les français, furent finalement marginalisés par une école historique utilisant les exagérations de la Jeune École, dont les insuffisances sont apparues lors des manœuvres de l’été 1886, pour disqualifier entièrement la méthode matérielle. Étudiant les débats du Royal United Service Institution Journal, ce mémoire démontre l’existence, en Angleterre, au cours de la décennie 1880, d’un débat polarisé au contraire d’une historiographie ne montrant que l’ascension des précurseurs de Mahan et de l’école historique. / Great Britain saw in the 1880s, at the end of a period of intense technical change and before the publication of Mahan’s classic on Sea Power, the decline of the material way of thinking about naval affairs and the rise, from the years 1885 and 1886, of the historical school of John Knox Laughton. Proponents of a material method established the idea that technological change altered naval warfare in a fundamentally way. They were, however, opposed by the partisans of a historical method who supported the idea that naval warfare is set on some timeless principles which can be discovered by the use of the methods of the new historical profession. Throughout the decade, the material method, successful in an era of rapid technological change, quickly subsumed to Mahan’s precursors. In a debate originally dominated by tactics, we observe the introduction of strategy by the French materialist Jeune École. Consequently, strategy became the core of the historical school and seems closely linked to the rise of strategy as a subject of reflection. The Jeune École believed that the torpedo would democratize Sea Power in making the powerful navies to use its mastery over the oceans. The Jeune École’s original success was so great, in France and abroad, that it influenced the English’s debate. Although materialists in Great Britain where more moderate than in France, they finally got marginalize by the historical school using the Jeune École’s wildest claims to disqualify the materialist point of view. Studying the debates through the Royal United Service Institution Journal, this thesis shows the existence, in Great Britain, of a debate centered on two method of thinking naval warfare and contributes to reassess current historiography which still focuses solely on the rise of Mahan’s precursors.

This dissertation offers a framework for understanding the strategies of states engaged in competition for regional hegemony. Although international relations literature refers extensively to such competition and obliquely to states' strategies, to date little has been done to show how states' strategies in such competition may be analyzed. Drawing on a variety of strategic literature, this dissertation synthesizes a theoretical approach to analyzing the strategies of states engaged in regional security competition. Employing insights drawn from business strategy, this dissertation argues for an essentially asymmetric understanding of fundamental policy goals for states engaged in competition for regional hegemony, with one state attempting to maintain a dominant position and another attempting, by focusing limited resources, to supplant it. The competition is understood metaphorically (based on an anecdote from the end of the Cold War) as a “race with no finish line,” with the reigning hegemon attempting to extend the race and the challenger attempting to create a finish line and cross it. With homage to realism, liberalism, and constructivism, possible state goals are categorized as belonging to three realms: security, welfare, and intangible goals. These are used as metrics for a state's success or failure in any given competitive scenario, as well as the resources at its disposal. Drawing on military strategic literature, this thesis then applies decision-cycle analysis to state competitive behavior. The conclusions from this analysis are then synthesized into a framework for analysis of similar regional competitive scenarios, the first such framework yet devised for such purposes. A case study: the “Dreadnought Race” between Britain and Germany prior to World War One, is then examined, in which states' performance is analyzed in the competitive scenario in light of the above strategic precepts.