ABSTRACT This thesis examines how Russian political elites and intellectuals have approached the issues of Russian nation and diaspora since 1991. This thesis observes that while Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin claim to advocate a civic definition of a nation in the boundaries of Russia / they extend the definition of Russian nation to cover the &lsquo / Russian diaspora&rsquo / as well. This thesis argues that the inclusion of the term Russian diaspora in Russian discourse of nationalism has paved the way for developing a consensus about Russia&rsquo / s new identity among its political elites and intellectuals. Accordingly, Russia which is defined as a homeland of ethnic Russians identifies itself as the protector of the rights of Russians in ex-Soviet republics. Moreover, this diasporic politics has been used to legitimate the Russian engagement in the internal and external affairs of post-Soviet states. Nevertheless, as this thesis demonstrates, ethnic Russians residing in the post-Soviet states have significant diversity in terms of their political orientations towards Russia. There are five parts in this thesis. After the introduction, the first chapter explains the role of Russian diaspora in the politics of Russian nationalism under Yeltsin and Putin. While the second chapter examines intellectual approaches to the issues of Russian national identity and diaspora, the third chapter focuses on the conditions of ethnic Russians in the post-Soviet states. The final part is the conclusion.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has affected millions of people in different ways. The everyday lives of Russians has changed significantly. Our purpose in this study is to explore the experiences of Russian immigrants in Sweden. The areas we are specifically interested in are the understanding individuals have of the conflict and the experiences these individuals describe when it comes to how the conflict has affected their sense of identity as well as their personal relationships with friends and family. This qualitiative study was conducted through interviews of these Russian immigrants. The perspective from the Russian diaspora is a rather unexplored one compared to their Ukrainian counterpart. This study covers many different subjects and there is a lack of previous research on this specific topic, likely because of the recency of these events. Considering this, the section on previous research is based on the themes the study discusses. These themes are public opinion of international military interventions, the Russian diaspora, empathy in polarized politics, shame, and group responsibility, and finally the group borders in the Ukrainian solidarity movement. The theoretical framework this study is based on is emotional sociology. A theory has been built out of the combined viewpoints of Goffman’s theory on categorization and stigma, Collins’s theory of group solidarity, interaction ritual, and conflict talk, Hochschild’s theory of deep stories and empathy walls as well as Scheff’s theory on shame and conformity. The final results of the study show that the understanding of the conflict varies wildly between individuals and said understanding tends to affect in which manner the conflict has changed the sense of identity as well as personal relationships. The individuals who share an understanding that agrees with the idea that Russia is at fault tend to feel a larger sense of shame over their identity and it has had a more negative effect on their personal relationships especially with family in Russia. Individuals who are more inclined to either have a more ambivalent- or pro-Putin understanding didn’t express these experiences but instead had different worries, such as receiving negative sanctions for their opinions. Respondents of all understandings expressed a worry about suffering sanctions for their ethnicity, but none of them described personal experiences with this in Sweden. / Den ryska invasionen av Ukraina har påverkat miljontals människor på olika sätt. Ryssars vardagliga liv har förändrats ordentligt av detta. Vårt syfte i denna studie är att undersöka ryska invandrare i Sverige och deras olika upplevelser. De områden vi är specifikt intresserade av är förståelsen individer har av konflikten och de upplevelser de beskriver angående hur konflikten har påverkat deras identitet och relationer till vänner och familj. Denna kvalitativa studie genomfördes genom intervjuer av dessa ryssar. Den ryska diasporans perspektiv är ett relativt outforskat område i jämförelse med den ukrainska motsvarigheten. Denna studie täcker många olika ämnen och det finns en brist på tidigare forskning på specifikt detta ämne, troligtvis på grund av hur aktuell situationen fortfarande är. Med tanke på detta är sektionen med tidigare forskning baserad på de teman som studien diskuterar. Dessa teman är den allmänna opinionen angående internationella militära interventioner, den ryska diasporan, empati i polariserad politik, skam och gruppansvar och slutligen gruppgränser inom den ukrainska solidaritetsrörelsen. Den teoretiska referensramen vi utgått från är baserad på emotionssociologi. En teori har blivit byggd av de gemensamma synpunkterna av Goffmans teori om kategorisering och stigma, Collins teori om gruppsolidaritet, interatktionsritualer och konfliktsamtal, Hochschilds teori om deep story och empatimurar samt Scheffs teori om skam och konformitet. Resultaten av studien visar att förståelsen av konflikten varierar stort mellan individer och detta tenderar att påverka hur konflikten har förändrat deras identitet och relationer. Individer som delar en förståelse som stämmer överens med idén att konflikten är Rysslands fel tenderar att känna mer skam över deras identitet och det har haft en större negativ påverkan på deras relationer, framförallt med familj i Ryssland. Individer som är mer benägna att antingen ha en mer ambivalent- eller pro-Putinförståelse utryckte inte dessa upplevelser utan andra saker oroade dem, som att lida negativa sociala sanktioner för deras åsikter. Respondenter från alla olika former av förståelse utryckte en oro över att få lida sanktioner på grund av deras etnicitet, men ingen beskrev några personliga erfarenheter av detta i Sverige.

無論是沙皇政權或是蘇維埃政權，都會在侵略併吞而來的土地上實行俄化或是蘇維埃化的政策，希望能建立一個大一統的國家，創造一個享有共同文化、共同語言、甚至是有共同認同的民族。但是，1991年蘇聯的解體，不只打破了蘇共創造「蘇維埃民族」的美夢，還證明了蘇聯民族政策的嚴重錯誤。 19世紀以前，進入波海地區的俄羅斯人數量並不多。19世紀之後，沙皇政府開始在此區實行大規模的俄化，並開始將大批的俄羅斯人遷移至此。從第一次世界大戰以後到第二次世界大戰這段期間，波海三國享有了一段短暫的獨立國家時期。這個時期，基本上，波海三國對其境內的俄羅斯人是採取尊重的態度。第二次世界大戰爆發，因為德蘇密約的簽訂，使波海三國再次地被蘇聯併吞。史達林佔領波海三國之後，立刻大規模地流放波海三國的人民，並將大批的俄羅斯人引進，使愛沙尼亞與拉脫維亞兩國在人口統計學上的俄化情形十分嚴重。 1985年戈巴契夫上台以後，波海三國利用改革的機會，追求獨立，最後，以非暴力的方式獲得成功，重建獨立國家。波海三國獨立以後，俄羅斯人的地位有了很大的改變，一下子從優勢的統治地位變成弱勢的少數民族。愛沙尼亞與拉脫維亞因為懷疑俄羅斯人的忠誠度以及擔心會被滅族，所以採取了排外的公民權法，使大部分的俄羅斯人都無法獲得公民權。另外，因為大部分的俄羅斯人都不會說愛沙尼亞語或拉脫維亞語，所以不僅在取得公民權上有困難，在經濟與社會處境上也變得比較差。至於俄羅斯人的認同，可以說是複雜的。大多數的俄羅斯人在政治上是對所居住的共和國忠誠，在文化上還是認為自己是屬於俄羅斯文化的一部份。至於立陶宛，賦予境內大部分的俄羅斯人公民權，因此，立陶宛的族群關係較緩和。 俄羅斯政府自認為是境外俄羅斯人權益的捍衛者，但是，對於波海三國的少數民族政策所能造成的影響並不大。相反地，西方政府的批評與建議常常能成功地影響波海三國的決策。主要的原因在於波海三國急切地想回歸歐洲、西方政府與組織能提供援助、滿足國家安全需求與歐安組織派遣使節到愛、拉兩國。 / No matter what it was the Czar’s regime or the Soviet government, it would always implement a policy of Russification or Sovietization on invaded lands, in order to establish a united nation with common culture, shared the same language and national identity. However, since the breaking down of the Soviet Union in 1991, not only the dream of the ‘Soviet People’ broke down, but it also suggested a misleading of ethnic-national policy. Before the 19th century, there were not many Russians in the Baltic area. After the 19th century, the Czar’s regime started to implement the policy of Russification on a large scale, and it also moved many Russians to settle there. During the period of the First World War and the Second World War, the Baltic States had enjoyed a short period as independent nations. In this period, the Baltic States basically treated the Russians within their states with respect. Because Germany and Russia had signed a treaty before the Second World War, therefore, when the war erupted, the Baltic States were once again occupied by the Russia. After Stalin took over the Baltic States, he exiles people from the Baltic States on a large scale, while moving many Russians into these countries. As a result, Estonia and Latvia were seriously Russificated demogranphically. In 1985, Gorbachev gained the power. While the Russia government was reforming its political entity, the Baltic States seized the opportunity to go independent. They successfully gained their independence through non-violent method and rebuild themselves as independent states. Ever since the Baltic States became independent, the status of the Russians within their regions had changed rapidly. The Russians were once the dominant ruling class and suddenly became the ruled minority. Estonia and Latvia are concerned with the issues of royalty of the Russian people, also they were worried that they would become extinct as an ethnic group, therefore, they adopted an exclusive citizenship laws. Because most of the Russians could not speak Estonian and Latvian languages, therefore, they had difficulties to acquire the citizenship and they also did poorly financially and politically within these two nations. As for the notion of the Russian identity, it was a very complicated issue. Most Russians are politically royal to the Republics they reside, but culturally they still considered themselves as part of the Russian culture. In Lithuania, it granted most of the Russians that reside in its nation the citizenship; therefore, the ethnic relationship within the country was less tense comparatively. Russian government always views itself as the protector of the rights of its people that reside in other countries. However, this does not affect the policies regarding the minority in the Baltic States. On the other hand, the criticism and suggestions from the western governments can often affect the process of the policy-making in the Baltic States. The main reason is that the Baltic States are eager to return to Europe, and they can acquire aids from the western governments and organizations, securing their nations. Another reason is Estonia and Latvia hopefully get rid of the representatives from OSCE as soon as possible.