Le matériel peint du Palais califal de Samarra est issu d'une fouille datant de 1913, il a traversé deux guerres mondiales et a été distribué sur plusieurs institutions à travers le monde. En outre la seule publication significative dont il a fait objet date de 1927 (Malereien) et il n'a pas été réévaluée depuis à l'exception de quelques études (iconographiques pour la plupart) aux interprétations divergentes. Ce travail fait d'abord une mise au point sur l'état actuel des peintures murales et des jarres peintes issues de ce Palais. Une analyse combinant l'observation directe de ce qui est conservé avec les données des archives et la confrontation avec ce qui est publié est ensuite proposée. En prenant en compte les travaux récents dont le Palais a fait objet et les publications plus ou moins récentes sur des témoignages archéologiques, techniques ou iconographiques pertinents au contexte, une étude argumentée tente de clarifier certaines questions d'interprétation de ce matériel et de sa datation. Le recours aux sources textuelles apporte de façon ponctuelle un appui au propos. Loin d'avoir résolu toutes les questions, ce travail a d'abord démontré que, bien qu'incontournable, le recours au Malereien devrait être complété par un retour aux archives et au matériel conservé. Ensuite l'analyse a révélé que ces peintures relèvent essentiellement d'une tradition locale, notamment pour leurs techniques. Une mixité de références est cependant décelable dans le vocabulaire iconographique où l'ancrage local reste plausible mais où d'autres pistes d'interprétations sont également envisageables. / The painted material uncovered at the Caliphal Palace of Samarra comes from an old excavation dating back to 1913, it went through two world wars and was distributed over several institutions throughout the world. Besides it has not been reassessed since then, apart from few studies (mainly iconographical) with divergent interpretations. The present study first provides an update on the present state of the murals and painted jars discovered at this Palace. It then offers an analysis combining observation of the preserved pieces and the study of archival data and a comparison with the already published information and analysis. Taking into account recent works and studies that have dealt with the Palace as well as recent publications related to archaeological, technical or iconographical evidence relevant to the context, a reasoned study attempts to clarify issues related to the interpretation of this material and its dating. Literary sources are sometimes used to support the arguments. Far from having resolved ail the questions, this study has first demonstrated that, although unavoidable, the Malereien shouldn't be the only source to rely on and that archival data and preserved material should also be taken into account. Then, the analysis has shown that this material stems principally from a local tradition, particularly as far as its techniques are concerned. However, the iconographic vocabulary reveals diverse references where local roots remain plausible but other interpretations are also possible.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / After defeating the Iraqi military, Coalition Forces spread out across Iraq to stabilize and transition control of the country back to Iraqis. This historical analysis of Mosul, Ramadi, and Samarra studies military operations intended to stabilize these three cities from April 2003 to September 2005. Prior to and after the reestablishment of Iraqi sovereignty, Coalition Forces worked with Iraqi citizens at the local level to reestablish control of the population. In order to achieve this, the counterinsurgent force must understand that when consensus for non-violent political opposition does not exist within the governed populace, coercive measures must be taken to enforce local security. This analysis evaluates the effects of military operations over time and through frequent unit transitions with varying numbers of U.S. and Iraqi security forces. The conclusions gleaned from this analysis are summarized as unit approaches that either achieved control or failed to achieve control at the local level. This study suggests that a distributed lightto- medium equipped ground force operating within urban centers and in continuous close proximity to the population is best able to establish local control and partner with local police and military forces. This force should be enabled with language and cultural skills. Necessary combat multipliers include human intelligence collectors and social network analysts. / Major, United States Army