This is an examination of how the fictional representation and re-creation of past wars is colliding with the personal video presentations of the Iraq War. It raises questions about how war and art are experienced in a new way and also how “instant history” is made available to the public. Personally recorded footage of the everyday experience of war has altered the way in which society views war and copes with its aftereffects because Generation Y has become a computer based generation. This is a reception study that will show how Generation Y has used the Baby Boomers’ input about the Vietnam War as a basis for its perceptions of historiography and as both a positive and negative framework for its videography.

Throughout history, radical individuals have caused violence and tarnished the reputation of many communities and beliefs. Following 9/11, Islamic Terrorism put fear into many individuals. New fronts of the War on Terror began to open as militaries began to engage terrorist groups who sought to take action through radical beliefs. Al Qaeda had opened up a new front and joined the ranks of the Sunni Insurgency to confront the armed forces of the United States as the Invasion of Iraq began to unfold. This new group had radical leaders who were able to incite a stiff and violent campaign against their enemies. The U.S. was able to slow down the group, but not the ideology, tactics, and leadership once it withdrew from the conflict zone. As leaders in the area began to divide their societies by violence and marginalization, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria were able to come into power and create small, quasi-legitimate caliphate. Although the group may be somewhat defeated in the region, the ideology will carry on. By using organizational theory, we can better compare both groups and learn from their strengths and weaknesses. Through analyzing this parallel case study, new doors may be opened up for research to be able to slow down radical ideologies and thwart violent actions. / Master of Arts / Following 9/11, we begin to see the United States devote countless amounts of resources and energy to combat radical Islamic ideologies. In this, we study Al Qaeda and its Iraq branch, AQI, and how its remnants were able to create one of the most successful and notorious Islamic terror organizations. This thesis allows growth to the study of terrorism, primarily by comparing two terror groups and understanding their rise to success and failures. This thesis also helps study how groups can split apart and form new offshoot organizations. Looking into groups' ideologies allows for the researchers to also how they may affect success. As groups rise and fall, there may a continuation of an ideology. New platforms can assist in this, and play large parts of a groups success. Leadership can be a large factor, guiding a group to success or hurting its image. To combat terror organizations, the military can affect how they grow, thus showing the power of settings and where terror organizations can thrive. By comparing and contrasting organizations, it allows for a different approach of research that can help in preventing violent actors to continue on a similar path.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / After defeating the Iraqi military, Coalition Forces spread out across Iraq to stabilize and transition control of the country back to Iraqis. This historical analysis of Mosul, Ramadi, and Samarra studies military operations intended to stabilize these three cities from April 2003 to September 2005. Prior to and after the reestablishment of Iraqi sovereignty, Coalition Forces worked with Iraqi citizens at the local level to reestablish control of the population. In order to achieve this, the counterinsurgent force must understand that when consensus for non-violent political opposition does not exist within the governed populace, coercive measures must be taken to enforce local security. This analysis evaluates the effects of military operations over time and through frequent unit transitions with varying numbers of U.S. and Iraqi security forces. The conclusions gleaned from this analysis are summarized as unit approaches that either achieved control or failed to achieve control at the local level. This study suggests that a distributed lightto- medium equipped ground force operating within urban centers and in continuous close proximity to the population is best able to establish local control and partner with local police and military forces. This force should be enabled with language and cultural skills. Necessary combat multipliers include human intelligence collectors and social network analysts. / Major, United States Army