Urban operations is one of the most difficult challenges a modern army can be tasked with. These challenges have been studied in history and present with various perspectives, but rarely from a combat engineering point of view. The purpose of this thesis has been to study the urban capabilities of a Swedish combat engineer company by examining if it can perform similar combat engineering fieldwork that supported the basic capabilities mobility, defence and effect in Operation AL FAJR, Fallujah Iraq 2004. These are the capabilities a Swedish engineer company are primarily designed to support in urban operations. For example, the study of Operation AL FAJR has shown that fieldwork supported mobility with breaching minefields, obstacles, walls and doors. Defence by creating defensive positions and obstacles. Effect by destroying weapons caches and fortified buildings with bulldozers and explosives.  The results of this study indicates that a Swedish combat engineer company has the capability to perform most of the fieldwork performed in Operation AL FAJR. However, the company lacks capability to destroy fortified buildings and perform explosive mine and obstacle breaching, all examples on fieldwork performed in AL FAJR. / Operationer i bebyggelse är kanske en av de svåraste utmaningar en modern armé kan ställas inför. Dessa utmaningar har studerats i historien och i nutid med olika utgångspunkter, men väldigt sällan ur ett fältarbetsperspektiv. Syftet med det här arbetet har varit att studera de urbana förmågorna hos ett svenskt ingenjörkompani genom att undersöka om det kan utföra liknande fältarbeten som genomfördes för att stödja de grundläggande förmågorna rörlighet, skydd och verkan i Operation AL FAJR, Fallujah Iraq 2004. Dessa är de förmågor som ett svenskt ingenjörkompani huvudsakligen ska kunna understödja i urbana operationer. Studien av Operation AL FAJR har till exempel visat på att fältarbeten understödde rörlighet genom minbrytning, forcering av hinder och inbrytningar genom väggar och dörrar. Skydd genom att bygga stridsfordonsvärn. Verkan genom att förstöra vapengömmor samt förstöra byggnader och motståndsnästen med sprängmedel och bandschaktare. Resultatet av det här arbetet tyder på att ett svenskt ingenjörkompani har förmåga till att genomföra huvuddelen av de fältarbeten som förekom i Operation AL FAJR. Dock saknar kompaniet till exempel förmåga för att förstöra motståndsnästen och genomföra explosiv hinderröjning och minbrytning, samtliga exempel på fältarbeten som förekom i AL FAJR.

No / There are few today who can claim that the US occupation of Iraq has been a success, for Iraq or the US. A War Too Far takes this on by looking back on the many unanswered questions about the invasion itself. What was the real reason for the Iraq War? Did George Bush ever have a strategy to confront al-Qaida in one arena? How does the invasion alter Iraq's relationship with Iran? And what does this mean for the future? World-renowned security expert Paul Rogers tackles these questions, offering a uniquely insightful analysis of events during and after the war. Examining the delicate balance of power in Iraq, he explores the options for a US exit strategy, and how the invasion affects America's relationship with Iran. Paul Rogers predicted in 2000 that the US would experience a terrorist attack on its own soil. Subsequent events proved how accurate he was. This book is required reading for students, journalists, policy-makers and anyone interested in getting the whole story about the dangerous consequences of the latest American venture in the Middle East. Paul Rogers explores: ¿ The neo-conservative vision of a US-dominated Middle East ¿ The oil link ¿ Iraq's significance in energy geopolitics ¿ Links with Israel ¿ the development of close military cooperation between the US and Israeli military ¿ The growing possibility of a war on Iran and its potential repercussions.

In today’s modern conflicts air power has proven to be a major contributing factor towards success.Whether the conflict is of regular or irregular nature, air power has many positive attributes that canplay a crucial role in the result of the battle. However there are cases where air superiority wasachieved but the outcome of the conflict didn’t result in success. Which indicates that air power isn’talways the key to success. To examine this further it is necessary to test an air theory on two separatecases that are similar but different in one aspect, the outcome. The theory that is used to examinethe two cases is Robert Pape´s theory “Coercive by denial”, because this theory has been criticizedthat it does not function on modern and irregular conflicts. The purpose of this thesis is to implement Pape´s air theory “Coercive by denial” to see if this theorycan explain the differences in the outcome between the two battles of Fallujah in Iraq 2004 by usinga comparative case study. Although air superiority was achieved in both battles the first is considereda failure, the second a success. The results of the research show that the theory cannot explain why the second battle was successfuland the first one was a failure. The result shows that Pape´s statement about what to target first inan irregular conflict to have the highest effect against insurgents isn’t always right. The result showsthat the second battle was more focused on attacking the enemy’s logistics then the first battle. Thatcould be a reason why the second battle was a success but it is against Pape´s own statement in histheory. The main conclusion of the thesis is that “Coercive by denial” cannot explain the variationin the outcome of the battles of Fallujah, and Pape´s theory can be questioned. This indicates thenecessity of further studies on Pape’s theory on irregular conflicts

The two battles for Fallujah took place in 2004. Earlier research states that air power was a key reason for the success following the second operation, and as a critical omission during the first operation. Following this statement that air power changed the way urban operations should be conducted it should be possible to use an air power theory to explain the different outcomes of the battles. The purpose of this study is to see if Robert Pape’s theory of denial strategy is applicable as an explanation for the two operations differences of outcome.   The method used for this study is a comparative case study of the two operations in which the operations are compared by analysing then using the framework of Pape’s theory.    The result of this study shows that the outcomes partly can be explained from Pape’s theory, but the results differ between the two components which leads to a discussion of what this means for the theory. The result contributes to the existing research and gives reason for criticism of the earlier research which states that it was Close Air Support (CAS) that was successful during the second operation. This study shows that CAS was mostly used during the first operation and only partly used during the second, successful, operation. This study states that it was the use of operative interdiction, one of the three components of Pape’s theory, which led to the second operations success.

Air power alone cannot hold ground and secure the population. How then can air power contribute to irregular conflicts? Robert Johnson states in his article Predicting Future War that air power have the potential to determine the outcome of irregular operations. Even though air superiority was achieved during the two battles of Fallujah in Iraq 2004 there is a difference in the outcome of the two operations, Vigilant Resolve and Phantom Fury. The purpose of this thesis is to examine if Warden´s theory The Enemy as a System and his Five-Ring Model can explain the variation in the outcome of the two battles using a comparative case study. Research findings indicate that the Five-Ring Model cannot explain why the second operation, Phan-tom Fury was a victory. The findings indicate that striking the most critical ring, i.e. Leaders, did not contribute to victory. Instead, results indicate that the most critical ring leading to victory in the second operation were Infrastructure. The main conclusion of the thesis is that the theory cannot explain the variation in the outcomes and that Warden´s Five-Ring Model cannot be applied to an irregular enemy and therefore needs to be questioned and further researched. The findings further strengthen earlier research stating that the most critical part of an enemy may not always be represented by Leaders.

Throughout history, radical individuals have caused violence and tarnished the reputation of many communities and beliefs. Following 9/11, Islamic Terrorism put fear into many individuals. New fronts of the War on Terror began to open as militaries began to engage terrorist groups who sought to take action through radical beliefs. Al Qaeda had opened up a new front and joined the ranks of the Sunni Insurgency to confront the armed forces of the United States as the Invasion of Iraq began to unfold. This new group had radical leaders who were able to incite a stiff and violent campaign against their enemies. The U.S. was able to slow down the group, but not the ideology, tactics, and leadership once it withdrew from the conflict zone. As leaders in the area began to divide their societies by violence and marginalization, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria were able to come into power and create small, quasi-legitimate caliphate. Although the group may be somewhat defeated in the region, the ideology will carry on. By using organizational theory, we can better compare both groups and learn from their strengths and weaknesses. Through analyzing this parallel case study, new doors may be opened up for research to be able to slow down radical ideologies and thwart violent actions. / Master of Arts / Following 9/11, we begin to see the United States devote countless amounts of resources and energy to combat radical Islamic ideologies. In this, we study Al Qaeda and its Iraq branch, AQI, and how its remnants were able to create one of the most successful and notorious Islamic terror organizations. This thesis allows growth to the study of terrorism, primarily by comparing two terror groups and understanding their rise to success and failures. This thesis also helps study how groups can split apart and form new offshoot organizations. Looking into groups' ideologies allows for the researchers to also how they may affect success. As groups rise and fall, there may a continuation of an ideology. New platforms can assist in this, and play large parts of a groups success. Leadership can be a large factor, guiding a group to success or hurting its image. To combat terror organizations, the military can affect how they grow, thus showing the power of settings and where terror organizations can thrive. By comparing and contrasting organizations, it allows for a different approach of research that can help in preventing violent actors to continue on a similar path.