The increased probability that future battles will take place in cities can leave military organizations unprepared for future conflicts. Urban warfare requires a different tactical approach than battles in other terrain due to its unique complexity. Previous research on urban warfare tends to agree that combined arms contribute to urban tactical success but lacks on explanations for how it carries into effect inside cities.   This study will examine how combined arms can lead to tactical victory, in a theory-testing approach, by analyzing the U.S assaults on Aachen in 1944 and Fallujah in 2004 during Operation Phantom Fury. Since the Swedish Armed Forces can be considered tactically influenced by Robert Leonhards theory on combined arms, the purpose of this study is to examine the theory’s ability to explain tactical success in urban terrain. The results show that an attacking combined arms force with superior firepower can put the defending enemy in a dilemma. However, the dilemma creates unfavorable conditions for the Alcyoneus principle of the theory to explain why the attacking forces succeeded.

In 1994, military historian Martin Van Creveld presented his hypothesis about the future of modern military conflicts. He argued that these conflicts primarily would involve non-state actors or state actors employing unconventional means and methods. Thirty years later, his hypothesis appears more relevant than ever. He claims that his theory of maneuver warfare should be able to explain success against this type of adversary.  This thesis aims to test whether Van Creveld's theory of maneuver warfare can lead to success when a conventional actor faces an unconventional opponent. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the current research regarding maneuver warfare and increase understanding of whether his theory can be applied against an unconventional adversary.  The theory has been applied on the U.S. lead coalition during Operation Anaconda and Operation Phantom Fury, from early 2000s. The result of the thesis implies that Van Creveld's theory of maneuver warfare can explain the outcome of both operations and should therefore be considered as valid. However, several circumstances are identified that should be considered in modern military conflicts in the future.

Even though battles have been fought in built-up areas for a long time, there have not been any specific theories connected to it. As the world becomes increasingly urbanized, the problem of not having any complete theories with which to analyze military operations in urban terrain becomes bigger. This essay aims to contribute to the field of military theory by investigating if Robert Leonhard’s theory of combined arms can be used in analyzing such operations and to be able to explaining the outcome of them.   The main question posed in this essay is; to what extent can Leonhard’s theory explain the outcome of military operations in urban terrain? The method used to answer this question is a comparative method formed as a case study of two military operations in urban terrain, Operation Vigilant Resolve and Operation Phantom Fury, which both took place in Fallujah during the Iraq war 2004. The intention is to test Leonhard’s theory in both cases by assigning the theory several indicators, which are tested in each case.   The result shows that the indicators appeared almost equally in both cases, even though one of the operations was said to be a success and the other a failure. However during the occasions when the coalition force used combined arms, both operations achieved military effectiveness. The conclusion is that Leonhard’s theory of combined arms cannot be used to explain the outcome of military operations in urban terrain. The theory has not been verified and strengthened by empirical evidence, but weakened, which is the opposite of what should have been the result. Combined arms-theory cannot be used to assimilate lessons learned from military operations in urban terrain.

The two battles for Fallujah took place in 2004. Earlier research states that air power was a key reason for the success following the second operation, and as a critical omission during the first operation. Following this statement that air power changed the way urban operations should be conducted it should be possible to use an air power theory to explain the different outcomes of the battles. The purpose of this study is to see if Robert Pape’s theory of denial strategy is applicable as an explanation for the two operations differences of outcome.   The method used for this study is a comparative case study of the two operations in which the operations are compared by analysing then using the framework of Pape’s theory.    The result of this study shows that the outcomes partly can be explained from Pape’s theory, but the results differ between the two components which leads to a discussion of what this means for the theory. The result contributes to the existing research and gives reason for criticism of the earlier research which states that it was Close Air Support (CAS) that was successful during the second operation. This study shows that CAS was mostly used during the first operation and only partly used during the second, successful, operation. This study states that it was the use of operative interdiction, one of the three components of Pape’s theory, which led to the second operations success.

Different prerequisites for war exists and varies due to the terrain. Cities, mountains and covered terrain all creates their special conditions for the battle. The biggest difference in methods is found between the urban warfare and all the other ways of fighting in war. Combined arms constitutes the fundamentals of fighting a war, and organizing armed forces. But if the environment of the war is changing, the different prerequisites of combined arms need to change. The purpose of this study is to survey the distinguishing differences and prerequisites between the two kinds of environments, described in the invasion and fight in Rumaila oil field (2003) and Operation Phantom Fury (2004). By analyzing these cases, the purpose of this theory consuming case study is to explore and examine the use of combined arms in different environments during the Iraqi war in between 2003 and 2004. The analytical results reveal that the prerequisites before Operation Phantom Fury that made the operation successful was premonition to all the civilians in the city of Fallujah, the aggressive and massive use of indirect fire support, the reorganization of the divisions backbone, infantry, and finally the knowledge from earlier operations in Fallujah.

The world is rapidly becoming more urbanised and with key infrastructure being located inside or close to cities the probability of urban warfare in the next major conflict is very high. This thesis examines how the use of Alice Hills theory can explain success in urban warfare on the tactical level of war. The purpose of the thesis is to test the validity of Hills theory. To examine to what extent Hills’s theory can explain the success of the coalition forces during Operation Phantom Fury and the failure of Operation Vigilant Resolve, a theory testing case study is applied. The two cases have similar background variables, which allows for a structured comparison of the two cases. The analysis is based on Hills’s success factors in urban warfare. The results of the analysis reveal that Hills theory can explain the success of the coalition during Operation Phantom Fury and the failure of Operation Vigilant Resolve, thereby strengthening the validity of Hills theory. The results highlight the need to control the civilian population during urban combat. However, due to the difficulties of measuring success factors such as leadership and morale with the chosen method, the external validity of the results is negatively affected.

Världen globaliseras och urbaniseras i en allt högre takt vilket innebär utmaningar för framtida försvarsmakter. Försvarsmakterna kommer mer frekvent att få lösa militära operationer genom strid i bebyggelse (SIB). Denna undersöknings ansats är att pröva Alice Hills teori om framgångsfaktorer som analyserats fram ur krigshistoriens militära operationer i kontexten SIB. Hills argumenterar för en mängd framgångsfaktorer. Denna undersökning prövar faktorerna utbildningsståndpunkt/stridserfarenhet, tillgång till infanteriförband, nyttjande av indirekt bekämpning och tredje parts inverkan på operationer. Dessa faktorer prövas i en jämförande fallstudie av operationerna i Fallujah 2004 Operation Vigilant Resolve (misslyckad operation) och Operation Phantom Fury (framgångsrik operation) vilka båda ingick i Operation Iraqi Freedom. De källor som har nyttjats för att genomföra teoriprövningen är Vincent L. Foulks, ”The Battle for Fallujah: Occupation, Resistance and Stalemate in the War in Iraq” och Bing Wests ”No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah”. Resultatet av undersökningen stärker Hills teori om de fyra prövade framgångsfaktorerna. Fallstudien påvisar att ingående förband i Operation Vigilant Resolve (misslyckad operation) endast hade en grundlagd utbildningsståndpunkt i SIB samt att stora delar av förbanden saknade stridserfarenhet. Vidare påvisar undersökningen att det var låg numerär av infanteriförband och att mixen mellan infanteri och pansarförband medförde att infanteriförbanden inte kunde lösa uppgiften att skydda pansarförbanden i tillräcklig omfattning. I denna operation finns inget som bevisar att någon form att markgrupperad, indirekt bekämpning nyttjats. Tredje parts påverkan var stor givet förutsättningen att endast en mindre del av befolkning flytt staden Fallujah. Operation Phantom Fury påvisar det motsatta gentemot Operation Vigilant Resolve. Förbanden var bättre utbildade genom att de fått dra lärdom under genomförande under Operation Vigilant Resolve samt att de fått stridserfarenhet genom samma operation. Stor numerär av infanteri och en bättre mix av infanteri och pansarförband där infanteriet understöddes av pansarförbanden istället för tvärtom som var fallet vid Operation Vigilant Resolve. Operation nyttjade indirekt bekämpning i form av granatkastare och artilleri i stor omfattning. Den fjärde och sist prövande framgångsfaktorn, tredje parts inverkan på operationen påvisar att stora delar av staden Fallujah var utrymd vilket indirekt påverkar framförallt faktorn nyttjande av indirekt bekämpning. Sammanfattningsvis stärker denna teoriprövande fallstudie Hills förklaringskraft avseende de fyra utvalda framgångsfaktorerna. Detta ger en vetenskaplig grund att bygga framtidens förband kring där SIB kommer vara frekvent återkommande.

The Principles of War have long been debated about their relevance and usefulness within the military context. Some theorists think that the Principles of War are laws that should be followed to achieve success in battle, while others see them more as guidelines. The principles have also been discussed on which level and type of warfare they should apply on, furthermore which types of principles to include. A theorist that has published a revised set of nine principles is Marvin Pokrant (2021), these Principles of War aim to be relevant across all levels and types of warfare. They are also one of the most contemporary sets of principles and has not yet been tested. Therefore, are the purpose of this study to both contribute to the overall research about the principles of war and more specifically if Pokrant’s (2021) set of principles has any explanatory value about success in modern military operations. The result of this study shows that this set of principles has explanatory value about the success in modern military operations. This is because the successful case had eight out of nine principles present, while the unsuccessful case only had two.