Western armies, while traditionally avoiding urban combat, cannot ignore cities due to their significant operational, strategic, and political resources. This study has a dual purpose: firstly, to assess the applicability of Alice Hill's theory to a close-to-peer conflict, and secondly, to deepen understanding of the factors influencing tactical outcomes in urban warfare. Conducted as a comparative case study, it analyzes Russia's assault on Grozny and Israel's assault on Bint Jbeil. Key findings indicate that the application of Hill's tenets significantly increases the likelihood of success in such conflicts. Crucially, training and prior combat experience are shown to be decisive in determining outcomes. The study not only reinforces the validity of Hill's theory but also contributes to military professionalism by emphasizing the importance of a robust foundation for tactical success in urban areas before conflicts arise.

The increased probability that future battles will take place in cities can leave military organizations unprepared for future conflicts. Urban warfare requires a different tactical approach than battles in other terrain due to its unique complexity. Previous research on urban warfare tends to agree that combined arms contribute to urban tactical success but lacks on explanations for how it carries into effect inside cities.   This study will examine how combined arms can lead to tactical victory, in a theory-testing approach, by analyzing the U.S assaults on Aachen in 1944 and Fallujah in 2004 during Operation Phantom Fury. Since the Swedish Armed Forces can be considered tactically influenced by Robert Leonhards theory on combined arms, the purpose of this study is to examine the theory’s ability to explain tactical success in urban terrain. The results show that an attacking combined arms force with superior firepower can put the defending enemy in a dilemma. However, the dilemma creates unfavorable conditions for the Alcyoneus principle of the theory to explain why the attacking forces succeeded.

Different prerequisites for war exists and varies due to the terrain. Cities, mountains and covered terrain all creates their special conditions for the battle. The biggest difference in methods is found between the urban warfare and all the other ways of fighting in war. Combined arms constitutes the fundamentals of fighting a war, and organizing armed forces. But if the environment of the war is changing, the different prerequisites of combined arms need to change. The purpose of this study is to survey the distinguishing differences and prerequisites between the two kinds of environments, described in the invasion and fight in Rumaila oil field (2003) and Operation Phantom Fury (2004). By analyzing these cases, the purpose of this theory consuming case study is to explore and examine the use of combined arms in different environments during the Iraqi war in between 2003 and 2004. The analytical results reveal that the prerequisites before Operation Phantom Fury that made the operation successful was premonition to all the civilians in the city of Fallujah, the aggressive and massive use of indirect fire support, the reorganization of the divisions backbone, infantry, and finally the knowledge from earlier operations in Fallujah.