In today’s modern conflicts air power has proven to be a major contributing factor towards success.Whether the conflict is of regular or irregular nature, air power has many positive attributes that canplay a crucial role in the result of the battle. However there are cases where air superiority wasachieved but the outcome of the conflict didn’t result in success. Which indicates that air power isn’talways the key to success. To examine this further it is necessary to test an air theory on two separatecases that are similar but different in one aspect, the outcome. The theory that is used to examinethe two cases is Robert Pape´s theory “Coercive by denial”, because this theory has been criticizedthat it does not function on modern and irregular conflicts. The purpose of this thesis is to implement Pape´s air theory “Coercive by denial” to see if this theorycan explain the differences in the outcome between the two battles of Fallujah in Iraq 2004 by usinga comparative case study. Although air superiority was achieved in both battles the first is considereda failure, the second a success. The results of the research show that the theory cannot explain why the second battle was successfuland the first one was a failure. The result shows that Pape´s statement about what to target first inan irregular conflict to have the highest effect against insurgents isn’t always right. The result showsthat the second battle was more focused on attacking the enemy’s logistics then the first battle. Thatcould be a reason why the second battle was a success but it is against Pape´s own statement in histheory. The main conclusion of the thesis is that “Coercive by denial” cannot explain the variationin the outcome of the battles of Fallujah, and Pape´s theory can be questioned. This indicates thenecessity of further studies on Pape’s theory on irregular conflicts

The two battles for Fallujah took place in 2004. Earlier research states that air power was a key reason for the success following the second operation, and as a critical omission during the first operation. Following this statement that air power changed the way urban operations should be conducted it should be possible to use an air power theory to explain the different outcomes of the battles. The purpose of this study is to see if Robert Pape’s theory of denial strategy is applicable as an explanation for the two operations differences of outcome.   The method used for this study is a comparative case study of the two operations in which the operations are compared by analysing then using the framework of Pape’s theory.    The result of this study shows that the outcomes partly can be explained from Pape’s theory, but the results differ between the two components which leads to a discussion of what this means for the theory. The result contributes to the existing research and gives reason for criticism of the earlier research which states that it was Close Air Support (CAS) that was successful during the second operation. This study shows that CAS was mostly used during the first operation and only partly used during the second, successful, operation. This study states that it was the use of operative interdiction, one of the three components of Pape’s theory, which led to the second operations success.