In today’s modern conflicts air power has proven to be a major contributing factor towards success.Whether the conflict is of regular or irregular nature, air power has many positive attributes that canplay a crucial role in the result of the battle. However there are cases where air superiority wasachieved but the outcome of the conflict didn’t result in success. Which indicates that air power isn’talways the key to success. To examine this further it is necessary to test an air theory on two separatecases that are similar but different in one aspect, the outcome. The theory that is used to examinethe two cases is Robert Pape´s theory “Coercive by denial”, because this theory has been criticizedthat it does not function on modern and irregular conflicts. The purpose of this thesis is to implement Pape´s air theory “Coercive by denial” to see if this theorycan explain the differences in the outcome between the two battles of Fallujah in Iraq 2004 by usinga comparative case study. Although air superiority was achieved in both battles the first is considereda failure, the second a success. The results of the research show that the theory cannot explain why the second battle was successfuland the first one was a failure. The result shows that Pape´s statement about what to target first inan irregular conflict to have the highest effect against insurgents isn’t always right. The result showsthat the second battle was more focused on attacking the enemy’s logistics then the first battle. Thatcould be a reason why the second battle was a success but it is against Pape´s own statement in histheory. The main conclusion of the thesis is that “Coercive by denial” cannot explain the variationin the outcome of the battles of Fallujah, and Pape´s theory can be questioned. This indicates thenecessity of further studies on Pape’s theory on irregular conflicts

Air power alone cannot hold ground and secure the population. How then can air power contribute to irregular conflicts? Robert Johnson states in his article Predicting Future War that air power have the potential to determine the outcome of irregular operations. Even though air superiority was achieved during the two battles of Fallujah in Iraq 2004 there is a difference in the outcome of the two operations, Vigilant Resolve and Phantom Fury. The purpose of this thesis is to examine if Warden´s theory The Enemy as a System and his Five-Ring Model can explain the variation in the outcome of the two battles using a comparative case study. Research findings indicate that the Five-Ring Model cannot explain why the second operation, Phan-tom Fury was a victory. The findings indicate that striking the most critical ring, i.e. Leaders, did not contribute to victory. Instead, results indicate that the most critical ring leading to victory in the second operation were Infrastructure. The main conclusion of the thesis is that the theory cannot explain the variation in the outcomes and that Warden´s Five-Ring Model cannot be applied to an irregular enemy and therefore needs to be questioned and further researched. The findings further strengthen earlier research stating that the most critical part of an enemy may not always be represented by Leaders.