<p>Idag är krigföringens principer en vedertagen del av svensk doktrin. Så har det inte alltid varit. För ungefär ett sekel sedan tvistade militära tänkare i väst om det överhuvudtaget fanns något som kunde kallas för krigföringens principer. Det finns än idag de som hävdar att det inte finns några principer, eller att krigföring är en konst och inte en vetenskap. I Försvarsmaktens doktriner är dessa principer dock en väsentlig komponent. Detta arbete skildrar hur principerna gradvis tog sig in i Försvarsmaktens reglementen och doktriner för armén samt belyser hur de olika principerna dök upp, byttes ut och fick olika innebörd sedan de först implementerats i ett svenskt reglemente 1924.</p> / <p>The aim of this essay is to outline how the principles of war were implemented in Swedish army regulations and doctrines. The essay attempts to answer the following questions: What trends can be identified with regards to the importance of different principles? How have the principles been understood historically? The material used consists mainly of regulations and doctrine for the Swedish army from different parts of the 20th century. The method of the author is to analyze and compare the different regulations to come to conclusions about the importance of the principles of war in Swedish military history. The results of the essay indicate that surprise is the principle that has been a part of Swedish regulations the longest. This in turn could indicate that surprise is the principle that is the least susceptible to change in tactics and modernization.</p>

Idag är krigföringens principer en vedertagen del av svensk doktrin. Så har det inte alltid varit. För ungefär ett sekel sedan tvistade militära tänkare i väst om det överhuvudtaget fanns något som kunde kallas för krigföringens principer. Det finns än idag de som hävdar att det inte finns några principer, eller att krigföring är en konst och inte en vetenskap. I Försvarsmaktens doktriner är dessa principer dock en väsentlig komponent. Detta arbete skildrar hur principerna gradvis tog sig in i Försvarsmaktens reglementen och doktriner för armén samt belyser hur de olika principerna dök upp, byttes ut och fick olika innebörd sedan de först implementerats i ett svenskt reglemente 1924. / The aim of this essay is to outline how the principles of war were implemented in Swedish army regulations and doctrines. The essay attempts to answer the following questions: What trends can be identified with regards to the importance of different principles? How have the principles been understood historically? The material used consists mainly of regulations and doctrine for the Swedish army from different parts of the 20th century. The method of the author is to analyze and compare the different regulations to come to conclusions about the importance of the principles of war in Swedish military history. The results of the essay indicate that surprise is the principle that has been a part of Swedish regulations the longest. This in turn could indicate that surprise is the principle that is the least susceptible to change in tactics and modernization.

Due to the new demands put upon combat vehicles of today the development quickly strives for-ward. With developers and experts across the globe working to meet the needs of tomorrows armies. The question we ask ourselves is what will be the characteristics of these vehicles. In order to be able to categorize combat vehicle and analyze its characteristics we use the principles of war. Based on J.F.C Fullers theory from the early 19 hundreds that anything can be analysed using these principles, through a modern interpretation of the Swedish army, we can categorise the present and future abilities of combat vehicles. This interpretation includes lethality, mobility, protection, sustainability, command and intelligence. The future is represented by several articles regarding upcoming projects and future plans of vehicle developers and customers. This is some-thing witch has never been done before and gives us new ways of interpreting the role of the ar-moured fighting vehicle in the future of land warfare. The essay identifies lethality, mobility and protection as the most important principles of todays armoured fighting vehicles, witch diverts from the judgment that the most important principles of armoured fighting vehicles of the future will be mobility, protection, sustainability and command. / På grund av nya krav på stridsfordon så sker utvecklingen snabbt och offensivt. Experter och industrier världen över gör sitt yttersta för att möta behoven av framtidens arméer. Frågan som här ställs är hur dessa fordon kommer att se ut och vilka egenskaper kommer de ha. För att kunna kategorisera och analysera stridsfordonets och dess egenskaper används uppdragstaktikens grund-läggande förmågor. Detta baseras på J.F.C. Fullers teori om att förmågorna är tillämpbara på allt som gäller krigföring. Enligt svensk doktrin består de grundläggande förmågorna av verkan, rör-lighet, skydd, uthållighet, ledning och underrättelser/information. Det som undersöks är synsättet på framtidens stridsfordon i ett antal artiklar. Detta har aldrig gjorts tidigare i samma omfattning och ger oss möjlighet att se stridsfordonets roll i framtidens konflikter i nytt ljus. I uppsatsen identifieras verkan, rörlighet och skydd som de viktigaste förmågorna för dagens stridsfordon, vilket skiljer sig från resultatet att de viktigaste förmågorna för framtidens stridsfor-don kommer att vara rörlighet, skydd, uthållighet och ledning.

Since the dawn of military thinking, theorists have been trying to find the key to victory in armed conflict. theories of classic thinkers like Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz represented two positions in the debate regarding the principles of war as universally applicable rules for battle, or as a tool for planning not capable of fully overcoming the complex reality of war. In the wake of the first world war the principles of war as formulated by Fuller following his experiences of the war, found its way into doctrine. Naval theory on the principles of war developed under the influence of these thinkers through Alfred Mahan and Julian Corbett and is still found in naval doctrine.  The debate of the validity of the principles however, is still enduring. In a world of constant technological innovation and increasing complexity their relevance is questioned. Despite of this, modern theories on principles for warfare are still emerging from theorists like Geoffrey Till. The purpose of this study is to test the applicability of Till´s modern naval principles of war against historical battles, and thus, the timeless claim of the theory.  The study examines the theoretical reach of Till´stheory regarding principles of war, intended for naval warfare. This theory, much like its precursors, have adopted the Jominian school of thought, sharing the ambition of universal applicability. Geoffrey Tills Creating Decisive Victorywas tested against three historical cases of naval warfare.  The results of the study partially support the universal and timeless claim of Till´s theory by being represented, though not wholly, in every case. Additionally, the result indicates that the theory partially suffers from its modern design, impeding its timeless applicability. This claim, however, must be supported by further research.

I juli 2006 utbröt krig mellan Israel och Hizbollah i södra Libanon. Erfarenheterna från historien visade på att Israel borde kunna gå segrande ur kriget, men utgången blev en annan. Hizbollah nådde framgång och Israel misslyckades med sin militära kampanj trots övertag i luften och i militära resurser. För att förstå hur Hizbollah nådde framgång i kriget utifrån militärteoretiskt perspektiv så har denna uppsats till syfte att analysera det faktiska agerandet genom tre av krigföringens grundprinciper kraftsamling, överraskning, handlingsfrihet och doktrinen ”Hizbollahs 13 punkter för krigföring” genom krigföringens samtliga sju grundprinciper. Analysens resultat visar på att genom sitt agerande så uppnådde Hizbollah krigföringens grundprinciper kraftsamling, överraskning¸ handlingsfrihet och i sin doktrin finns samtliga sju av krigföringens grundprinciper representerade. Dessa visar att Hizbollahs framgång i kriget kan vara ett resultat av att de planerat och agerat efter krigföringens grundprinciper. / In July 2006, war broke out between Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. The experience showed that Israel should be able to emerge victorious from the war, but the outcome was different. Hezbollah achieved success and Israel failed in their military campaign despite superiority in the air and military resources. To understand how Hezbollah achieved success in the war on the basis of military theory perspective, this essay aims to analyze the actual conduct of warfare by three basic principles; concentration, surprise, flexibility. Hezbollah’s doctrine "Hezbollah's 13  principles of war" will be analyzed through all of the seven basic principles of war. Analysis results show that through their actions, Hezbollah used three of the principles of warfare and their doctrine contains all of the seven basic principles of warfare. These results suggest that Hezbollah's success in the war may be a result of the basic principles of warfare.

Background: The principles of war have a central but debated role in modern doctrine with heritage dating back to Sun Tzu. Despite that the principles are used in several modern doctrines, there is surprisingly little research to be found on these principles. The principles of security and surprise, are both argued as being key components in amphibious operations, though can also be seen as contradictory. Method: This thesis explores the principles of war by studying the theory of security, developing a theory with a set of success factors. These factors consist of physical protection, information supremacy and reserves. Hypothetically, the presence of these factors explains the outcome of amphibious raids. The theory is examined in a qualitative text analysis on two case studies on the raids on St Nazaire and Makin Island where the success factors are tested by a deductive dihedral design. The results open for a final discussion in comparison with Jimmy Johansson’s research of the principle of surprise previously made on the same raids. Results: The results show that security, through the presence of success factors, is positively affecting the outcome of amphibious raids, though further research is necessary. Security and surprise although contradictory can work in synergy with a successful surprise element leading to increased security and information supremacy a prerequisite for surprise.

Technology evolves quickly in the armed forces, however the quick progression and development in warfare is hindered when the war studies and tactics fall behind. This is apparent when examining the Swedish artillery system Archer. Even if “Archer” has the capability to shoot and use a high course trajectory, the tactics still focus on the traditional low course trajectory. A quantative study based on the principles of war (fire, movement and protection), examines if the high or low course trajectories are the most effective in an urban environment. Both the low and the high course trajectory has their own advantages however, in this study, the high course trajectory proves to be the most effective. This entails that the artillery tactics regarding the Archer needs to be examined and developed to match the technological advances.

SAMMANFATTNING Tid för förändring av krigföringens principer. Världen är i en konstant förändring, allianser bildas och överenskommelser tecknas. Detta har drivit omvärldsutvecklingen och globaliseringen till där vi är idag och där det militära maktmedlet används i syfte att uppnå politiska och religiösa målsättningar. Precis som världen har utvecklats så har även de militära styrkorna och vapensystem utvecklats. Att bli segrare i nästa konflikt är en innovationskraft som har drivit utvecklingen av den militära förmågan framåt runt om i världen. Krigen och konflikterna har fungerat som en testanläggning där vapensystem och den militära personalen prövas i strid. Erfarenheter från krigen har dragits och sedan implementerats i syfte att bli ännu starkare och militärt överlägsen.     Krigföringens principer, även kallade de militära grundprinciperna, är ett antal olika principer vilka syftar till att ge en vägledning i planering och genomförandet av militära operationer. Dessa principer togs fram och utvecklades under mitten av 1800-talet av militärteoretikerna Carl von Clausewitz och Antoine-Henri Jomini. Båda dessa militärteoretiker hade framgångar på slagfältet vilket gjorde att de fick genomslag för sina teorier. Dessa teorier har sedan, genom utbildning, applicerats på officerskårer världen över och på så sätt ”cementerats” fast och blivit en basplatta i militärteorin.  Dagens militärteoretiker, framförallt med en amerikansk anknytning, menar på att grundprinciperna är föråldrade på dagens slagfält. Principerna skrevs för att vinna ett lokalt slag på en begränsad plats, inte för att vinna ett krig som påverkar ett helt samhälle under en lång tid. Med en accelererande teknikutveckling och globalisering så har vissa av dessa grundprinciper blivit föråldrade och bör således omformuleras för att vara relevanta i en modern konflikt. Denna studie syftar till att undersöka om krigföringens principer, ur en svensk kontext, behöver förändras för att på ett mer adekvat sätt kunna möta en modern konflikt. Detta görs genom att undersöka utvalda amerikanska militärteoretikers teorier gällande vilka grundprinciper som är inaktuella och därmed behöver ersättas eller omformuleras. Genom en kvalitativ innehållsanalys undersöks sedan om dessa nya grundprinciper kan återfinnas i skrivningar i Försvarsmaktens doktriner vilket kan utgöra stöd för att dessa principer kan implementeras i en svensk kontext. Analysen och resultatet av denna studie påvisar att det finns grundprinciper vilka, ur en svensk kontext, är i behov av revidering för att på ett mer adekvat sätt vara applicerbara i en framtida konflikt. Vidare påvisar resultatet att dessa principer tydligt återfinns i skrivningar i Försvarsmaktens doktriner. Dessutom har teknikutvecklingen spelat en stor roll i vidareutvecklingen av grundprinciperna, då den kan fungera som ett stöd och komplement till grundprinciperna. Således bör de militära grundprinciperna omformuleras alternativt revideras i svenska doktriner syftande till att göra det möjligt för Sverige att stå som vinnare i nästa konflikt. Nyckelord: Försvarsmakten, Krigföringens principer, teknisk utveckling, Militärstrategisk doktrin, Precision, Förskjutning, Överraskning, Modern krigsföring, Hybridkrigsföring. / ABSTRACT Time to change the principles of war. The world is under constant change, alliances and agreements are made. This has pushed the development and globalization to where we stand today, and the military force is used to achieve political and religious objectives. The armed military forces and weapon systems have been refined, just like the world has. The strive to win the next armed conflict has been an innovation force, pushing the augmentation of armed forces around the world. The wars and conflicts have served as test facilities, were weapon systems and personnel have been proven on the battlefield. Experiences from the battlefield have been implemented, with the purpose to achieve more military superiority.        The principles of war are principles that are meant to give guidance in the planning and implementation of military operations. These principles were created during the mid-19th century by the two military theorists Carl Von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini. Both these military theorists had successful careers on the battlefield, contributing to the impact of their theories. These theories have been implemented in the education of officers worldwide, thereby forming a foundation in military theory.        Modern military theorists, especially from the US, states that the principles of war are outdated on the modern battlefield. The principles were written to win a battle in a constrained area, not for winning an entire war, affecting a whole society during a long period of time. With accelerating development of technology and globalization, some of the principles of war are outdated and should be rewritten or replaced to be relevant in a modern conflict.     The aim of this thesis is to examine if the principles of war, in a Swedish context, needs to be altered in order to confront a modern conflict more aptly. This is conducted through an examination of selected American military theorists’ theories in terms of which of the principles that are obsolete and in need of replacement or rephrasing. Swedish doctrines are then to be examined through qualitative content analysis in order to find wordings that can support the ability of these new principles of war to be implemented in a Swedish context. The analysis and result of this thesis demonstrates that there are principles of war that needs reformulation to be applicable on the battlefield of the future. Furthermore, the result demonstrates that these principles clearly are found in the Swedish doctrines writings. Also, the advancing technology has been a significant contributor in the development of the new principles of war, as a complement and support. The principles of war must be rewritten or changed in Swedish doctrines in order to enable Sweden to become the winner in the next modern conflict.           Keywords: Swedish armed forces, Principles of war, Technology development, Military Strategic Doctrine, Precision, Dislocate, Surprise, Modern Warfare, Hybrid Warfare.

The principle of war, surprise, has long been criticized for being imprecise and in need of interpretation. Some believe it is because of this ambiguity that the principle has survived in military doctrine. The purpose of the study is thereby to empirically test the principle of surprise to investigate its validity in modern naval warfare. Due to the lack of precision in doctrine, the surprise has been interpreted into an analytical instrument based on the compiled thoughts written by theoreticians; Sun Zi, Carl Von Clausewitz, Raoul Castex and Milan Vego. The analytical instrument aims to identify whether criteria for surprise are represented or not in a context of successful surprise. This was achieved through a two-case study based on a qualitative text analysis of the methods used by the Sea Tigers of Sri Lanka and the attack on ARA General Belgrano during the Falklands War. The study shows that all the criteria were met in some way in both cases and that the military principal surprise is valid as a principle of war in modern naval warfare. Further research is recommended to investigate more cases and not to limit the research to a tactical level.

The Principles of War have long been debated about their relevance and usefulness within the military context. Some theorists think that the Principles of War are laws that should be followed to achieve success in battle, while others see them more as guidelines. The principles have also been discussed on which level and type of warfare they should apply on, furthermore which types of principles to include. A theorist that has published a revised set of nine principles is Marvin Pokrant (2021), these Principles of War aim to be relevant across all levels and types of warfare. They are also one of the most contemporary sets of principles and has not yet been tested. Therefore, are the purpose of this study to both contribute to the overall research about the principles of war and more specifically if Pokrant’s (2021) set of principles has any explanatory value about success in modern military operations. The result of this study shows that this set of principles has explanatory value about the success in modern military operations. This is because the successful case had eight out of nine principles present, while the unsuccessful case only had two.