Principles of war have for a long time constituted a central part of military thinking, but for as long as they have existed their value has been debated and criticized. Strangely, there seems to exist almost no scientific research testing the empirical validity of such principles, despite the fact that they still appear to play an important role in military doctrine, training and education. This study aims to test the validity of principles of war, by examining whether they can explain the outcome of naval battle. Through a case study approach, principles of naval warfare expressed by theorist Geoffrey Till are tested on a historical naval engagement between US and Japanese forces during World War II. The result of the study shows a certain correlation between some of Till’s principles and victory in the analysed battle, and thereby proves the empirical validity of principles of war to some extent. Further research is however required to increase the confidence in principles as an analytical framework for explaining the outcome of battle, and to determine the possible underlying causal mechanisms.

In the current research, the factors of success and foundational principles of war are vaguely described; this is in spite of their prominent occurrence in military doctrines. There seems to be a lack of empirical evidence underpinning the theories of Wayne P. Hughes (2000) and Geoffrey Till (2014) and also few or none precursor studies that apply these frameworks to the analysis of modern sea battles, which reduces their theoretical validity. This paper aims to address the gap in empirical research in the field by applying the theories of Hughes and Till to a case-study examination of the Yom-Kippur war 1973 and to determine their utility and relevance for analysing modern naval warfare. The findings of the case-study indicate that Hughes’ theory in particular can contribute to the theoretical analysis of modern naval warfare since all factors of success were fulfilled. Nine of the eleven factors of Till's theory were identified in the analysis, and these nine are regarded as having high explanatory power. The remaining two factors partly identified in the analysis are regarded as having less relevance as factors of success for modern naval warfare. More empirical studies have to be researched to allow generalization of this papers results.

Since the dawn of military thinking, theorists have been trying to find the key to victory in armed conflict. theories of classic thinkers like Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz represented two positions in the debate regarding the principles of war as universally applicable rules for battle, or as a tool for planning not capable of fully overcoming the complex reality of war. In the wake of the first world war the principles of war as formulated by Fuller following his experiences of the war, found its way into doctrine. Naval theory on the principles of war developed under the influence of these thinkers through Alfred Mahan and Julian Corbett and is still found in naval doctrine.  The debate of the validity of the principles however, is still enduring. In a world of constant technological innovation and increasing complexity their relevance is questioned. Despite of this, modern theories on principles for warfare are still emerging from theorists like Geoffrey Till. The purpose of this study is to test the applicability of Till´s modern naval principles of war against historical battles, and thus, the timeless claim of the theory.  The study examines the theoretical reach of Till´stheory regarding principles of war, intended for naval warfare. This theory, much like its precursors, have adopted the Jominian school of thought, sharing the ambition of universal applicability. Geoffrey Tills Creating Decisive Victorywas tested against three historical cases of naval warfare.  The results of the study partially support the universal and timeless claim of Till´s theory by being represented, though not wholly, in every case. Additionally, the result indicates that the theory partially suffers from its modern design, impeding its timeless applicability. This claim, however, must be supported by further research.

Defence against an amphibious assault is an extremely difficult endeavour as is evident by the long line of successful amphibious assaults undertaken throughout history. Field fortifications has to a large extent been present in defences, yet little research has been done on the effects of field fortifications in preventing successful landing operations. Therefore, this thesis examines the specific role of field fortifications in defence against amphibious assaults. The purpose is to combine theories about amphibious operations with concepts of field fortifications to add depth to existing theories as two historical examples are examined.  Results show that the existing theories’ notions, especially regarding the devastating effects of indirect fire and pre-bombardment, are not true for the two cases of study. It is furthermore shown that avoiding terrain where the enemy’s defence is focused was of little consequence for whether the assault was successful or not. Of greater importance was the power imbalance of attacker versus defender. Lastly, it is argued that the development of advanced weaponry plausibly levels out the power imbalance as effects of pre-bombardment is more likely to be successful.

The coast is a domain characterized by great complexity based on its dynamic and challenging nature, which can create both opportunities and challenges for attackers and defenders. The purpose of this study is to investigate Geoffrey Till's theory of defence against amphibious operations and to increase an understanding of how military resources can be used to achieve success in defence in the event of a military attack from the sea. Research and theory development in this area have long been under-prioritized and Till has created a relatively unique theory, based on the prevailing research situation. These are arguments that strengthen the reason for examining the theory and field further. Through a theory-testing case study, the Battle of Wake Island and Operation Avalanche are analyzed to ascertain to what extent empirical evidence is given to the chosen theory. In this way, the explanatory capacity of the theory is determined and whether its credence is strengthened or weakened. The study discloses that Till's theory successfully explains the outcome of the first case however not the second. The analysis shows that a defence that acts on and adjacent to land contributes to success, which Till's theory does not emphasize. The study indicates that the theory is underspecified as it does not give any indication of how to prioritize between the different areas of the theory, which indicates that wone should be vigilant against the explanatory value of the theory.

This research paper examines the advantages of deployment of naval forces in peace support operations. The study has been undertaken because the research on this subject is fairly limited. The research tends to be normative and traditional strategists are often focusing on the effect of naval force in terms of war. None of the writers on the subject dispute the use of naval force moreover, they tend to highlight the advantages of a naval force.   The purpose is to analyse the usefulness of a naval force in peace support operations. This has been achieved by testing Till´s theory of the inherently advantage of a naval force in a study of two cases, Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic Sea during the conflict in former Yugoslavia and the Swedish contribution to UNIFIL MTF448 in Lebanon. These two cases were selected in order to ascertain to what extent Till´s theory can explain the effect of naval force. Results of this analyse demonstrate the existence of sound arguments for the use of naval force in peace support operations and the empirics of the two cases are valid evidence for that. Naval force can sometimes even work as an enabler for ground troops and air force. The analysis shows furthermore that flexibility and strategic mobility was the two most distinguishing features of a naval force in both cases.

On May 31 in 1916, the battle of Jutland between Germany and Great Britain broke out in the North Sea. By the end of the battle, Great Britain had won at the strategic level of warfare while the Germans became victorious at the tactical level. Much research has been done on the battle, however, only from the British perspective. Germany emerged victorious at the tactical level, and despite solid research efforts of the battle, no one has made efforts to understand the German victory. The purpose of the study is to analyze the Battle of Jutland, which contributes to the research world with knowledge of how Germany could win at the tactical level. This will be done with a theory-consuming approach where the warring sides based on Geoffrey Till’s 11 perspectives were compared. By analyzing the two warring sides with the help of till’s theory and comparing their tactics, a greater understanding of the outcome of the battle has been created at the tactical level of warfare. The outcome of the analysis shows us that Germany was more successful than the British in six out of eight analyzed perspectives. The results contribute to existing research by highlighting the results of the tactical level of warfare.

Since coastal defense operations tend to fail, this thesis aims to investigate how this type of operation can be more effective and lead to success. The thesis tests two coastal defense theories, developed by Jacob Børresen and Geoffrey Till, on two cases of coastal defense operations by evaluating the validity of the outcomes. Applying the theories as a tool and analyzing the coastal defense operations in the Falklands War in 1982 and Narvik in 1940, a comparative case study is carried out through a qualitative text analysis. The result shows the importance of offensive actions, joint operations and the ability to unity of effort. However, the theories tends to miss important underlying factors and, if the theories are to be used for explaining success in coastal defense operations, they should be further developed.

The thoughts and theories regarding the command of the sea were written down during the last century. In the aftermath of WW2, marine strategists were less comfortable about using the phrase command of the sea which now seemed to be too absolutist in tone. This resulted in a new phrase which had a less ambitious tone the phrase control of the sea became more acceptable and even though the main difference is that control of the sea is applicable under a certain time and place, the main thought is still the same.   The question then that should be asked is: are these old theories regarding the battle of the seas still applicable today? The battlefield has certainly changed since then, particularly regarding the development of military technology but also regarding what kind of foe the navies of today meet.   This is the issue that this paper aims to address by studying the civil war in Sri Lanka with focus on what took place between the Sri Lankan navy and the sea tigers of LTTE. The study will be done by using Geoffrey Tills theories about control of the sea as a lens and a means to decipher what occurred during this time.   This study shows that the theory of control of the sea played a part of the Sri Lankan navy’s ability to defeat the sea tigers and by doing so contributed to ending of the almost three century long conflict.

There are few studies investigating marine unfinished battles. Most research is focused on victory and defeat, which are, however, rather undefined concepts. Therefore, this study intends to help understand why The Battle of Jutland ended as a draw. Geoffrey Till’s theory, on how success is achieved in a battle, was used to illustrate this. Nine factors from the theory constituted the analytical instrument to assist the author in identifying the essential elements regarding The Battle of Jutland. By doing so, the result will demonstrate what is important in a marine battle when it comes to success. The results of the study show that the factors of the theory are influenced by each other and because of this the battle was unfinished​.