För att en ledningsfilosofi ska vara relevant för marin stridsledning måste den vara optimerad förhantering av ovisshet, förmåga till ett effektivt första eldöppnande och medge förutsättningar föratt därefter fortsätta striden.Studien genomfördes för att splittringen mellan förespråkare av centraliserad- och decentraliseradledning gör det meningsfullt att studera uppdragstaktikens relevans och tillämpning för nutidasjöstridskrafter.Den militära ledningens existensberättigande i sjöstriden är förmågan att omvandla spaning ocheldkraftspotential till effekt i målet. Dilemmat för ledningen är att hantera den ovisshet somuppkommer på grund av fientlig aktivitet och oförutsägbara omständigheter. En framgångsrikmetod för att hantera ovisshet är att decentralisera ledningen.Militära chefer tenderar dock att eftersträva kontroll och centralisering, särskilt i kombination mednya ledningssystem och höga insatser. En liten stats sjöstridskrafter som slåss för nationensöverlevnad med få kvalificerade vapenplattformar riskerar därmed att ledningen centraliseras,oavsett vad doktriner och andra styrdokument säger.Metoden i denna studie är en idékritisk analys av uppdragstaktik som den dominerande idén förledning. Analysen utgår från förhållandet mellan en doktrinär beskrivning av idéns centralabegrepp, hur dessa begrepp beskrivs i sjömaktsteorin och hur idén verkställs som tillämpad ledningunder SWENEX 2016.Uppdragstaktiken är utifrån denna studie den mest relevanta ledningsfilosofin för en liten statssjöstridskrafter, men en konflikt har identifierats mellan de doktrinära styrningarna och dentillämpade ledningen. Konflikten tar sig bland annat uttryck i mycket omfattande och detaljeradeorder, krav på detaljerade rapporter och övrig kommunikation som överskrider vad tillgängligpersonal och ledningssystem kan hantera.

Principles of war have for a long time constituted a central part of military thinking, but for as long as they have existed their value has been debated and criticized. Strangely, there seems to exist almost no scientific research testing the empirical validity of such principles, despite the fact that they still appear to play an important role in military doctrine, training and education. This study aims to test the validity of principles of war, by examining whether they can explain the outcome of naval battle. Through a case study approach, principles of naval warfare expressed by theorist Geoffrey Till are tested on a historical naval engagement between US and Japanese forces during World War II. The result of the study shows a certain correlation between some of Till’s principles and victory in the analysed battle, and thereby proves the empirical validity of principles of war to some extent. Further research is however required to increase the confidence in principles as an analytical framework for explaining the outcome of battle, and to determine the possible underlying causal mechanisms.

Denna uppsats undersöker huruvida vi med hjälp av Gustav von Schmalensees modifikation av Lanchesters kvadratiska N2-Law kan bestyrka eller falsifiera teorin att en kustflotta med hjälp av en amfibisk miljö kan slå en på pappret överlägsen motståndare. Den komplexa miljö som en kustremsa eller skärgård utgör påverkar en högsjöflottas kapacitet att utgöra ett hot mot en kustflotta vars taktik är anpassad för terrängen och de synergieffekter som den ger. Uppsatsen försöker påvisa hur stor inverkan variabeln geografi har i sammanhanget. Vidare undersöker uppsatsen huruvida det är möjligt att förbättra von Schmalensees modifikation av Lanchesters N2-Law med hjälp av den faktiska sannolikheten för träff med sjömålsrobot inomskärs respektive utomskärs. Med hjälp av Försvarshögskolans sjökrigsspel Simple Surface Warfare Model (SSM) genomförs ett experiment där teorierna testas empiriskt. Resultaten visar en förbättring i prediceringen av stridsutfall med sjömålsrobot om koefficienten för den faktiska sannolikheten för träff räknas in i ekvationen. Vidare konstateras att en stark korrelation kan ses i en mindre kustflottas överlevnad i amfibisk miljö då de möter en på pappret överlägsen motståndare.

Theorists of military effectiveness have, through the course of time, developed principles explaining ways in which victory is efficiently enabled in battle. However, as a result of technological developments as well as a lack of empirical research, the principle of concentration is now questioned in terms of its explanatory value when applied in the context of modern naval warfare. Its questioning finds even more foundation in light of the fact that it still has a place in naval doctrines. This study therefore aims to examine whether the fundamental basics of the principle are applicable as a concept leading to success in modern naval operations where missiles are used as the main source of weaponry. Thus, are theories on concentration of force, formed by Sun Zi, Antonie- Henri Jomini and Alfred Thayer Mahan, used to create a theoretical framework which then functions as an analytical tool in analysing the Israeli success in 1973 and the Argentine failure in 1982. Accordingly, the result of this analysis offers convincing evidence for the principle of concentration in terms of its continued applicability in modern naval warfare in spite of environmental changes caused by technology. However, more research is needed if further conclusions are to be drawn in terms of generalizability.

Developing and maintaining maritime power is difficult, particularly for small coastal states. However, maritime power is not a concept that merely concerns larger states. This paper relies on theories regarding littoral warfare to analyse the state of current and future Swedish maritime power. This is done by evaluating existing platforms and capabilities as well as future procurements, following the increasing defence budget. The importance of the littorals from an economic and political standpoint has been increasing recently and is thought to be the area in which future naval conflict will unfold. Thus, naval combat envelops more than just ships, pointing to the need of a coastal navy that cooperates with land and air units towards a common goal. While this need might have been realized, it must also be materialized. In the case of the small coastal state with limited resources, this study aims to identify current challenges and priorities regarding units and capabilities to achieve an effective and functional maritime power. The findings of the thesis suggest that Sweden to a certain degree acts according to what theory recommends. Strengths include the possession of advanced surface warfare units and submarines as well as extensive mine warfare capabilities. However, weaknesses shine through in the form of limited, or even completely lacking, anti-air warfare and coastal artillery capabilities. Further, while Sweden is involved in several international cooperations, none of them constitute an actual alliance with binding responsibilities.

There are different ways to understand warfare. Some see it as an artform, some as a science. For hundreds of years writers and theorists have tried to explain war in terms of principles such as initiative, surprise, and simplicity. These principles are sometimes distilled into maxims that try to define the most meaningful, crucial rules of war. This essay examines naval writer Wayne P. Huhges’s maxim “attack effectively first”. The somewhat self-evident concept of attacking effectively first leading to naval victory is tested and discussed. Hughes has developed three factors that he sees as essential in achieving the maxim, firepower, scouting and command and control (C2). The factors are analyzed and applied to the Yom Kippur war to investigate their meaning and value. The results of the analysis show that the factors are necessary to attack effectively first. However more research is required to evaluate how other factors can contribute and if the maxim is relevant in other maritime warfare cases.

This study examines the framing of the sinking of the Russian cruiser and flagship of the Black Sea fleet Moskva in 2022 during the Russo-Ukrainian War, focusing on the variation in the post-hoc battle for meaning. Specifically, the analysis explores the role of targeting and its relationship to strategic narratives. Employing a framing analysis approach, the study investigates how the framing surrounding success, failure and deterrence was communicated. By examining various textual sources, including media reports and official statements, the analysis uncovers different framing strategies employed by the different actors involved. The findings shed light on how the event was portrayed, the underlying narratives that shaped the framing and the implications of these narratives on the perception of success or failure and the concept of deterrence.

This study utilises organizational learning theory to understand how learning can influence inductive military change in peacetime. Attributes such as lead-ership and organizational culture in conjunction with learning- and dissemi-nation mechanisms can either hinder or enhance learning effectiveness and change. Through interviews conducted with Swedish navy personnel during spring of 2023 the study brings further knowledge to the field of military innovation. The results show the challenges for a military organisation to hold on to learn-ing because of cutbacks and established peacetime processes. Individuals drive change rather than the organisational structure itself. This study also illustrates how leadership affects learning in both a positive and negative way.

Development of concepts for victory through exercises, simulations and force comparison is a continuously ongoing process in military organizations. A complementing method of contributing to concepts for victory can be made through systematic testing of existing theories which prescribes such concepts. This can provide knowledge regarding the validity of a theory and provide fundamental insights concerning which basic factors contributes to victory in naval combat. In this essay Wayne P. Hughes Six Cornerstones are tested through a qualitative case study of the battle of the Nile in 1798 and the Falklands campaign in 1982 to test its explanatory value for victory. The results show findings of the theory in both cases and larger deviations only occurred between two cornerstones. The largest deviations occurred between the cornerstones which contained specific descriptions for successful actions. The cornerstones which described success in a general manner and as desired effects were more applicable in the cases. This strengthens the fact that a recipe for specific actions in combat hardly can prescribe general success. The results also show that general descriptions can be viewed valuable for what it excludes, not for what it specifically prescribes. More research has to be done to say something further regarding the validity of the theory.