Denna uppsats undersöker huruvida vi med hjälp av Gustav von Schmalensees modifikation av Lanchesters kvadratiska N2-Law kan bestyrka eller falsifiera teorin att en kustflotta med hjälp av en amfibisk miljö kan slå en på pappret överlägsen motståndare. Den komplexa miljö som en kustremsa eller skärgård utgör påverkar en högsjöflottas kapacitet att utgöra ett hot mot en kustflotta vars taktik är anpassad för terrängen och de synergieffekter som den ger. Uppsatsen försöker påvisa hur stor inverkan variabeln geografi har i sammanhanget. Vidare undersöker uppsatsen huruvida det är möjligt att förbättra von Schmalensees modifikation av Lanchesters N2-Law med hjälp av den faktiska sannolikheten för träff med sjömålsrobot inomskärs respektive utomskärs. Med hjälp av Försvarshögskolans sjökrigsspel Simple Surface Warfare Model (SSM) genomförs ett experiment där teorierna testas empiriskt. Resultaten visar en förbättring i prediceringen av stridsutfall med sjömålsrobot om koefficienten för den faktiska sannolikheten för träff räknas in i ekvationen. Vidare konstateras att en stark korrelation kan ses i en mindre kustflottas överlevnad i amfibisk miljö då de möter en på pappret överlägsen motståndare.

There are different ways to understand warfare. Some see it as an artform, some as a science. For hundreds of years writers and theorists have tried to explain war in terms of principles such as initiative, surprise, and simplicity. These principles are sometimes distilled into maxims that try to define the most meaningful, crucial rules of war. This essay examines naval writer Wayne P. Huhges’s maxim “attack effectively first”. The somewhat self-evident concept of attacking effectively first leading to naval victory is tested and discussed. Hughes has developed three factors that he sees as essential in achieving the maxim, firepower, scouting and command and control (C2). The factors are analyzed and applied to the Yom Kippur war to investigate their meaning and value. The results of the analysis show that the factors are necessary to attack effectively first. However more research is required to evaluate how other factors can contribute and if the maxim is relevant in other maritime warfare cases.

Development of concepts for victory through exercises, simulations and force comparison is a continuously ongoing process in military organizations. A complementing method of contributing to concepts for victory can be made through systematic testing of existing theories which prescribes such concepts. This can provide knowledge regarding the validity of a theory and provide fundamental insights concerning which basic factors contributes to victory in naval combat. In this essay Wayne P. Hughes Six Cornerstones are tested through a qualitative case study of the battle of the Nile in 1798 and the Falklands campaign in 1982 to test its explanatory value for victory. The results show findings of the theory in both cases and larger deviations only occurred between two cornerstones. The largest deviations occurred between the cornerstones which contained specific descriptions for successful actions. The cornerstones which described success in a general manner and as desired effects were more applicable in the cases. This strengthens the fact that a recipe for specific actions in combat hardly can prescribe general success. The results also show that general descriptions can be viewed valuable for what it excludes, not for what it specifically prescribes. More research has to be done to say something further regarding the validity of the theory.