EU-NAVFOR är den första insatsen som den Europeiska Unionen skapat och den första okonventionella konflikten till havs som ska bekämpas med konventionella medel. Forskningsläget angående hur dessa konventionella styrkor ska agera mot denna typ av motståndare är väldigt begränsad. Syftet med denna uppsats är således att undersöka om Wayne P. Hughes konventionella krigföringsteorier är användbara i en nutida konflikt samt att se om det finns några likheter eller skillnader mellan dessa teorier och den taktik ME02 använde sig av under insatsen utanför Somalia. Denna uppsats baseras på en kvalitativ metod där Wayne P. Hughes teorier om ”The Great Constants” studeras och beskrivs för att sedan nyttjas som analysverktyg i en teoriprövande fallstudie på ME02. Fallstudien baseras på ME02:s Operations plan och den Marintaktiska chefens slutrapport. Som komplement används även en kvalitativ intervju med en av ME02:s tre vaktchefer. En av slutsatserna är att Wayne P. Hughes taktiska teorier om ”The Great Constants” till viss del visat sig vara användbara av den svenska styrkan ME02 i deras verksamhet. Trots det faktum att moståndaren är av en helt annan karaktär än den som Hughes utgår ifrån i sin teori. Generellt har de delar av Hughes teori som syftar till offensiv krigföring varit mer användbara än de defensiva.

Development of concepts for victory through exercises, simulations and force comparison is a continuously ongoing process in military organizations. A complementing method of contributing to concepts for victory can be made through systematic testing of existing theories which prescribes such concepts. This can provide knowledge regarding the validity of a theory and provide fundamental insights concerning which basic factors contributes to victory in naval combat. In this essay Wayne P. Hughes Six Cornerstones are tested through a qualitative case study of the battle of the Nile in 1798 and the Falklands campaign in 1982 to test its explanatory value for victory. The results show findings of the theory in both cases and larger deviations only occurred between two cornerstones. The largest deviations occurred between the cornerstones which contained specific descriptions for successful actions. The cornerstones which described success in a general manner and as desired effects were more applicable in the cases. This strengthens the fact that a recipe for specific actions in combat hardly can prescribe general success. The results also show that general descriptions can be viewed valuable for what it excludes, not for what it specifically prescribes. More research has to be done to say something further regarding the validity of the theory.

There are different ways to understand warfare. Some see it as an artform, some as a science. For hundreds of years writers and theorists have tried to explain war in terms of principles such as initiative, surprise, and simplicity. These principles are sometimes distilled into maxims that try to define the most meaningful, crucial rules of war. This essay examines naval writer Wayne P. Huhges’s maxim “attack effectively first”. The somewhat self-evident concept of attacking effectively first leading to naval victory is tested and discussed. Hughes has developed three factors that he sees as essential in achieving the maxim, firepower, scouting and command and control (C2). The factors are analyzed and applied to the Yom Kippur war to investigate their meaning and value. The results of the analysis show that the factors are necessary to attack effectively first. However more research is required to evaluate how other factors can contribute and if the maxim is relevant in other maritime warfare cases.