Överraskning är en av krigföringens etablerade grundprinciper och har fascinerat under lika lång tid det betraktats meningsfullt att förstå krigföring. Paradoxalt nog befinns principen vara såväl förhållandevis outforskad som abstrakt och allmänt hållen trots sin oomtvistliga funktion genom historien. Undersökningens syfte är att med en teoriutvecklande ansats identifiera vilka framgångsfaktorer som bidrar till en lyckad överraskning i amfibieoperationer. Undersökningen har med en hypotetisk-deduktiv metod, där såväl en referenshypotes som delhypoteser genererats, använts för hypotesprövning av två empiriska fall, räderna mot St Nazaire 1942 och Makin Island 1942.   Resultatet identifierar efter en falsifikationsprincip att framgångsfaktorerna vilseledning, operationssäkerhet, tempo och originalitet har en giltighet som bidrag till en lyckad överraskning i amfibieoperationer. Teoriutvecklingsmässigt påvisar även resultatet att originalitet är den framgångsfaktor som möjliggör och är dimensionerande för de övriga framgångsfaktorernas bidrag till en lyckad överraskning. Rekommendationsmässigt och i termer av en ökad generaliserbarhet bör fler empiriska prövningar genomföras för att än bättre förstå vad som bidrar till en lyckad överraskning.

An amphibious assault can open new fronts and totally change the operational and strategic situation. Amphibious assault often depends on the principles of surprise and tempo.   The principles of war, surprise and tempo are the main focus in this thesis. The context consists of the operational type, amphibious assault. The main problem that the study will try to answer is the paradox that theorists highlight these principles as essential conditions for amphibious operations, but they have not developed specifically why and how. In this context it is interesting because there are a number of paradoxes between the type of operation and the principles.   To be able to examine the principles a higher degree of concreteness has to be applied. This is done by examining what other modern theorists has developed on the principles. The most prominent factors then become the thesis operationalized indicators that provides the analysis tool for the thesis. The theory will then be tested by analysing two case studies, Operation Shingle in Anzio and Operation Chromite in Inchon.   The result shows that the indicators of surprise consists of unexpected acting, diversion and operations security. The results of the case study regarding this comes to the conclusions that unexpected acting and operation security are key factors. The indicators of tempo are rapid decision-making and quick physical movement. The case study result indicates that both are criterias for success and are based on a mutual relationship between the indicators.

Defence against an amphibious assault is an extremely difficult endeavour as is evident by the long line of successful amphibious assaults undertaken throughout history. Field fortifications has to a large extent been present in defences, yet little research has been done on the effects of field fortifications in preventing successful landing operations. Therefore, this thesis examines the specific role of field fortifications in defence against amphibious assaults. The purpose is to combine theories about amphibious operations with concepts of field fortifications to add depth to existing theories as two historical examples are examined.  Results show that the existing theories’ notions, especially regarding the devastating effects of indirect fire and pre-bombardment, are not true for the two cases of study. It is furthermore shown that avoiding terrain where the enemy’s defence is focused was of little consequence for whether the assault was successful or not. Of greater importance was the power imbalance of attacker versus defender. Lastly, it is argued that the development of advanced weaponry plausibly levels out the power imbalance as effects of pre-bombardment is more likely to be successful.

The coast is a domain characterized by great complexity based on its dynamic and challenging nature, which can create both opportunities and challenges for attackers and defenders. The purpose of this study is to investigate Geoffrey Till's theory of defence against amphibious operations and to increase an understanding of how military resources can be used to achieve success in defence in the event of a military attack from the sea. Research and theory development in this area have long been under-prioritized and Till has created a relatively unique theory, based on the prevailing research situation. These are arguments that strengthen the reason for examining the theory and field further. Through a theory-testing case study, the Battle of Wake Island and Operation Avalanche are analyzed to ascertain to what extent empirical evidence is given to the chosen theory. In this way, the explanatory capacity of the theory is determined and whether its credence is strengthened or weakened. The study discloses that Till's theory successfully explains the outcome of the first case however not the second. The analysis shows that a defence that acts on and adjacent to land contributes to success, which Till's theory does not emphasize. The study indicates that the theory is underspecified as it does not give any indication of how to prioritize between the different areas of the theory, which indicates that wone should be vigilant against the explanatory value of the theory.

Defending against a modern amphibious landing is one of the most difficult operations in warfare. Many have tried but very few have succeeded to throw an assaulting landing force back into the sea. This essay is an attempt to create deeper understanding for anti-landing defense by using Milan Vego’s theory on littoral warfare in a case study of the landings in Salerno 1943 and on Okinawa 1945. This is in order to examine if this theory on marine warfare in coastal regions can be used to create deeper understanding for defense against a modern amphibious assault. With a current trend towards increasing military interests in littoral regions, this essay intends to bring an up-to-date contribution to the theoretical foundation of marine warfare in littoral regions, and more specifically coastal defense.   The analysis shows that Vego’s theory did create deeper understanding of the two cases and particularly regarding command, inter-service cooperation and sea control or sea denial. These concepts have in both cases proven successfully practiced by the assaulting force, while the defenders have failed to benefit from them.

The traditional landings with large warships near the coastline have been replaced by means of vessels moving beyond the horizon from the coast where the landing will take place. The old landing crafts have been replaced by transport helicopters and close air support, a threat that the amphibious battalion lacks resources to meet. The Swedish Armed Forces faces a possible acquisition of MANPADS and therefore the main purpose with this study was to examine the systems: FIM-92 Stinger RMP, Mistral and RBS70 NG, in order to assess which one of them who had the greatest potential to be effective when used by the amphibious battalion in a coastal defense operation. The study was conducted as a multiple criteria decision analysis, based on the concept of military utility. The result indicated that the RBS70 NG was the system that best met the requirements and demonstrated the greatest potential to be military efficient, although Mistral with minor exceptions fulfilled the requirements. As the study was delimited to a theoretical study based on three specific scenarios, further studies are recommended with simulations, as well as field trials before the result can be given a higher validity. The result, however, already helps us to understand how MANPADS contributes with military utility in coastal defense operations. / De traditionella landstigningarna med stora fartyg uppträdandes kustnära har ersatts med metoder innebärandes att fartygen rör sig bortom horisonten från den kust där landsättningen/landstigningen ska ske. De gamla landstigningsbåtarna har i hög grad ersatts med helikoptrar som understödda av attackhelikoptrar och flygplan utgör den nya dimensionerande hotbilden. En hotbild som amfibiebataljonen saknar resurser för att möta. Då Försvarsmakten står inför en eventuell anskaffning av ett buret luftvärnssystem till amfibiebataljonen har denna undersöknings främsta syfte varit att bedöma vilket av systemen FIM-92 Stinger RMP, Mistral eller RBS70 NG som uppvisat störst potential att vara militärt effektivt när de nyttjas av en amfibiebataljon i kustförsvarsoperationer. Undersökningen genomfördes som en komparativ analys med multimålmetod och tre olika typfall som grund. Jämförelsen tog sin utgångspunkt kring teoribildningen om militär nytta och då mer specifikt militär effektivitet. Resultatet indikerade att RBS70 NG var det system som bäst mötte amfibiebataljonens krav och därmed uppvisade störst potential att vara militärt effektivt, även om Mistral med enstaka undantag också uppfyllde kraven till synes utan begränsningar. Då studien avgränsats till en teoretisk jämförelse i tre specifika typfall, rekommenderas fortsatta studier med såväl simuleringar som praktiska prov innan resultatet kan ges en högre validitet. Resultatet bidrar däremot redan nu till en förståelse för vad som ökar den militära effektivitetenvid genomförande av kustförsvarsoperationer.