Inaug. diss.--Stockholms högskola. / Extra t.p., with thesis statement, inserted. "The ms. on which the edition ... has been based in codex Vaticanus Latinus 500l ... from about the year 1300."

Inaug. diss.--Stockholms högskola. / Extra t.p., with thesis statement, inserted. "The ms. on which the edition ... has been based in codex Vaticanus Latinus 500l ... from about the year 1300."

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1970. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Univ., Magisterarbeit--Düsseldorf, 2003. / Literaturverz. S. 111 - 171.

Diss.--München--Universität, 1988. / Bibliogr. p. 145-150.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-05-12T13:15:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Mônica Soares Stacheski.pdf: 20430811 bytes, checksum: e8a855e80c376c2b39448d517600276c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-12T13:15:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mônica Soares Stacheski.pdf: 20430811 bytes, checksum: e8a855e80c376c2b39448d517600276c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-17 / Antidotarium Nicolai is a collection of recipes of composite medicines probably written about 1180 in Salerno, southern Italy, was related to the medical literary movement originated in the School of Salerno. Its author remains unknown, although the manuscript begins stating “Ego, Nicolaus” (I, Nicholas). It was written for the author’s colleagues, i.e., practicing doctors, or students as a practical book on the preparation of medicines. Copied in hundreds of manuscripts and printed as incunabula and books, Antidotarium Nicolai circulated across medical schools outside Italy starting at the end of the 13th century. It was included both officially and unofficially in the syllabus of European university courses along the Middle Ages and modern times. The present study discusses the historical-social context, secondary literature and primary sources closest to Antidotarium Nicolai and analyzes its content from the perspective of history of science / O Antidotarium Nicolai é uma coleção de receitas de medicamentos compostos, redigido provavelmente perto de 1180, na cidade de Salerno, no sul da península itálica e conexo ao movimento literário médico da Escola de Salerno. De autoria desconhecida, apesar do autor escrever “Ego, Nicolaus” (Eu, Nicolau), essa obra surgiu da solicitação de colegas praticantes de medicina ou discípulos, no sentido de elaborar uma obra prática sobre a produção de medicamentos. Copiado em centenas de manuscritos, impresso em incunábulos e livros, o Antidotarium Nicolai circulou em escolas médicas estrangeiras a partir do final do século XIII. Fez parte de currículos universitários de forma oficial e extraoficial pela Europa medieval e moderna. O presente estudo averigua o contexto histórico-social, a literatura secundária e as fontes primárias temporalmente mais próximas da origem, e faz uma análise da obra da perspectiva da história da ciência

This thesis presents the first steps towards a critical edition of the ‘De podagra’ (‘On Gout’), a pre-Gariopontean treatise excerpted from the Latin translation of the Greek ‘Therapeutica’ by Alexander of Tralles. From information collated, from manuscripts and printed texts, from four textual traditions, the Greek ‘Therapeutica’, the Latin Alexander, the ‘De podagra’, and Gariopontus’ ‘Passionarius’, a provisional Latin text of the ‘De podagra’ has been produced which looks forward to the last of these traditions, Gariopontus’ ‘Passionarius’. A full English translation of the ‘De podagra’ is given. The footnotes to the provisional Latin text of the ‘De podagra’ serve to illustrate the textual tradition and highlight points of relevance for the content of the text itself. These footnotes also contain information of significance to the reconstruction of each of the other three traditions. An appendix of ‘materia medica’ and an ‘index uerborum’ are included.

The coast is a domain characterized by great complexity based on its dynamic and challenging nature, which can create both opportunities and challenges for attackers and defenders. The purpose of this study is to investigate Geoffrey Till's theory of defence against amphibious operations and to increase an understanding of how military resources can be used to achieve success in defence in the event of a military attack from the sea. Research and theory development in this area have long been under-prioritized and Till has created a relatively unique theory, based on the prevailing research situation. These are arguments that strengthen the reason for examining the theory and field further. Through a theory-testing case study, the Battle of Wake Island and Operation Avalanche are analyzed to ascertain to what extent empirical evidence is given to the chosen theory. In this way, the explanatory capacity of the theory is determined and whether its credence is strengthened or weakened. The study discloses that Till's theory successfully explains the outcome of the first case however not the second. The analysis shows that a defence that acts on and adjacent to land contributes to success, which Till's theory does not emphasize. The study indicates that the theory is underspecified as it does not give any indication of how to prioritize between the different areas of the theory, which indicates that wone should be vigilant against the explanatory value of the theory.

Defending against a modern amphibious landing is one of the most difficult operations in warfare. Many have tried but very few have succeeded to throw an assaulting landing force back into the sea. This essay is an attempt to create deeper understanding for anti-landing defense by using Milan Vego’s theory on littoral warfare in a case study of the landings in Salerno 1943 and on Okinawa 1945. This is in order to examine if this theory on marine warfare in coastal regions can be used to create deeper understanding for defense against a modern amphibious assault. With a current trend towards increasing military interests in littoral regions, this essay intends to bring an up-to-date contribution to the theoretical foundation of marine warfare in littoral regions, and more specifically coastal defense.   The analysis shows that Vego’s theory did create deeper understanding of the two cases and particularly regarding command, inter-service cooperation and sea control or sea denial. These concepts have in both cases proven successfully practiced by the assaulting force, while the defenders have failed to benefit from them.

This is an analysis of the U.S. Army's personnel decisions in the Second World War. Specifically, it considers the U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall's appointment of generals to combat command, and his reasons for relieving some generals while leaving others in place after underperformance. Many historians and contemporaries of Marshall, including General Omar N. Bradley, have commented on Marshall's ability to select brilliant, capable general officers for combat command in the war. However, in addition to solid performers like J. Lawton Collins, Lucian Truscott, and George S. Patton, Marshall, together with Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lesley J. McNair, often selected sub-par commanders who significantly underperformed on the battlefield. These generals' tactical and operational decisions frequently led to unnecessary casualties, and ultimately prolonged the war. The work considers six case studies: Lloyd Fredendall at Kasserine Pass, Mark Clark during the Italian campaign, John Lucas at Anzio, Omar Bradley at the Falaise Gap, Courtney Hodges at the Hürtgen Forest, and Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. at Okinawa. Personal connections and patronage played strong roles in these generals' command appointments, and often trumped practical considerations like command experience. While their superiors ultimately relieved corps commanders Fredendall and Lucas, field army and army group commanders Clark, Hodges, and Bradley retained command of their units, (Buckner died from combat wounds on Okinawa). Personal connections also strongly influenced the decision to retain the field army and army group commanders in their commands.