Throughout history, research on sea power has mainly focused on naval superpowers with global reach, but the application of sea power is still relevant for coastal states without means or ambitions to rule the high seas. In 1994, Norwegian Fleet Admiral Jacob Børresen met the need of a post-Cold War theory of sea power usage for smaller navies by publishing the article The Seapower of the Coastal State. As Sweden qualifies for the definition of a coastal state and could gain from optimizing its sea denial abilities, the aim of this study is to validate the relevance of Børresen’s theory for the Swedish Navy of tomorrow. Using a qualitative text research method, this study compares and contrasts Børresen’s theory with the Swedish and Norwegian military advice study, to find to what extent the naval strategy of the two coastal states aligns with the functions that the coastal navy, according to Børresen, must be able to perform in times of war. The results show alignment to a large extent, with coastal artillery and the utilization of territorial awareness being the main exceptions. In conclusion, this theory holds an obvious relevance for present studies of sea denial and deterrence.

Defending against an amphibious operation is one of the most complex operations in warfare, especially for a small coastal state. Despite this, there is only a limited amount written about how a small coastal state should defend itself against an amphibious operation. This study explains how a smaller coastal state manages to delay an amphibious landing despite being disadvantaged. The purpose of this paper is to explain how the Norwegian coastal defense managed to delay the German invasion of Oslo on April 9, 1940. The research was conducted using the qualitative text analysis method, to obtain a good overall picture of the invasion with several independent sources. Jacob Børresen's theoretical framework, which deals with how smaller coastal states should defend themselves against overwhelming resistance, was used to analyze the empirical material. His theory is broken down into four analytical dimensions: Coast artillery, Robust command structure, Combined defense and Intelligence. The results show that the main success factor for the Norwegian coastal defense was their coastal artillery, that sank the German cruiser Blücher. The conclusions drawn from the study are that good leadership and timely intelligence are vital for the coastal artillery to be effective.

Since coastal defense operations tend to fail, this thesis aims to investigate how this type of operation can be more effective and lead to success. The thesis tests two coastal defense theories, developed by Jacob Børresen and Geoffrey Till, on two cases of coastal defense operations by evaluating the validity of the outcomes. Applying the theories as a tool and analyzing the coastal defense operations in the Falklands War in 1982 and Narvik in 1940, a comparative case study is carried out through a qualitative text analysis. The result shows the importance of offensive actions, joint operations and the ability to unity of effort. However, the theories tends to miss important underlying factors and, if the theories are to be used for explaining success in coastal defense operations, they should be further developed.