Thesis (doctoral)--München, 1959. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 201-204).

Berlin, Freie Universiẗat, Diss., 1997. / Dateiformat: zip, Dateien im PDF-Format.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rheinischen Friedrich Wilhelms-Universität. Philosophische fakultät, Bonn, 1954. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 397).

Mémoire (M.A.)--Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, 2005. / Comprend des réf. bibliogr.: f. 112-117. Également disponible en format microfiche.

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Theologische Fakultät--Jena--Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, 1994. / Bibliogr. p. 161-178. Index.

Diss.--Philosophisch-historische Fakultät--Universität Basel, 1995. / Bibliogr. p. 395-408.

Zugl.: Kassel, Universiẗat, Diss., 2007.

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Freiburg i. Br.--Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, 1986.

Thesis advisor: John Sallis / This dissertation investigates the importance of the imagination in the thought of F.W. J. Schelling and Martin Heidegger, and argues that Heidegger's later philosophy cannot be understood properly without appreciating Schelling's central importance for him. It is increasingly recognized today that Schelling, who had long been overlooked, is an important figure in post-Kantian German Idealism. However, his significance for Heidegger's concentration on the creative character of thought remains undervalued. I argue that, by tracing the theme of imagination in these thinkers, the milieu of Schelling's absolute idealism and that of Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenlogy may be understood as distinct discourses that nevertheless share in a profound impulse to overcome sensible-intelligible and subject-object dualisms and retrieve and refine the productive and projective character of reason. This impulse is first evident in both thinkers' attention to the role of imagination in Kant's critical project (for Schelling, cir. 1800; for Heidegger, cir. 1929). It then proves inseparable from Schelling's treatments of intuition, identity, ground, and freedom; and it becomes still more evident in Heidegger's 1936 lecture course on Schelling and his affiliated inquiries into the essence of art and poetry. Even as Heidegger labors to deconstruct the alleged visual and subjectivist bias of metaphysics, he remains preoccupied with Schelling's ontological treatment of the law of identity and intent on translating Schelling's aesthetic emphasis into a poetic paradigm for philosophical inquiry. By focusing on how, alongside his engagement with Schelling, Heidegger endeavors to recover the imagination as a poetic (as opposed to reductive and willful) basis for reason, we attain a decisive rubric for understanding his later thought / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2011. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Thesis advisor: John Sallis / This dissertation is a reading of Schelling's influential <italic>Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom</italic> (1809), focusing on the meaning of "grounding" and the principle of sufficient reason (called the "principle of ground" in German philosophy). One of the contributions of my dissertation is to show how Schelling's treatise frames the traditional debate about "freedom vs. determinism" in terms of system. The connection with system provides a context for the claim of determinism and shows what is at stake in denying it. I argue that the principle of ground underlies the difficulties in integrating freedom within a system. Schelling is able to resolve these difficulties by distinguishing a deterministic from a non-deterministic sense of ground. Schelling uses the non-deterministic sense of ground (ground as condition of the possibility) to connect the parts of the system without jeopardizing freedom. At the same time, Schelling reserves the deterministic sense of ground for the ultimate act of freedom, by which individual human beings determine themselves. Beyond this core argument, the dissertation contributes to Schelling scholarship by interpreting the <italic>Freedom Essay</italic> in continuity with the texts leading up to and following its publication, most of which have not yet been translated. I show how these texts help to clarify some of the most difficult passages in the <italic>Freedom Essay</italic>. In particular, I draw on Schelling's correspondence to correct a widespread misreading of the fundamental distinction between that-which-exists and the ground of existence. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.