Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1973. / Vita. Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S.)--Missouri State University, 2008. / "May 2008." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 93-103). Also available online.

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Are U.S. nuclear weapons still needed in Europe now that the threat that brought them there is gone? This thesis examines whether basing theater nuclear weapons in Europe is useful, irrelevant or counterproductive for maintaining European security. U.S. and NATO policymakers adhere to political and military utility arguments, while others argue TNWs in Europe are irrelevant-their utility has been supplanted by political, cultural and economic interdependence, modern conventional capabilities and the existential deterrent of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. Nonproliferation and arms control advocates argue TNWs are counterproductive because they enhance, rather than deter proliferation, undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and impede cooperation in the NATO-Russia security relationship. This thesis demonstrates how economic and political ties, including widespread participation in nuclear planning, the increasing importance of the nuclear taboo, prospects for conventional deterrence and the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella render TNWs in Europe irrelevant. Emphasizing their utility provides incentive for others to join the "nuclear club," degrades the nonproliferation regime, and creates a roadblock for NATO-Russian arms control and counterproliferation efforts. This thesis recommends withdrawing U.S. theater nuclear weapons from Europe, relying instead on a strategy of conventional deterrence and reassurance while maintaining general nuclear deterrence via strategic forces. / Major, United States Air Force

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / The evolution of Kazakhstan's security policies since independence, and particularly after September 11, 2001, indicates that the country has chosen to play an active role in regional and international security as a means to security its own national interests. It has opened to the West, and played an active role in the War on Terrorism. It has also worked to maintain Central Asia's regional security architecture. These policies have had some demonstrable affect on national, regional and international security, but as a young state in a troubled region Kazakhstan will require increased Western assistance if it is to become the force for stability that it seeks to be. Kazakhstan has a very important geopolitical location, and can play a role of a regional leader in Central Asia, but it is still a very young state and needs a strong support. "Perhaps nowhere was the granting of independence more bittersweet and the challenges of sustaining it more complex than in the case of Kazakhstan." (Mathews, Jessica T. Foreword in "Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise" by Olcott, Martha Brill, Washington D.C. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002) / Colonel, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Kazakhstan

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Much has been written during this century's energy security debate about the external threats the West faces to oil and natural gas supplies. This literature is often prescriptive, offering solutions to address these assumed threats. This research takes a much-needed look inward at the pressures placed on the multi-dimensional relationships within the transatlantic security community. An original contribution to knowledge is made through the exploration of these energy security tensions within the community and how they impact the two energy security prerequisites, availability and affordability. An examination of key oil and natural gas issues in the United States, Europe and the main transatlantic institutions demonstrates that the transatlantic community is very secure and often acts inadvertently to undermine its own energy security condition. Thus, the conventional wisdom that the supply of fossil fuel energy is a leading and high-priority security issue is challenged. Contrary to most literature, the conclusion is reached that energy security is actually not a high-level concern to the transatlantic security community, and that on occasions leading members of the community, who are high energy consumers, choose to put fossil fuel energy supply at risk to pursue political and strategic policies assigned a higher priority. In practice, producer states are found to be much more dependent on uninterrupted energy trade than consumer states, positively contributing to the reliability of oil and natural gas supply. In fact, through highly competitive political engagement with Russia and the Middle East North Africa region, the transatlantic states risk undermining the energy security of the community. Nevertheless, transatlantic energy security tensions have not risen to an actionable level. When placed in the overall context of transatlantic security issues, these energy security tensions do not threaten to divide the transatlantic community in any meaningful way.

This dissertation is comprised of three separate papers that address how cyber power contributes to national power and the implications for international security posed by cyber operations. The first paper, “Cyber Power and International Stability: Assessing Deterrence and Escalation in Cyberspace,” posits that there are unique attributes that define the cyber domain and that have direct implications on deterrence and escalation dynamics between state actors. The second paper, “Arms Control and Confidence Building Measures for the Cyber Domain,” explores at various mechanisms that states have traditionally used to foster stability and prevent inadvertent conflict and assesses their applicability to controlling cyber operations. Finally, “The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace” delves into the role of cyber operations as both inadvertent and deliberate signals and assesses their utility as a coercive instrument of statecraft.

Univ., Diss.--Zugl.: Aix-Marseille, 2004.

Univ., Diss.--Paris, 2002.