The application of Art. 87(1) EC to taxes above all is connected to the application of the derogation method, which appears to be part of the selectivity criterion. This dissertation examines the application of the derogation method and the assessment of the selectivity criterion applied to taxes, primarily de lege lata, but also de lege ferenda. It begins with an analysis of the relationship among the criteria of Article 87(1) EC and continues with an analysis of the relationship between the derogation method and the assessment of the selectivity criterion applied to taxes. Several scholars have criticised the application of the derogation method because of the difficulty of identifying a derogation and of establishing the benchmark against which the derogation should be assessed. In this dissertation both the benchmark and the establishment of a derogation is analysed, partly with reference to the tax expenditure debate that occurred in the subject area of international taxation during the 1970s and 1980s. The selectivity criterion applied to taxes contains an assessment of justification, whereby the selective nature of a measure can be justified on the basis of the nature or general scheme of the system: Therfore the meaning and implications of this assessment are also examined. After all these issues have been examined de lege lata, the extents to which the application of the derogation method and the assessment of the selectivity criterion follow a logical system are discussed and recommendations for eliminating the identified deficiences are put forward.

The selectivity criterion is one of the defining elements of State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. The selectivity criterion is considered to be the most important and the most problematic in its application in the assessment of Member States' measures at the same time. The aim of this work is to analyze the development of ECJ's case-law and the Commission's decisional practice related to the selectivity criterion and by means of their analysis to point out the disputableness and lack of clarity of the selecivity criterion and to critically assess the unpredictability and questionable character of certain judgments of the ECJ. The first chapter deals with an introduction to the issue of State aid, subsumes it under the system of competition and describes the defining elements of State aid. The second chapter analyzes one of the two features, into which the selectivity criterion divides, referred to as an advantage. It describes both the broad concept of advantage and also a way how to identify an advantage. It also addresses the exceptions and specific regimes to which the provisions on State aid in principle do not apply. The third chapter considers general issues relating to the second feature of the selectivity criterion, which is selectivity (in the strict sense). It also pays...

L’étude repose sur l’hypothèse que les aides d’État fiscales sont autonomes, se singularisant par rapport aux autres règles du droit fiscal de l’Union. Cela est dû au fait que la véritable nature de l’intégration, la véritable finalité du contrôle des aides fiscales, n’est pas facilement perceptible.Le régime des aides fiscales dépasse son cadre initial de contrôle des systèmes fiscaux pourintégrer celui d’élaboration de règles juridiques communes. Les autorités de l’Union, par le biais du régime des aides fiscales, contrôlent les systèmes fiscaux nationaux ; en même temps, elles parviennent à jouer un rôle important pour la coopération interétatique au regard de la lutte contrela concurrence fiscale dommageable. Plus important encore, elles réussissent à coordonner les systèmes fiscaux nationaux, procédant d’une instrumentalisation du contrôle des aides fiscales,contrôle étant conçu comme un succédané de l’harmonisation fiscale. La démonstration des finalités protéiformes de ce contrôle repose d’abord sur la méthode d’identification d’une aide fiscale, identification qui correspond aux finalités recherchées. La vérification de l’hypothèse initiale de singularisation des aides fiscales pose également la question de sa finalité. Ce contrôle est-il susceptible de façonner la structure même du droit fiscal de l’Union et, d’une manière plus substantielle, la répartition des compétences entre les autorités européennes et nationales ? Une technique comme celle du contrôle des aides fiscales peut-elle potentiellement contribuer à redéfinir la ligne de démarcation entre souveraineté fiscale des États membres et limitation tolérable de celle-ci par le droit de l’Union ? / This thesis is based on the premise that tax state aids differentiate themselves from other tax law related rules of the European Union. This is due to the fact that the true nature of the integration, the true purpose of the regulation of tax state aids, is not so easily discernible. The legal status oftax state aids outreaches its original scope—the scrutiny of fiscal systems—to integrate that of creation of common legal rules. The authorities of the Union, through the tax aids regime, monitor domestic tax systems; at the same time, they come to play an important role in the context of the interstate cooperation tackling harmful tax competition. More importantly, they manage to coordinate domestic tax systems as a result of the “instrumentalization” of the regulation of taxaids. The latter is then regarded as a substitute to tax harmonization. This manifestation of themultifarious objectives of tax state aids regulation is firstly based on the technique ofcharacterization of a tax aid, a characterization corresponding ultimately to the goals as expected.The proof of the initial hypothesis of the self-containment of tax aids raises the question of its purpose. Is this regulation likely to weave the very structure of Union tax law and, more substantially, the division of competences between European and domestic authorities? Is a technique like the one related to tax state aids regulation likely to contribute to redefining the dividing line between member States tax sovereignty and its tolerable limitation by Union law?