In this thesis I consider the problem of the distinctiveness of knowledge of our own mental states and attitudes. I consider four influential approaches to this problem: the epistemic approach, the "no reasons view," the neo-expressivist approach and the rational agency approach. I argue that all of them face serious problems. I further argue that many of these problems are connected with the lack of fine-grained enough classification of the entities with respect to which we have self-knowledge. I suggest such a classification, distinguishing passive occurrent mental states, mental actions and standing attitudes, and argue that we should treat each of these categories separately for the purpose of explaining self-knowledge of them. I discuss in detail self-knowledge we have with respect to two of these categories: standing attitudes and mental actions. On my account self-knowledge of standing attitudes stands in a derivative relation to self-knowledge of other kinds. In my discussion of self-knowledge of mental actions I establish that we have a distinctive non-observational kind of self-knowledge and show some specific characteristics of this kind of self-knowledge. In the end I attempt to relate self-knowledge of mental actions to practical knowledge in the ordinary sense of skill.

<p>While both intuitive knowledge (<italic>scientia intuitiva</italic>) and reason (<italic>ratio</italic>) are adequate ways of knowing for Spinoza, they are not equal. "The greatest virtue of the mind" and "the greatest human perfection" consist in understanding things by intuitive knowledge, which Spinoza regards as superior to reason. Understanding why on Spinoza's account intuition is superior to reason is crucial for understanding his epistemological and ethical theories. Yet, the nature of this superiority has been the subject of some controversy due to Spinoza's parsimonious treatment of the distinction between reason and intuitive knowledge in the Ethics. In my dissertation, I explore this fundamental but relatively unexplored issue in Spinoza scholarship by investigating the nature of this distinction and its ethical implications. I suggest that these two kinds of adequate knowledge differ not only in terms of their method, but also with respect to their representative content. More specifically, I hold that unlike reason, which is a universal knowledge, intuitive knowledge descends to a level of particularity, including an adequate knowledge of one's own essence as it follows directly from God, which represents a superior form of self-knowledge. Attaining this superior self-knowledge makes intuitive knowledge the culmination of not only understanding but also happiness. Since, for Spinoza, there is an intrinsic relationship between the pursuit of knowledge and how we live our lives, I argue that these two ways of knowing are at the same time two ways of living.</p> / Dissertation

The self-knowledge has been a central problem throughout the history of philosophy, but it has remained, as Kant also declares, as the

The chapters contained in this dissertation are three essays on the nature of practical authority, and the role it plays in the thought and action of those subject to it. In chapter 1, I criticize a recent and influential philosophical theory of authority, Joseph Raz’s service conception, and argue that it is inadequate because it does not recognize that authority thwarts an obedient subject’s ability to express her personality and character traits in action. In chapter 2, I argue that, in cases of personal authority, the issuing of a command involves the authority supplying the content of an intention to act to the subject, and that this breaks down the self-other asymmetries which theorists of self-knowledge have assumed exist with respect to the ‘privileged access’ one is said to have to one’s own mind. In chapter 3, I argue that in cases of both personal and non-personal (e.g., institutional) authority, there is a further problem in exercising and obeying authority which has gone unrecognized. I draw on recent work in social psychology to show that authoritative directives fix a subject’s understanding of her own actions across time and thus thwart the otherwise dynamic process of the development of the subject’s self-conception. I show that these arguments constitute a new burden in justifying authority and therefore revive the anarchist objection that authority and autonomy are conceptually incompatible. / text

Damage to the brain can affect the core of the individual, i.e. the self. Results from a small number of studies with amnesic individuals indicate that patients' ability to show preserved knowledge of self may vary. The present study explored self-knowledge in patients with memory impairment as a result of confabulation, mild cognitive impairment, Alzheimer's disease and acquired brain damage. We found that different memory disorders differentially affected patients' self-knowledge. At least some patients showed a preserved sense of self, and were able to acquire information about another person that they had met postmorbidly. Frontal function and stability of cognitive impairments over time appear to be two variables important in determining whether patients can have a consistent and updated sense of self. We also explored the extent to which self-referential and other-referential processing might enhance memory in individuals with memory-impairment. The self-reference effect (SRE) and other-reference effect (ORE) have been consistently found in normal adults. Results indicated that patients showed a normal SRE and ORE. The SRE and ORE appeared to be at least partly dependent on degree of knowledge of the person being referenced, and were also related to general memory and frontal function. Only the SRE, however, was also related to patients' ability to improve memory as a result of emotional processing. These findings may have important implications for caregivers and healthcare professionals working with memory-impaired patients, and may pave the way to novel memory rehabilitation methods.

Thesis (M.A.)(Hons)--University of Western Sydney, Nepean, 1995. / Includes bibliography.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2006. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 96-98).

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2006. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 96-98).

Thesis (M.C.S.)--Regent College, 2006. / Abstract and vita. Description based on Microfiche version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 123-132).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1962. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [122]-123).