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The construction of meanings in and for : a stochastic domain of abstractionPratt, David Charles January 1998 (has links)
This study takes as its focus young children's intuitive knowledge of randomness. Previous work in this field has studied the misconceptions that people, especially adults, hold in making judgements of chance (see, for example, the work of Kahneman & Tversky and Konold). In contrast, I study how primitive meaningsf or randomnessfo rm a basis for new meanings,a processw hich the misconceptionsa pproachf ails to illuminate. The guiding principle for this study is that the observation of students' evolving thought in a carefully designedc omputer-basedd omain will provide a betteru nderstanding of how the specific features of the domain shape and are shaped by activities within it. There are, then, two deeply connected strands to this thesis: the study of children's evolving meanings for randomness as expressed in a computer-based microworld, and the articulation of design principles which encapsulate pedagogic meaningsfor that microworld. More specifically, the thesis aims to shed light upon the answers to four crucial questions: Meanings for the domain: What do formalisms of stochastic behaviour look like in a domain of abstraction? What structures in the domain for stochastic abstraction optimise the articulation of intuitions and the construction of new meanings? Meanings in the domain: What articulations of informal intuitions of stochastic behaviour do we observe? How do the structures of the domain support the forging of situated meanings? The study uses an iterative design methodology, which cycles between the design of computer-based tools and the observ4tion of children, between the ages of 9 and II years, as they use these tools. The thesis identifies initial meanings for the behaviour of various stochastic phenomena and traces how new pieces of knowledge, especially relating to long term random behaviour, emerge through the forging of connections between the internal and external resources.
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Active Suffering: An Examination of Spinoza's Approach to TristitaSchenk, Kathleen Ketring 06 April 2017 (has links)
Humans' capacity to attain knowledge is central to Spinoza's philosophy because, in part, knowing things enables humans to deal properly with their affects. But it is not just any sort of knowledge that humans should attain. There are different types of knowledge, but only two of them–rational and intuitive knowledge–enable humans who attain them to know things clearly. Because rational knowledge attends to universals whereas intuitive knowledge attends to particulars, intuitive knowledge is better than rational knowledge at enabling humans to deal with their affects. Most scholars recognize both the importance of knowledge to humans' dealing with their affects and the superiority of intuitive knowledge at enabling them to do this. But these points are particularly relevant to the affect that Spinoza calls "tristitia," which is usually translated as either "pain" or "sadness." I argue in this dissertation that attaining knowledge– especially intuitive knowledge–enables humans to deal properly with their experiences of pain. This ability that humans acquire by knowing things is what I call "active suffering." A person suffers passively when she merely reacts to her pain, in this way allowing an external force to control her. She suffers actively when she uses knowledge to respond to her pain, in this way being in control of herself. This knowledge she uses to deal actively with her pain bears a relation to Spinoza's theory of freedom, since it entails a realization that all events (such as a person's experience of pain) happen necessarily and that embracing this necessity is the same as being free.
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Reason and Intuitive Knowledge in Spinoza's 'Ethics': Two Ways of Knowing, Two Ways of LivingSoyarslan, Sanem January 2011 (has links)
<p>While both intuitive knowledge (<italic>scientia intuitiva</italic>) and reason (<italic>ratio</italic>) are adequate ways of knowing for Spinoza, they are not equal. "The greatest virtue of the mind" and "the greatest human perfection" consist in understanding things by intuitive knowledge, which Spinoza regards as superior to reason. Understanding why on Spinoza's account intuition is superior to reason is crucial for understanding his epistemological and ethical theories. Yet, the nature of this superiority has been the subject of some controversy due to Spinoza's parsimonious treatment of the distinction between reason and intuitive knowledge in the Ethics. In my dissertation, I explore this fundamental but relatively unexplored issue in Spinoza scholarship by investigating the nature of this distinction and its ethical implications. I suggest that these two kinds of adequate knowledge differ not only in terms of their method, but also with respect to their representative content. More specifically, I hold that unlike reason, which is a universal knowledge, intuitive knowledge descends to a level of particularity, including an adequate knowledge of one's own essence as it follows directly from God, which represents a superior form of self-knowledge. Attaining this superior self-knowledge makes intuitive knowledge the culmination of not only understanding but also happiness. Since, for Spinoza, there is an intrinsic relationship between the pursuit of knowledge and how we live our lives, I argue that these two ways of knowing are at the same time two ways of living.</p> / Dissertation
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Developing Skills for Successful LearningSwersky, Liz 20 March 2012 (has links) (PDF)
No description available.
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Developing Skills for Successful LearningSwersky, Liz 20 March 2012 (has links)
No description available.
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