Si la déconstruction devait commencer quelque part, si son principe n'était pas d'emblée celui de lamultiplication originaire du principe, il faudrait alors dire que c'est comme déconstruction de l'autoaffectionpure qu'elle commence. En effet, l'interrogation du concept d'auto-affection pure estl'interrogation d'une dernière tentative pour penser encore la subjectivité en termes de principe (c'est-àdireen termes aussi de « subjectivité »). L'« auto-affection pure » est un concept qui renvoiecouramment au livre de 1929 de Heidegger sur Kant, Kant et le problème de la métaphysique. Or, dansce contexte, il renvoie déjà de manière essentielle à la répétition comme dispositif de sa production etcomme ce à partir de quoi sa déconstruction a concrètement lieu. La question de la répétition est en faitinséparable de la déconstruction de l'auto-affection pure. Si celle-ci est un autre nom de la temporalité,il faut alors démontrer en droit ce qui est un fait : c'est à partir de la répétition que la temporalité peutseulement être dévoilée. En ce sens, la répétition est déjà répétition de la question de l'être (Sein undZeit) mais aussi répétition de Kant (Kant et le problème de la métaphysique). Or, la détermination de latemporalité comme auto-affection pure, dans la répétition heideggerienne de Kant, n'est elle-mêmepossible que d'après la compréhension essentielle de la temporalité phénoménologique à partir duconcept de Husserl d'impression originaire. En ce sens, comme déconstruction de l'auto-affection pure,la répétition – en-deçà de toute identité constituée – doit aussi se trouver déjà à la racine de touteimpression originaire. / If deconstruction begins somewhere, if its starting point is not already the original multiplication ofprinciple and origin, then it is necessary to say that it begins first as the deconstruction of pure selfaffection.The interrogation of the concept of pure self-affection is the interrogation of probably the lastattempt to think about subjectivity in the terms of a principle (which are of course the terms of“subjectivity”). The pure self-affection concept widely refers to the 1929 book by Heidegger on Kanttitled Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. In this context, the concept of pure self-affection refersalready to repetition as the essential “device” for its production. The question of repetition is in factinseparable from pure self-affection deconstruction. If pure self-affection can work as another name fortemporality, then we have to show the reason for a well established fact : it is just through repetitionthat temporality can be disclosed. In this sense, repetition is already the repetition of the question onbeing (Sein und Zeit), but also the repetition of Kant (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics). Now, thedetermination of temporality as pure self-affection, through Heidegger's repetition of Kant, supposesthe essential understanding of phenomenological temporality on the basis of Husserl's concept oforiginary impression. In this sense, as leading pure self-affection deconstruction, repetition – before theconstitution of identity – is to be found on the grounds of the originary impression itself.

nÃo hà / A pesquisa discute argumentos sobre o conhecimento de si na DeduÃÃo Transcendental da CrÃtica da RazÃo Pura, utilizando como estratÃgia de anÃlise e estudo da obra o seu cotejamento com um manuscrito kantiano encontrado e publicado apenas no final do sÃculo XX. Utiliza tambÃm para aprofundamento das teses os comentadores que notadamente realizaram discussÃes sobre a temÃtica. Os argumentos defendem a importÃncia do sentido interno para compreensÃo do argumento principal e para caracterizaÃÃo de suas especificidades, o que o torna esse Ãltimo tema adjunto ao problema. O tempo, que à a forma desse sentido interno, foi estudado como aparecimento do sujeito na sensibilidade e, portanto, à fator crucial na compreensÃo da subjetividade kantiana. O trabalho de pesquisa foi estruturado em torno de algumas distinÃÃes importantes para compreensÃo do tema em anÃlise, sÃo elas: entre sentido interno e sentido externo, e apercepÃÃo e sentido interno. Ao longo da produÃÃo dos argumentos, ressaltou-se o carÃter sistÃmico do pensamento kantiano, o que implica em maior complexidade na definiÃÃo de seus elementos, visto os mesmos estarem bastante definidos em relaÃÃo aos demais. Do trabalho se conclui a especificidade do conhecimento de si, compreendido como distinto do conhecimento em sentido strictu por nÃo conter os qualificativos de um conhecimento propriamente objetivo. Das conclusÃes tambÃm emergiram a corporeidade do sujeito empÃrico como modo de apreensÃo de si mesmo, revelando a relaÃÃo sentido interno e externo, alÃm da autoafecÃÃo como conceito importante na compreensÃo da distinÃÃo do sentido interno da apercepÃÃo transcendental. / This research discusses arguments about self-knowledge in the work Transcendental Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason using as a strategy of analysis and study of the work the comparison of it with a Kantian manuscript found and published only at the end of the 20th century. It also uses, in order to deepen the theses, the commentators who notably held discussions on the subject. The research defends the importance of inner sense to understand the main argument and to characterize its specificities. Inner sense is a secondary theme, but very attached to the main problem. Time, which is the form of this inner sense, has been studied as the appearance of the subject in the sensibility and, therefore, crucial factor in the understanding of the Kantian subjectivity. This research was structured around some important distinctions to understand the theme under analysis, they are: between internal sense and external sense, and apperception and inner sense. Throughout the production of the arguments the systemic character of the Kantian thought was emphasized, which implies in a greater complexity in the definition of its elements since they are defined in relation to the others. The research concludes the specificity of the self-knowledge that is distinct from the knowledge in a strict sense, because it does not contain the qualifiers of a properly objective knowledge. From the conclusions also emerged the importance of the embodiment of the empirical subject as a way of apprehending oneself, expressing the relation between internal and external sense; as well as the self-affection as an important concept to understand the distinction of the inner sense from the transcendental apperception.

Le présent mémoire explore la problématique du corps où s’articule la phénoménologie de la chair de Michel Henry et le concept d’angoisse de Kierkegaard par une analyse d’En Route (1895) de J.-K. Huysmans et de Sous le soleil de Satan (1926) de Georges Bernanos. D’ailleurs, le choix de l’écriture romanesque pour « rendre sensible » le mystère de Dieu, lui prêter figure et contours, chair et matière dans des personnages fictifs s’inscrit de plein pied dans la pensée chrétienne de l’Incarnation, puisque le christianisme est justement une religion de l’incarnation des réalités éternelles et absolues dans le relatif et le contingent. D’abord, le cadre théorique d’une philosophie de le la chair conceptualisée dans Incarnation (2000) de Michel Henry nous servira de cadre théorique principal pour penser le rapport qu’entretient le corps avec l’immanence et la transcendance, c’est-à-dire les régimes d’auto-affection et d’hétéro-affection. Ensuite, dans le deuxième chapitre, nous prendrons la mesure de la récupération du concept d’angoisse de Kierkegaard par Henry dans Incarnation. Outre le dialogue entre ces deux philosophes de la subjectivité pathétique, les pensées phénoménologiques respectives de Merleau-Ponty et de Jean- François Lavigne nous permettront de mettre à l’épreuve la thèse principale henryenne d’une immanence absolue. Ce travail s’inscrit au carrefour de la littérature, de la philosophie et de la théologie. / This thesis explores the question of the body, where Michel Henry’s phenomenology of the flesh and Kierkegaard's concept of anxiety are articulated by an analysis of J.K. Huysmans’ En Route (1895) and George Bernanos’ Sous le soleil de Satan (1926). The choice of fiction to render the mystery of God "perceptible"- to give God shape and form, flesh and substance - through fictional characters is fully in line with the Christian belief in the Incarnation, as Christianity is indeed a religion characterized by the incarnation of eternal and absolute realities in the relative and the contingent. The theoretical framework of the philosophy of the flesh conceptualized in Michel Henry’s Incarnation (2000) will serve as our principal theoretical framework for thinking about the relationship that the body maintains with immanence and transcendence; that is to say, the institutions of self-affection and hetero-affection. In the second chapter, we will evaluate Henry’s reclaiming of Kierkegaard's concept of anxiety in Incarnation. In addition to the dialogue between these two philosophers of pathetic subjectivity, the phenomenological thought of Merleau-Ponty and Jean-François Lavigne will allow us to test Henry’s principal thesis of absolute immanence. This research is at the crossroads of literature, philosophy, and theology.