A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in (Counselling Psychology) in the department of psychology, University of Zululand, South Africa, 2012. / Self-respect is defined as pride and confidence in oneself, a feeling that one is behaving with honor and dignity. The objective of the study was to find out the conceptualization of self-respect from high school learners. This study adopted a phenomenological approach to facilitate the understanding of the information gathered. The sample consisted of 10 participants: 5 males and 5 females. Participants were Grade 12 learners who were willing to participate. A self-administered questionnaire was given to the participants to fill. Results from the participants revealed that the concept self-respect means respecting yourself and others, as well as having self-confidence. Participants also mentioned that self-respect comes from home, from parents as well as friends. The study concludes with limitations of the study and recommendations for future research.

The purpose of this paper is to examine what role anger plays in the moral realm. To do so, I will critique Martha Nussbaum’s view that anger is normatively problematic for sustaining moral relations due to its prevalent relation to seeking payback and status. I will expand the limits Nussbaum imposes on what people can be angry at as well as what are normal responses to the emotion, to attempt to show how anger can be a vital tool in our moral lives as a tool in response to wrongdoing or injustice.

<p>I den psykoterapeutiska relationen kan individen speglas och stärkas i sin självkänsla, men det är inte alla förunnat. Syftet med undersökningen var att finna hur individer i vardagligt samspel kan stödja varandra. En kvalitativ intervjustudie i halvstrukturerad form genomfördes med åtta pensionärer i Västerås. Undersökningen analyserades med meningskoncentrering. Resultatet redovisar att , samt hur, deltagarna anser det möjligt att stödja sig själva och varandra i att växa i självkänsla. Resultatet visar även att det kan vara viktigt att stödja olika åldersgrupper på olika sätt för att skapa trygga förutsättningar för att växa i självkänsla. Hur olika kulturer samt skilda förutsättningar under olika tidsepoker kan påverka individens självkänsla är exempel på områden som med fördel kan undersökas vidare.</p>

I den psykoterapeutiska relationen kan individen speglas och stärkas i sin självkänsla, men det är inte alla förunnat. Syftet med undersökningen var att finna hur individer i vardagligt samspel kan stödja varandra. En kvalitativ intervjustudie i halvstrukturerad form genomfördes med åtta pensionärer i Västerås. Undersökningen analyserades med meningskoncentrering. Resultatet redovisar att , samt hur, deltagarna anser det möjligt att stödja sig själva och varandra i att växa i självkänsla. Resultatet visar även att det kan vara viktigt att stödja olika åldersgrupper på olika sätt för att skapa trygga förutsättningar för att växa i självkänsla. Hur olika kulturer samt skilda förutsättningar under olika tidsepoker kan påverka individens självkänsla är exempel på områden som med fördel kan undersökas vidare.

Slavery is an unjust institution. Indeed, slavery is often seen to be a paradigmatic case of injustice. Despite this, there is little agreement on how to best explain the injustice of slavery. In this dissertation I examine and reject three main explanations of the injustice of slavery: that slavery is unjust because slaves lack freedom, that slavery is unjust because slaves are alienated from their social world, and that slavery is unjust because slaves lack self-respect. Such explanations are unable to explain the injustice of slavery itself because they cannot identify all cases of slavery as unjust. Instead, I argue that slavery is unjust because it makes it impossible for slaves to realise both their interest in self-respect and their interest in being at home in the world. Slavery is not the only institution, however, that places people in this dilemma; any institution that treats some people as inferior to others will be unjust for the same reason, although not necessarily to the same extent. Thus the explanation of the injustice of slavery also provides us with an explanation of the importance of political equality.

In this paper, I will argue against the position of Carol Hay, who asserts that the oppressed have an obligation against oppression and that the bare minimum of this obligation is to resist internally. I will demonstrate that resisting internally leaves space for the oppressed to affirm the oppressors' false beliefs. Affirming the oppressor's false belief causes the oppressed person to disrespect themself. In order to understand why we must first understand what things contribute to our self-respect. Our ability to respect ourselves depends on many factors, but I will focus on two specifically. The first is our internal/self-image; this is how we see ourselves. The second is our external image; this is how we think people see us. One way we can disrespect ourselves is by causing conflict between these two elements, which undermines our self-respect. Hay's account is grounded on the oppressed person respecting themself. Therefore, if an oppressed person can disrespect themself while meeting the bare requirements of the duty to resist oppression, then we need to reconsider the bare minimum of the obligation to resist oppression. / Master of Arts / In this paper, I will argue against the position of Carol Hay, who asserts that the oppressed have an obligation against oppression and that the bare minimum of this obligation is to resist internally. I will demonstrate that resisting internally leaves space for the oppressed to affirm the oppressors' false beliefs. Affirming the oppressor's false belief causes the oppressed person to disrespect themself. In order to understand why we must first understand what things contribute to our self-respect. Our ability to respect ourselves depends on many factors, but I will focus on two specifically. The first is our internal/self-image; this is how we see ourselves. The second is our external image; this is how we think people see us. One way we can disrespect ourselves is by causing conflict between these two elements, which undermines our self-respect. Hay's account is grounded on the oppressed person respecting themself. Therefore, if an oppressed person can disrespect themself while meeting the bare requirements of the duty to resist oppression, then we need to reconsider the bare minimum of the obligation to resist oppression.

Although empathy has been implicated in both academia and pop culture as nearly analogous to morality, some philosophers and psychologists have taken issue with this assessment. It has been argued that from an ethical perspective, empathy is biasing, myopic, and perhaps more trouble than it is worth. In this paper, I first address whether empathy is a necessary baseline trait for having some degree of ethical motivation. Based on the differing moral experiences of sociopaths and autistic individuals, as well as empathy’s unique ability to motivationally bridge the gap between self and other, I conclude that empathy is a required trait for the moral agent. Assuming empathy is present in the moral experience, I then delineate the negative and positive effects empathy has on the ethical outcome of actions. Empathy does appear to cause prejudiced biasing and derogation of self-respect, but it also acts as a powerful motivator for other-oriented action and provides ethically valuable information about mind-states. Ultimately, I conclude that empathy cannot be a standalone ethical trait, but when filtered through reason, it can be invaluably useful.

Alors que la plupart des théories libérales ont mis l’accent sur les principes de justice, et sur une conception de la justice qui nous fait penser la société et les relations individuelles de manière de plus en plus abstraite, les réflexions sur le respect de soi nous portent plutôt vers ce qui est essentiel à la valeur et l’importance de l’identité des personnes et de leurs relations sociales. Ces réflexions nous révèlent que non seulement les principes de justice ne sont pas la seule source de respect, mais que tant les cultures et les religions que les communautés morales et les groupes compréhensifs ont des rôles fondamentaux pour le niveau de respect de soi et de respect mutuel que les individus éprouvent envers eux-mêmes et envers les autres. Si les projets de vie, les valeurs et les croyances des individus sont révélés comme fondamentaux à leur autonomie et leur vie comme individu, les réflexions sur le multiculturalisme et le pluralisme révèlent les difficultés de notre temps : comment une société peut-elle promouvoir le respect de soi des individus dans un tel contexte de diversité morale, compréhensive, religieuse, etc.? Critiquant les théories de John Rawls, Will Kymlicka, ainsi que certains arguments de philosophes tels que Bhiku Parekh et David Miller, la thèse défendue dans ce mémoire prend la position très forte qu’une société doit donner beaucoup plus de moyens aux individus pour que leur respect de soi soit favorisé. La thèse centrale est que les individus ont tous le droit à un contexte de valorisation, soit un espace politique propre à une communauté ou un groupe et qui inclut les institutions et les pouvoirs nécessaires pour que le respect de soi des membres de ces groupes puisse être favorisé. C’est seulement par un tel droit et par les revendications structurelles et institutionnelles qui s’y rapportent que les groupes culturels et religieux, ainsi que les communautés morales et les groupes compréhensifs peuvent être reconnus politiquement et qu’une théorie libérale et multiculturelle des individus et des groupes puisse concilier idéal et réalité. / While most liberal theories have focused on the principles of justice and on an idea of justice in which the perspective used to reflect on society and on individuals’ relationship is becoming more abstract, an analysis of self-respect leads us towards what is essential to individuals’ self-esteem and esteem of their social relationships. These reflections reveal that the principles of justice are not the only sources of self-respect. Cultures and religions, as well as moral communities and comprehensive groups, have also fundamental roles in the level of self-respect and mutual respect that individuals have between themselves and towards each other. If individuals’ plan of life, values and beliefs are revealed as fundamental to their autonomy and to their life as individuals, the reflections on multiculturalism and pluralism reveal the problem of our time: how can a society achieve to promote individuals’ self-respect in a context where moral, comprehensive and religious diversities are among the main characteristics? Criticizing John Rawls and Will Kymlicka’s theories, as well as some arguments made by philosophers such as Bhiku Parekh and David Miller, the position taken in this theory is that a society must give individuals further means to achieve their self-respect. The main proposition of this essay is that individuals have a right to a self-respect framework, which is a political space particular to a group or community that includes the institutions and powers necessary to promote the self-respect of the members of such group or community. It is only through such right and through the structural and institutional claims that are associated with it, that cultural and religious groups as well as comprehensive groups and moral communities can be recognized politically and that a liberal and multicultural theory of individuals and groups can conciliate ideal and reality.

Alors que la plupart des théories libérales ont mis l’accent sur les principes de justice, et sur une conception de la justice qui nous fait penser la société et les relations individuelles de manière de plus en plus abstraite, les réflexions sur le respect de soi nous portent plutôt vers ce qui est essentiel à la valeur et l’importance de l’identité des personnes et de leurs relations sociales. Ces réflexions nous révèlent que non seulement les principes de justice ne sont pas la seule source de respect, mais que tant les cultures et les religions que les communautés morales et les groupes compréhensifs ont des rôles fondamentaux pour le niveau de respect de soi et de respect mutuel que les individus éprouvent envers eux-mêmes et envers les autres. Si les projets de vie, les valeurs et les croyances des individus sont révélés comme fondamentaux à leur autonomie et leur vie comme individu, les réflexions sur le multiculturalisme et le pluralisme révèlent les difficultés de notre temps : comment une société peut-elle promouvoir le respect de soi des individus dans un tel contexte de diversité morale, compréhensive, religieuse, etc.? Critiquant les théories de John Rawls, Will Kymlicka, ainsi que certains arguments de philosophes tels que Bhiku Parekh et David Miller, la thèse défendue dans ce mémoire prend la position très forte qu’une société doit donner beaucoup plus de moyens aux individus pour que leur respect de soi soit favorisé. La thèse centrale est que les individus ont tous le droit à un contexte de valorisation, soit un espace politique propre à une communauté ou un groupe et qui inclut les institutions et les pouvoirs nécessaires pour que le respect de soi des membres de ces groupes puisse être favorisé. C’est seulement par un tel droit et par les revendications structurelles et institutionnelles qui s’y rapportent que les groupes culturels et religieux, ainsi que les communautés morales et les groupes compréhensifs peuvent être reconnus politiquement et qu’une théorie libérale et multiculturelle des individus et des groupes puisse concilier idéal et réalité. / While most liberal theories have focused on the principles of justice and on an idea of justice in which the perspective used to reflect on society and on individuals’ relationship is becoming more abstract, an analysis of self-respect leads us towards what is essential to individuals’ self-esteem and esteem of their social relationships. These reflections reveal that the principles of justice are not the only sources of self-respect. Cultures and religions, as well as moral communities and comprehensive groups, have also fundamental roles in the level of self-respect and mutual respect that individuals have between themselves and towards each other. If individuals’ plan of life, values and beliefs are revealed as fundamental to their autonomy and to their life as individuals, the reflections on multiculturalism and pluralism reveal the problem of our time: how can a society achieve to promote individuals’ self-respect in a context where moral, comprehensive and religious diversities are among the main characteristics? Criticizing John Rawls and Will Kymlicka’s theories, as well as some arguments made by philosophers such as Bhiku Parekh and David Miller, the position taken in this theory is that a society must give individuals further means to achieve their self-respect. The main proposition of this essay is that individuals have a right to a self-respect framework, which is a political space particular to a group or community that includes the institutions and powers necessary to promote the self-respect of the members of such group or community. It is only through such right and through the structural and institutional claims that are associated with it, that cultural and religious groups as well as comprehensive groups and moral communities can be recognized politically and that a liberal and multicultural theory of individuals and groups can conciliate ideal and reality.

Throughout the scientific literature, researchers have referred to self-respect and self-esteem as being the same construct. However, the present study advocated that they exist as two distinct constructs. In this quantitative study, an instrument was developed to measure self-respect as a construct, and subsequently distinguish that self-respect is distinct from the construct of self-esteem. Exploratory factor analyses (EFA) indicated 32.60% of the variance was accounted for by the 11-item Jefferson Self-Respect instrument (JSR), which measured self-respect as a unidimensional construct. The reliability estimate of the scores from the JSR reached an acceptable α = .82. Fit indices (RMSEA = .031, SRMR = .037, CFI = .982, and TLI = .977) from the confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) signified a well-fitted hypothesized model of self-respect that existed as a unidimensional construct. Additionally, the CFA revealed that the construct of self-respect, and self-esteem was generally distinct, and the strength of the correlation between the two constructs was moderately positive (r = .62).