Thesis--Wisconsin. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [77]-80).

Habilitationsschrift--Göttingen. / Bibliography: p. [329]-333.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1968. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

I propose to analyse referring, the typical function of proper names and definite descriptions, in terms of speakers' intentions rather than in terms of the meanings of words. Grice's theory of meaning explains how a speaker can mean something simply by making an utterance with the proper sort of intention, and I attempt to apply this theory of meaning to referring. I see two related reasons for thinking a Gricean theory of reference correct. First, I try to show that our speech practice is such as to demand a Gricean-type theory; we simply do depend rather often on hearers' recognition of speakers' intentions to achieve reference. Second, the causal theory of proper names, which I investigate in Chapter 5. seems to demand a Gricean theory of reference. In Chapter 1, I am concerned with whole utterance meaning, and with the problem of going from occasional meaning to conventional meaning. Lewis' analysis of convention is deployed in a way which I think vindicates Grice's hope that conventional or timeless meaning may be analyzed in terms of occasional meaning. In Chapter 2, I attempt to extend the Gricean program to parts of utterances. That is, I argue that an utterance may have meaningful parts and grammatical structure entirely without benefit of convention. Primitive cases of referring and predicating can arise at this pre-conventional level, and here certainly referring is to be explained by a Gricean theory. Chapter 3 contains the body of my argument for a Gricean theory of reference. I try to show that our referring practice is in fact one which depends on the characteristic form of the Gricean intention: the speaker, by his utterance, intends that the hearer shall be affected in some way, intending this to come about at least in part by hearers' recognition of speakers' intentions. The first three section of Chapter 3 are devoted to arguing for the Gricean character of reference, and the remaining two to developing suitable epistemic foundations for such a theory. If a speaker's intention is primary, the meanings of the words he uses are (with qualifications) secondary, so we must be able to explain how a speaker is connected with the object of his reference in some way which does not essentially involve his being able to say something true about that object. I use Kaplan's theory of relational belief, with .its emphasis on the causal element in a belief, to provide this connection. Having a relational belief about an object connects one with it, and allows one to have an intention directed towards it. Chapter ^ is a criticism of the standard theory of reference with Searle and Strawson cast as its defenders. Chapter 5 is a presentation and elaboration of the 'causal' or the 'historical explanation' theory of names, the new theory of names which, I claim, requires a Gricean theory of reference. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

The central question guiding this thesis is, how do we determine what information is semantic? I argue that the amount of information semantically-encoded is proportional to the role semantic competence plays in linguistic communication. My reasons for this are meta-theoretical. Natural language semantics is the theory of the information encoded by linguistic expressions. As such, it should proceed in accordance with normal naturalistic inquiry on the model of the core natural sciences. This includes the practice of hypothesizing entities with the goal of explaining otherwise inexplicable phenomena and theoretical virtues like parsimony. These same considerations lead me to reject a standard claim in natural language semantics, that proper names semantically refer to their bearers. My argument proceeds as follows. Ordinary assumptions about natural language semantics include the assumption that semantics is essentially a theory of truth conditions; and that its tasks, including the analysis of logical properties like validity and consistency, are to be determined a priori. In Chapter 1, I argue that these assumptions must be earned, not stipulated, for a natural language semantics understood as a scientific theory of linguistic meaning. Instead, the nature of the semantic properties we ascribe to language should be determined by the explanatory niche they fill, which in turn is determined by the broader theoretical context. I argue that this broader context should be understood as the theory of linguistic communication and the cognitive mechanisms underlying it. In Chapter 2, I examine one strategy for delimiting the domain of semantic properties, the argument from competence. Arguments from competence infer from the limitations of the cognitive mechanisms devoted to linguistic interpretation to negative claims about what semantic properties cannot be. I take a detailed look at an instance of this strategy, Kent Bach’s argument that reference is not a semantic property of proper names. In Chapter 3, I argue that the viability of Bach’s argument, and arguments from competence in general, depends on the role played by semantic knowledge. We can infer to expressions’ semantic contents from speakers’ knowledge of semantic properties only if that knowledge is necessary for linguistic communication. In Chapter 4, I argue that, because linguistic communication is ostensive-inferential, not code-based, knowledge of semantic properties is not necessary for linguistic communication. Arguments from competence, including Bach’s argument that reference is not a semantic property of name, fail. However, many of the same considerations which lead to this failure point the way to a different argument against the referential theory of names, the argument from methodological semantic minimalism. Methodological minimalism requires us to posit only those semantic properties necessary to explain the phenomena of linguistic communication. Because these phenomena are ostensive-inferential, they depend primarily on pragmatic cognitive mechanisms, and we can explain many phenomena pragmatically, rendering semantic explanation redundant. In Chapter 5, I apply methodological semantic minimalism to the thesis that reference is a semantic property of proper names. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / Natural language semantics is the theory of the information encoded by natural languages. Of all the information a sentence can be used to communicate, which of it is semantically encoded? How can we tell? One method is an argument strategy called the argument from competence. Arguments from competence presuppose that semantically competent speakers have knowledge of the information their linguistic expressions encode. On this assumption, we can infer from the information competent speakers do, or plausibly could, possess in virtue of being competent with some expression(s) to the sorts of information we can reasonably call their semantic contents. I discuss one instance of an argument from competence in detail, Kent Bach's argument against the referential theory of names. The referential theory holds that proper names semantically refer to, or encode information about, their bearers. Bach argues that the referential theory must be false, and a proper name does not encode information about each of its bearers because competent speakers have incomplete knowledge of a name’s bearers for most names they use and encounter in linguistic communication. I argue that Bach's argument, and arguments from competence in general, fail because they misconceive the mechanics of linguistic communication and, along with them, the place of speakers’ knowledge of semantic information in the hierarchy of cognitive abilities underlying linguistic communication. Such knowledge plays a relatively minor role in linguistic communication, which is largely dependent on the same pragmatic mechanisms underlying non-linguistic communication. I offer an independent argument against the referential theory of names which follows from the essentially pragmatic nature of linguistic communication.

This thesis focuses on the interpretation of pronouns, in particular as subjects of the consequent clauses of counterfactual conditionals. More specifically, the constructions under consideration have been termed proxy counterfactuals. They are characterized as identifying two individual-denoting expressions in such a way that a new, composite individual is hypothesized. This hypothetical individual shares certain properties with both of the individuals denoted in the antecedent clause. Pronouns in the consequent clause referring back to this composite individual exhibit unusual binding properties. Their morpho-syntactic realization is uniquely determined by the subject of the antecedent clause, while their semantic interpretation is bound to both individuals denoted in the antecedent clause. I will examine cases involving first and second person pronouns, and adopt a previously put forth analysis which treats them as rigidly designating (Thomas, 2009). Cases involving the third person will require additional attention. The proposed analysis makes use of the Formal Link condition on e-type anaphora (Kadmon, 1987; Heim, 1990) in combination with a constraint on the use of gender features (Yanovich, 2012) in order to account for the observed constraints. / Thesis / Master of Science (MSc)

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The aim of this study is to investigate the semantic features of human beings in Tshivenda. For this purpose the theoretical assumptions of Lexical semantics were taken as the starting-point of the investigation. Various concepts such as synonymy, antonymy, hyponymy, hipernymy and lexical hierarchy are discussed. The semantic features of human beings are classified into two subclasses of features, i.e. physical and psychological features. The physical features which are prominent in Tshivenda are the following: age, physically disadvantaged, body shape, body part, body position and colour. Six subcategories of psychological features are recognized: intelligent, retarded, timid, good and bad behaviour, and habits. These features are represented by nouns in Tshivenda and such nouns may this function as semantic adjectives with a descriptive function. In the discussion of these features, attention is also given to the derivation of the nouns which have these features, i.e. whether derived or not, or whether there are compound nouns with these features. Attention is also given to the contribution of the noun class prefix to the semantics of these nouns. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie studie is om die semantiese kenmerke van mense in Tshivenda te ondersoek. Vir hierdie doel is die teoretiese aannames van die Leksikale semantiek geneem as die beginpunt van die ondersoek. Verskeie konsepte soos sinoniem, antoniem, hiponiem, hipernoniem en leksikale hierargie is bespreek. Die semantiese kenmerke van mense word geklassifiseer in twee subklasse van kenmerke, die fisiese en psigologiese kenmerke. Die fisiese kenmerke wat prominent is in Tshivenda is die volgende: ouderdom, fisies benadeel, liggaamsvorm, liggaamsdeel, liggaamsposisie en kleur. Ses subkategrieë van psigologiese kenmerke is gevind: intelligent, vertraag, skugter, goeie en slegte gedrag, en verskeie gewoontes. Hierdie kenmerke is teenwoordig in naamwoorde in Tshivenda en sulke naamwoorde kan dus funksioneer as semantiese adjektiewe met 'n deskriptiewe funksie. In die bespeking van hierdie kenmerke is aandag ook gegee aan die afleiding van die naamwoorde wat hierdie kenmerke het, d.i. of hulle afgelei is of nie, en of hulle saamgestelde naamwoorde is met hierdie kenmerke. Aandag is ook gegee aan die bydrae van die naamwoordklasprefiks tot die semantiek van hierdie naamwoorde.