Separation of powers, the rise of liberalism in eighteenth century and flourished in Europe, it curbs excessive concentration of state power through checks and balances, especially focus on the confrontation between each other. Nowadays it has evolved modern constitution contains two parts: the core components of human rights and the framework of separation of powers. Because the traditional theory of separation of powers derived from the distrust which people have the state power and exercise it. These people oppose the right of any advantage, they often confine to the core areas of power, coupled with the abstract of separation of powers principle itself. They are out of date and can not put forward the best and most functional theories. Also, asking national affairs should be played by the best conditions in all aspects of the sector within the organization, functions and the mode of decisions, and achieve the purpose of suppression of state power. In this paper, we analyzed the explanation and its reason of the petition No. 585 by using the traditional constitutional interpretation method to the new functional interpretation and figurative interpretation to interpret the traditional and fixed separation of powers to dynamic separation of powers. The main core of this paper is to probe into the evolution of our constitutional system. Using our current semi-presidentialism contrasts to the German Weimar Constitution which is one of our constitutional origins and is the prototype of semi-presidentialism. Comparing these two constitutions and try to find out the point and bring up recommendations. The essential of the Constitution in line with people¡¦s basic values and emotions; the content of the Constitution is the social status quo which is never qualified. The theories of separation of powers are methods, it aims to pursuit the union of national consciousness. Truth Investigation Committee exposed the lack of crisis management mechanism of Taiwan's constitutional system, once the constitutional authority doesn¡¦t strictly obey the rules, the Constitution has no solution to handle it! What can the Constitution do to face the lack of self-defense function? When the Constitution still follow the practice to define the authority but the result proceeds in opposite ways with public opinion. The constitution is the political law to safeguard human dignity, and it is futurology which can be pursued its objective of logic and it is interpretable. The rulers of Taiwan all want to control the Constitution but not adhere to it. According to this, we broke the stereotypes and reformulated defense mechanism. Even if we left it unused for a hundred years; perhaps we can provide another level of thinking , and give another solution to unconstitutional review for the future.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1970. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Guo li Taiwan shi fan da xue li shi yan jiu suo. / Mimeo. copy. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2006. / Title from title screen. Andrew Altman, committee chair; Christie Hartley, Peter Lindsay, committee members. Electronic text (88 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed May 2, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 80-88).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 327-346).

Masters in Public Administration - MPA / The relationship between the executive and the legislature in South Africa is determined by the Constitution. The study focuses on the separation of powers in a single party-dominant system and examines the role of the Leader of Government Business in parliamentary processes. The Leader of Government Business is appointed by the President in terms of Section 91(4) of the Constitution. The role is outlined in the terms of National Assembly Rule (150), while the functions have been developed over time since 1994. Though an executive function an office in parliament was established to act as conduit between the executive and the legislature on matters relating to the legislative and oversight processes. The office mainly fulfills its role by monitoring government‟s legislative programme and ensuring that government‟s priorities are achieved. Over the past 15 years, the office of the LOGB has developed into one that performs a dual function supporting both the executive and the legislature. Parliament relies more and more on this office in executing its oversight responsibilities with regard to the functions of programming in ensuring the availability of the executive, tracking matters of executive compliance and tracking vacancies in institutions that support democracy. The study employed a combination of research methods. It used a desk top study approach by consulting relevant literature on the subject matter. Interviews were conducted with both politicians and relevant officials in the South African Parliament and the House of Commons in Britain to gauge their perceptions, knowledge and experiences in respect of the role of the executive and the legislature in the legislative and oversight processes. Reports of Portfolio and Select Committees on deliberations during the legislative and oversight processes were consulted.

The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that the conduct of judge-led commissions of inquiry in Canada could be improved, and rendered more consistent with purposive values embodied in the rule of law, were judicial commissioners to observe a principle of fidelity to adjudication. The rule of law, practically understood as a political and legal ideal, treats independence as integral to the judicial role in interpreting and applying law, safeguarding the Constitution, and honouring individual rights. Public confidence in the independence and integrity of Canada’s judiciary flows not just from constitutional safeguards, however, but from judicial observance of adjudicative procedure. So too does confidence that in exercising their functions, judges respect the boundaries commanded by the separation of powers. Contrary to categorical distinctions that are often drawn between commissions of inquiry and courts, adjudicative procedure is an essential feature of many inquiries. This is so because the participants in such inquiries legitimately demand an assurance of justice equivalent to that associated with traditional judicial proceedings. Recognizing this commonality does not mean burdening public inquiries with the evidentiary and procedural rigidity of courts. It does suggest, however, that adjudication has a valuable (if non-exclusive) role to play in the conduct of some inquiries, establishing a compelling reason why judges should be their leaders. Fidelity to adjudication directs judicial commissioners to account for this reality when confronting common dilemmas and challenges in inquiry conduct. I explore the methodological implications of fidelity to adjudication in two broad areas, first concerning procedural fairness, and second concerning the protection of a commissioner’s independence. Finally, I consider how fidelity to adjudication establishes boundaries cautioning against judicial service in inquiries that demand different conceptions of justice, or advance different notions of truth-seeking, than those in which judges are traditionally informed. A principled alignment is thus established between judicial service on commissions of inquiry, judicial methods and skills, and observance of the rule of law.

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The system of government in modern democratic states can be categorized as presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary depending on its relationship between the legislative, executive and judicial branches. This relationship is known as the separation of powers and is often regulated by a written constitution. While there are many studies explaining the ideal system, there are few researches made as to whether the states correspond with their theoretical ideals. This study aims at explaining the theories of Giovanni Sartori regarding these three different systems of government and thus creating an ideal for each system. With the help of case studies of three different states representing each system the study analyses as to whether the states of each system correspond with its ideals. The states chosen for this purpose is Australia as a representative of the parlamentaristic state, France as a semi-presidential system and USA which is a presidential system. All three of them are using a bicameral legislature and have a written constitution. The study aims to analyse the systems through a comparative method using a qualitative text analysis of the material used. The results of this study shows that while the states at large resembles its ideal, there are some deviations. Australia and the United States of America fulfills Sartoris three criterias for their respective system, while France deviates from a majority of its ideal criterias as a hybrid semi-presidential system.

The control system is an original and sound system of this Country. The Founder of this Country, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, proposed after he established this Republic that the control power should be practiced by an independent body to highlight the functions of such power, rather than putting it under the legislative power as in the 3-Separated Powers common to many Western countries. This thesis begins by examining the status and nature of control power in the 5-Separated Powers as in the constitutional regime of this Country from a perspective of separation of powers. It follows by exploring the evolution of mandates of the Control Yuan as a result of various constitutional amendments during the 1990s when the Government undertook constitutional amendments engineering for the promotion of democratic development. This thesis then analyzes the impact of such constitutional amendments upon the practice of control power from existing laws and regulations relevant to the control power and provides the views of this author. It then analyzes the status quo of the practice of functions of the Third Control Yuan by its Members, in comparison to the statistics on the functional practice of the Second Control Yuan, so as to comprehend the efficacy of the practice of functions of the Third Control Yuan. In the conclusion, the author puts forward his own findings and suggestions on the practice of control power by the Third Control Yuan.