Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 1931. / Published also in International library of psychology, philosophy and scientific method, under title: The individual and the community; a historical analysis of the motivating factors of social conduct. "Selected bibliography": p. 303-308.

Thèse--Faculté de droit de Paris.

Thesis (doctoral)--Kjobenhavn Universitet, 1951. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 259-265).

Thesis. / Bibliography: p. xiii-xv.

Thesis (doctoral)--Friedrich-Alexanders-Universität Erlangen, 1903. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thèse--Faculté de droit de Paris.

Thesis (doctoral)--Kjobenhavn Universitet, 1951. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 259-265).

The purpose of this study was to investigate the stability of the social desirability scale values used by Edwards in the construction of his Personal Preference Schedule (PPS). The specific hypotheses were: (a) The social desirability scale values determined for University of British Columbia students, Hungarian university students and Canadian female delinquents will correlate significantly with Edwards’ scale values determined on American college students; and (b) The social desirability scale values derived for these three groups, together with Edwards' scale data and the scale values derived on five other groups will all intercorrelate significantly. This hypothesis specifies that a common stereotype of what is socially desirable and undesirable will persist throughout the various groups. Two additional problems were also investigated, namely, the extent to which the item pairs on the PPS were matched for social desirability for the groups tested, and how these three groups, together with Edwards' American sample, differed when the items on the PPS were grouped into the manifest needs that they purport to assess. In order to investigate the hypotheses and problems, social desirability ratings were obtained from 226 University of British Columbia students, 70 male Hungarian university students and 40 female delinquents. The items rated for social desirability were those contained in the PPS. The obtained ratings were scaled by the method of successive intervals. All Intercorrelations were significant at the .01 level. Thus the two hypotheses were supported, suggesting that a common attitude of what is desirable and undesirable cuts across many different groups. The results of the intraclass correlations for matched pairs on the PPS suggested that the PPS would control for the social desirability variable on a group of UBC students, but not for the Hungarians or delinquents. Analysis of variance techniques employed on the PPS items grouped in terms of the needs they measured indicated highly reliable group differences. The Canadian and American university students showed no significant differences in their need ratings. Compared with the American and Canadian students, the Hungarians appeared to evaluate positively the needs of order and aggression and to underevaluate the need for affiliation, and, comparatively, the delinquent group rated highly the needs of autonomy, change, heterosexuality and aggression and underrated the needs of achievement, order, introception and endurance. It was emphasized that it could not be assumed that a group possessed to a strong degree those needs to which they give high social desirability ratings. / Arts, Faculty of / Psychology, Department of / Graduate

D.Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy) / This thesis consists of two parts. First an argument is made to the effect that the contemporary debate on justice does not sufficiently address the specific problems pertinent to radically unjust societies. In the second part an attempt is made to propose remedies for these deficiencies. In chapter one the following deficiencies in the contemporary debate on justice are pointed out: (i) it does not provide sufficient guidance on how injustice should be identified, (ii) there is a lack of clarity on the universality or particularity of theories of justice; (iii) the methodology of theories of justice is neglected; (iv) a thorough evaluation of forms of political action acceptable for the transformation of injustice into justice is relatively absent; (v) there is a lack of attention to conflicts of pluralism other than religious and moral pluralism. In the second chapter it is noted that people in radically unjust societies often accept their situation willingly or endure it passively because they either accept a set of ideas legitimating it, or they perceive their situation as the inevitable product of natural forces that they are powerless to do anything about. Suggestions are made to enable these people to see their society as the product of human activity and thus as something that they as human beings can modify, alter, change, or transform. Having established, at the beginning of chapter three, that the quest for a universal theory of justice is important, various findings are briefly sketched. It is followed by an attempt to distinguish universal elements that ought to belong to the contents of any theory of justice, justified by reference to features of our common humanity, from ·the particular elements in a theory of justice, brought about by a variety of factors, such as socioeconomic circumstances, cultural values, specific experiences, and so on. In chapter four a theory of justice as complex consensus is expounded in six theses, which leads to a method appropriate for (i) the theoretical articulation and explanation of injustice and (ii) the design, construction, and justification of a theory of the optimally·just society that complements and completes the universal elements, distinguished above, by means of particular elements so that the resulting theory of justice is applicable to the unique socio-political context of a particular society only. In the fifth chapter views that defend an extrinsic or an intrinsic relation between the means and ends of the transformationof a radically unjust society into a nearly just (or even an optimally just) one, are contrasted. Thereafter an extensive defense of an intrinsic relation between the means and ends of political transformation is provided. The final chapter starts by indicating what should be counted as gains made in terms of justice once a radically unjust society has been transformed into a nearly just (or even an optimally just) one. A sketch of the simplest way possible for implementing and securing these gains will be examined and remedies will be proposed that best secure justice for those shortcomings that have been pointed out.

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