Currently, the argument that markets cannot provide public goods underlies the justification of political authority most widely accepted by political theorists. Yet, as theorists usually depict the problem, public goods could be voluntarily produced at levels of efficiency comparable to those attainable by coercion. Once we allow that the real problem is much more messy than its theoretical models led us to believe, we have to admit that coercion may be necessary after all. At the same time, we have to admit that the moral problem of justifying coercion is also more messy than we thought, and for precisely the same reason. I discuss contractual mechanisms for voluntary public goods provision, arguing that with such a mechanism, voluntary contribution levels might be much higher than conventional theories predict. My theory is borne out in laboratory experiments. Still, it remains an open question whether it would be worth the trouble to switch from the coercive methods presently employed to noncoercive (or less coercive) methods of public goods provision. A strictly efficient method is not among our options. We have to assess the efficiency of various methods in a relative sense. Should we find cases in which public goods cannot be provided by contract, or should we decide that in some cases we do not even want to risk trying voluntary methods, we are forced to face the moral issue squarely. I offer a traditional analysis of justice, although I employ it in a somewhat unorthodox way in drawing conclusions about the moral status of private property in a well-ordered society. I then use this analysis to develop a foundation for property rights, exploring its implications for questions concerning what people are morally obliged to do, and what they can legitimately be forced to do, for the sake of public goods production.

by Kwok-man Lui. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1989. / Bibliography: leaves 167-172.

Thesis (M.S.)--Rochester Institute of Technology, 2009. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 54-56).

Thesis (M.Env.St.)--University of Adelaide, Mawson Graduate Centre for Environmental Studies, 2000. / Bibliography: leaves 121-138.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Political Science, June 2000. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1997. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--George Mason University, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 213-220).

Thesis (doctoral)--Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam, 1987. / Summary in Dutch. Includes bibliographical references (p. 315-321).

In this paper, I investigated the influence of the existing political power on the economical and social development of the state. The paper went deeper into positive and negative effects, state of economy within the years since the establishment of the Republic of Belarus, dominating social tendencies and the ways of improving the existing situation. The last part of the thesis presented analysis of whether Belarus is ready to enter European Union, as some of its members have already done ( Poland, Lithuania), why/why not. I assess that my own ideas contribute by approximately 30 % to the presented text.

從雙加工的角度來看，個人在社會困境中的決策是自動加工和控制加工相互作用的結果。基於對不同方向的研究結論的回顧，我們提出兩個不同的親社會行為模型，自我控制者模型和社會直覺者模型。這兩個模型在對人性有不同的假設，且對自動加工和控制加工在親社會行為中所扮演的角色有不同的分配。具體來說，自我控制者模型假定個人的親社會性是表面的，人們的親社會行為主要來自控制加工--監測並調整以使人們的行為更符合社會規範。社會直覺者模型假定個人的親社會性是天生的，人們的親社會行為主要來自自動加工--社會交換啟發式把人們的行為錨定在教高的親社會水平上。我們在三個實驗中比較並探討了兩個模型在描述人們在資源困境中的親社會行為的適用性，以及自動加工和控制加工在決策過程中所扮演的角色。我們使用了通常用於分離兩種加工模式的範式，包括操控個人的自我調節的資源（實驗1），認知資源（實驗2），加工目標（實驗3）。三個實驗的結果一致地支持自我控制者型，即人類的親社會行為是控制加工的結果。在考慮到社會偏好的個體差異之後，我們發現，親自我個體的行為非常符合自我控制者模型。研究3和探索性分析結果也支持作為理性思考者的親自我個體，他們的親社會行為在很大程度上依賴於控制加工--通過計算和透徹思考來控制自私本能。親社會個體的合作行為沒有符合自我控制者模型的預測。探索性分析表明， 作為直覺思考者的親社會個體， 他們的親社會行為取決於利用啓發式和直覺的自動加工。我們認為，儘管三項研究的證據都支持自我控制者模型，它只反映到故事的一部分。我們需要考慮到社會偏好的個體差異並檢驗社會交換啓發式對親社會個體的合作行為的中介作用以深入對人類親社會性的了解。 / From a dual-processing perspective, individuals’ decision-making in social dilemmas is the result of interplay between automatic processing and controlled processing. Based on review on different lines of research, a self-controller model and an social intuitionist model of decision-making in social dilemmas are proposed with opposing assumptions about nature of human prosociality as well as roles assigned to the automatic processing and controlled processing. Specifically, the self-controller model assumes individuals’ prosociality is skin-deep, and major contribution of one’s prosociality comes from controlled processing, through monitoring and regulating one’s behavior to confirm to social norms; while the social intuitionist model assumes individuals’ prosociality is innate, and major contribution of one’s prosociality comes from the automatic processing through utilizing social exchange heuristics and intuitions that anchor individuals’ behavior on a cooperative end. In three studies, we compared applicability of the two models in depicting prosocial behavior in a resource dilemma with different paradigms that are typically used to dissociate two modes of processing. These include manipulations on individuals’ self-regulatory resources (Experiment 1), cognitive resources (Experiment 2), and processing goals (Experiment 3). Results from three experiments consistently advocated the self-controller model indicating that human’s prosociality is the result of controlled processing. Taking individual differences concerning social preferences into the analyses, we found that proselfs’ behavior was best described by the self-controller model. Results from study 3 and exploratory analysis also support that prosociality of proselfs depend heavily on controlled processing, in which people control their selfish instinct with calculation and deliberation. Prosocials’ cooperative behavior did not follow prediction of the self-controller model. Instead, result from exploratory analyses suggests that prosociality of prosocials, as intuitive thinkers, depend more on automatic processing, in which people express their prosociality through utilizing heuristics and intuitions. We conclude that, although evidence from three studies favors the self-controller model, it only reflects part of the story. We need to take individual difference in social preferences in to consideration in order to deepen our understanding of the human prosociality and more effort should be done in testing mediating role of the social exchange heuristics for prosocials’ cooperativeness. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Lu, Su. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 43-52). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese. / Chapter CHAPTER ONE: --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Dual-processing of Prosocial Decision-making --- p.3 / A Self-controller Model --- p.4 / A Social Intuitionist Model --- p.6 / Comparison of Two Models --- p.7 / Potential Moderator: Individual Differences in Social Preferences --- p.10 / Differences in Automatic Processing? --- p.11 / Differences in Controlled Processing? --- p.12 / Dissociation of the Two Modes of Processing --- p.13 / Cognitive Load --- p.14 / Ego-depletion --- p.14 / Instruction Induction of the Two Modes of Processing --- p.15 / Chapter CHAPTER TWO: --- OVERVIEW OF CURRENT RESAERCH --- p.16 / Chapter CHAPTER THREE: --- EXPERIMENT ONE --- p.17 / Method --- p.17 / Results --- p.20 / Discussion --- p.22 / Chapter CHAPTER FOUR: --- EXPERIMENT TWO --- p.23 / Method --- p.23 / Results --- p.25 / Discussion --- p.27 / Chapter CHAPTER FOUR: --- EXPERIMENT THREE --- p.27 / Method --- p.28 / Results --- p.29 / Discussion --- p.31 / Chapter CHAPTER FIVE: --- EXPLORATORY ANALYSES --- p.32 / Differences in Self-control Capacity/motivation? --- p.32 / Differences in Reliance on Intuitive Thinking? --- p.33 / Chapter CHAPTER SIX: --- GENERAL DISCUSSION --- p.35 / Proselfs as Self-controllers vs. Prosocials as Social Intuitionists --- p.36 / Measuring Social Preferences as the Result of Controlled Processing --- p.37 / Limitations and Future Directions --- p.38 / Implicit vs. Explicit Measure of Social Preferences --- p.40 / Further Issues about Social Exchange Heuristics --- p.41 / REFERENCES --- p.43