This thesis considers the education of children of immigrants in Finland, focusing on attainment and transitions around the age of 16. It is the first detailed representative study on the topic in Finland. Compared to international research it is amongst the ones to most fully explore the different aspects of education around this age. For the most part, it is limited to studying structural explanations for differences between students and ethnic groups. The majority of the analyses in the thesis are done using register data. Statistical modelling of this data is done using multivariate regression analyses. The results are supplemented with evidence from interviews with both majority students and children of immigrants. With regards to school achievement at the end of comprehensive school, many immigrant-origin groups are seen to have lower average grades than the majority. However, this is explained by lower parental resources. After controlling for parental resources, very few disadvantages remain. On the other hand, the gender gap evident amongst the majority is not found amongst many immigrant-origin groups. Looking at continuation to upper secondary education compared to dropping out, most children of immigrants are seen to have a higher probability of dropping out than the majority. This is explained by their lower school achievement and higher parental non-employment. Nevertheless, the difference between children of immigrants and the majority remains evident at the very low end of the achievement scale. Considering the choice of upper secondary school type, children of immigrants can be seen to be more likely than the majority to continue to vocational school. Yet, after controlling for prior school achievement and parental resources, almost all immigrant-origin groups are more likely than the majority to continue to general rather than vocational school. Interviews suggest that when considering their school choices, majority students tend to be driven by their interests and see their decision making as being independent of others. On the other hand, children of immigrants tend to have more specific future plans and to take the wishes of their parents more into consideration.

Growing economic inequality and cultural heterogeneity has brought increased attention to the issue of 'unity in diversity', that is, the state of being joined together or being in agreement in the presence of actual and perceived differences among people. Despite the growing interest in 'politics in divided societies', many political-sociological aspects of this issue remain largely unexplored. At the heart of this thesis lies an interest in explaining how social forces shape political preferences regarding the tension between unity and diversity in contemporary democracies. More specifically, this research seeks to understand how social (and identity-based) cleavages affect public responses to the idea of solidarity-based welfare provision and the reconciliation of increased ethnic diversity with national unity (including the functioning of the welfare state). Drawing on the institutionalist view that pre-existing policy creates mass politics (policy feedback effect), the study also investigates whether institutional structures condition the association between social forces and political attitudes. Although several chapters put particular emphasis on policy feedback effects (e.g., Chapters 2, 3, and 5), they are still within the general scope of this thesis, that is, the 'social embeddedness of political attitudes'. The thesis consists of two parts: the first assesses the explanatory power of socioeconomic status and social policy structures in predicting public attitudes toward income inequality, redistribution, and taxation policies (Chapters 2 to 4), and the second examines how differences in occupational status and national identity result in differences in reactions to welfare chauvinism and multiculturalism (Chapters 5 and 6). Taken together, the findings of this study underscore the importance of social cleavages, identity, and institutional structures in explaining why and under what conditions people are more likely to sacrifice part of their private interest or particularistic identity for the common good or the general welfare of all individuals in a community, in a situation of growing economic inequality and increased cultural plurality.

A large part of the study of politics is dedicated to identifying the circumstances under which democracy will flourish. Putnam made a major contribution to this field through his concept of social capital as developed in Making Democracy Work. Putnam found that communities with a high number of civic associations –i.e. social capital- had a better chance of developing an effective style of democratic government. This definition of social capital sparked much subsequent research and policy activity. It is argued here, however, that this work ignored the immediate needs of societies which do not have the required stock of social capital. There is still little guidance available on how effective government can be achieved even if the right societal circumstances are absent. This thesis hopes to find inspiration from government agencies that were successful despite their challenging social capital conditions. It specifically looks at sixteen public utilities on the Caribbean islands of Aruba, Curacao and St. Kitts between 2005 and 2009. The thesis then systematically investigates the relationship between the performance of the agencies and the behaviour of their senior officials. It emerges that in the absence of social capital, governance is in these cases mainly hampered by a deluge of irrelevant data. Successful utilities overcame this flood by constantly upgrading the quality of information, implementing a strict yet inclusive style of governance, and allowing strong leaders the space to translate words into actions. These outcomes suggest that social capital forms an important tool for ordering information, and that, in its absence, there are still alternative strategies available to secure success nonetheless.

This thesis looks at the role of discrimination and ethnic group identity as explanations of political behaviour of ethnic minorities in Britain. Chapter 2 examines vote choice and partisanship, arguing that a group utility heuristic explains the high level of support for the Labour party among ethnic minorities. I provide individual-level evidence of this heuristic by showing that ethnic minority voters support the Labour party to the extent that they are (i) conscious of the experiences of their ethnic group members with regards to discrimination, and (ii) believe that the Labour party is the best political party to represent their interests. These two attitudes mediate the effects of group-level inequalities. Chapter 3 asks whether Muslims are alienated from mainstream politics by Islamophobia and British military intervention in Muslim countries. I find that perceptions of Islamophobia are linked with greater political alienation, to a greater likelihood of non-electoral participation, but also to a lesser likelihood of voting. Likewise, disapproval of the war in Afghanistan is associated with greater political alienation and a greater likelihood of some types of non-electoral participation. I also provide strong evidence that Muslims in Britain experience more religious discrimination than adherents of other minority religions. Chapter 4 considers the interaction between the extreme right and ethnic minority political attitudes and behaviour. I find evidence that the extreme right British National Party (BNP) increases voting for the Labour party, at the expense of minor parties and abstention. Surprisingly, the BNP effect also benefits the other main parties. Although they do not benefit in increased vote share, Liberal Democrat and Conservative party and leader evaluations are more positive where the BNP stood and performed better in 2010, which I suggest is due to the electoral contrast provided by the BNP. Chapter 5 looks at the mobilisation effect of ethnic minority candidates on ethnic minority voters. I find a positive mobilisation effect of Pakistani and Muslim Labour candidates on Pakistani and Muslim voters, conditional on someone trying to convince the respondent how to vote. I also find a demobilisation effect of Labour Muslim candidates on Sikh voters.

Intergenerational solidarity and reciprocity are fundamental building blocks of any society. At the same time, socio-generational groups constantly struggle for influence and authority. In Sub-Saharan Africa, disproportionately male, gerontocratic and patrimonial systems governing economic, social and political life lend a special explosiveness to the social cleavage of generation. This dissertation draws on the concept of the generational contract to explore whether Sierra Leone’s decade-long civil war (1991-2001) – labelled a ‘revolt of youth’ – catalysed changes in the power-asymmetries between age groups. Based on fieldwork conducted between 2007 and 2010, I argue that youth in post-war Sierra Leone question fundamental norms of intergenerational relations and challenge local governance structures demanding changes to the generational contract. Amidst a strong continuity of gerontocratic dominance and counter-strategies from elders, youth draw on organisational forms and a local rights discourse to create spaces for contestation and negotiation. These openings hold potential for long-term rearrangements of societal relations in the medium to long-term future.

O Brasil possui uma característica incomum entre as democracias, seu altíssimo número de partidos políticos. Em sentido clássico, muitos partidos poderiam significar várias clivagens sociais. Na teoria, uma ampla participação partidária na arena política favoreceria uma democracia mais consensual, mais benevolente. Por outro lado, elevado número de atores partidários inibiria a clareza de responsabilidade de quem é governo, dificultando, com isso, a responsabilização eleitoral. Utilizando-se de dados eleitorais, como o índice de volatilidade eleitoral, o índice de coerência partidária e o índice do número efetivo de partidos políticos, o trabalho elabora a seguinte hipótese: no Legislativo, quanto maior a fragmentação partidária, maior a dificuldade do eleitor em identificar o partido governista. Para testá-la, foi criado uma proxy inédita de clareza de responsabilidade e um banco de dados de países presidencialistas do continente americano. Os resultados mostram como países com alta fragmentação partidária e com coalizões de governo dificultam a associação entre o sucesso ou o fracasso do partido governista no Legislativo e no Executivo. Mostra-se, ainda, que o multipartidarismo brasileiro não deriva da fragmentação sócio-cultural e sugere que as instituições políticas brasileiras atuais constrangem os partidos políticos a não sustentarem uma condição de oposição ao Poder Executivo. / The Brazil has an unusual characteristic between the democracies, yours very high number of political parties. In classic sense, many parties can mean multiple social cleavages. In theory, a wide partisan participation in political arena favors a democracy more consensual, more benevolent. By other side, a high number of partisan actors inhibit the clarity of responsibility of who is government, difficulting the electoral accountability. Utilizing electoral data, like the index of electoral volatility, the index of partisan coherence and the index of effective number of parties, the work elaborates the hypothesis: in Legislative, as bigger the party fragmentation, more difficult to the voter identify the government party. To test it, was created an inedited proxy of clarity of responsibility and a database of presidentialist countries of american continent. The results show how countries with high party fragmentation and with government coalitions hamper the association between the success or fail of party government in Legislative and Executive. It also shows that brazilian multiparty system doesn’t derives from social or cultural fragmentation and suggest that the current brazilian political institutions constrains the political parties to not sustain an condition of opposition to Executive Power.

O Brasil possui uma característica incomum entre as democracias, seu altíssimo número de partidos políticos. Em sentido clássico, muitos partidos poderiam significar várias clivagens sociais. Na teoria, uma ampla participação partidária na arena política favoreceria uma democracia mais consensual, mais benevolente. Por outro lado, elevado número de atores partidários inibiria a clareza de responsabilidade de quem é governo, dificultando, com isso, a responsabilização eleitoral. Utilizando-se de dados eleitorais, como o índice de volatilidade eleitoral, o índice de coerência partidária e o índice do número efetivo de partidos políticos, o trabalho elabora a seguinte hipótese: no Legislativo, quanto maior a fragmentação partidária, maior a dificuldade do eleitor em identificar o partido governista. Para testá-la, foi criado uma proxy inédita de clareza de responsabilidade e um banco de dados de países presidencialistas do continente americano. Os resultados mostram como países com alta fragmentação partidária e com coalizões de governo dificultam a associação entre o sucesso ou o fracasso do partido governista no Legislativo e no Executivo. Mostra-se, ainda, que o multipartidarismo brasileiro não deriva da fragmentação sócio-cultural e sugere que as instituições políticas brasileiras atuais constrangem os partidos políticos a não sustentarem uma condição de oposição ao Poder Executivo. / The Brazil has an unusual characteristic between the democracies, yours very high number of political parties. In classic sense, many parties can mean multiple social cleavages. In theory, a wide partisan participation in political arena favors a democracy more consensual, more benevolent. By other side, a high number of partisan actors inhibit the clarity of responsibility of who is government, difficulting the electoral accountability. Utilizing electoral data, like the index of electoral volatility, the index of partisan coherence and the index of effective number of parties, the work elaborates the hypothesis: in Legislative, as bigger the party fragmentation, more difficult to the voter identify the government party. To test it, was created an inedited proxy of clarity of responsibility and a database of presidentialist countries of american continent. The results show how countries with high party fragmentation and with government coalitions hamper the association between the success or fail of party government in Legislative and Executive. It also shows that brazilian multiparty system doesn’t derives from social or cultural fragmentation and suggest that the current brazilian political institutions constrains the political parties to not sustain an condition of opposition to Executive Power.

O Brasil possui uma característica incomum entre as democracias, seu altíssimo número de partidos políticos. Em sentido clássico, muitos partidos poderiam significar várias clivagens sociais. Na teoria, uma ampla participação partidária na arena política favoreceria uma democracia mais consensual, mais benevolente. Por outro lado, elevado número de atores partidários inibiria a clareza de responsabilidade de quem é governo, dificultando, com isso, a responsabilização eleitoral. Utilizando-se de dados eleitorais, como o índice de volatilidade eleitoral, o índice de coerência partidária e o índice do número efetivo de partidos políticos, o trabalho elabora a seguinte hipótese: no Legislativo, quanto maior a fragmentação partidária, maior a dificuldade do eleitor em identificar o partido governista. Para testá-la, foi criado uma proxy inédita de clareza de responsabilidade e um banco de dados de países presidencialistas do continente americano. Os resultados mostram como países com alta fragmentação partidária e com coalizões de governo dificultam a associação entre o sucesso ou o fracasso do partido governista no Legislativo e no Executivo. Mostra-se, ainda, que o multipartidarismo brasileiro não deriva da fragmentação sócio-cultural e sugere que as instituições políticas brasileiras atuais constrangem os partidos políticos a não sustentarem uma condição de oposição ao Poder Executivo. / The Brazil has an unusual characteristic between the democracies, yours very high number of political parties. In classic sense, many parties can mean multiple social cleavages. In theory, a wide partisan participation in political arena favors a democracy more consensual, more benevolent. By other side, a high number of partisan actors inhibit the clarity of responsibility of who is government, difficulting the electoral accountability. Utilizing electoral data, like the index of electoral volatility, the index of partisan coherence and the index of effective number of parties, the work elaborates the hypothesis: in Legislative, as bigger the party fragmentation, more difficult to the voter identify the government party. To test it, was created an inedited proxy of clarity of responsibility and a database of presidentialist countries of american continent. The results show how countries with high party fragmentation and with government coalitions hamper the association between the success or fail of party government in Legislative and Executive. It also shows that brazilian multiparty system doesn’t derives from social or cultural fragmentation and suggest that the current brazilian political institutions constrains the political parties to not sustain an condition of opposition to Executive Power.

This thesis examines the nature of mass factionalism and rebellious alignment during the Chinese Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1968. This period in Chinese history presents an internecine mass conflict that boasts the largest political upheavals of the 20th century. The most puzzling question of the explosion of this intense rebellious rivalry lies in the mechanisms and processes of insurgents’ political choices: Why did people join and affiliate with different insurgent groups? What decision did people make and what were their reasons? In conventional social structural analyses of contentious politics, mass actors’ decisions are affected by functionally differentiated interests inherent in their pre-existing social positions. This model defines mass rebellion and factional alignment as a form of interest group politics, attributing political choices to participants’ pre-existing sociopolitical status quo and thus pits different social groups against one another. As a result, similar occupational and status groups in the previous hierarchical structure would make similar political choices that lead them to form well-defined competing factions. In contrast to this static structural interpretation, I propose a contextual process model to analyze processes of political division and factional contention within political movements. With a case study of Guangzhou, I argue that rebellious alignment was rooted in their political interactions in a rapidly evolving phase of the conflict, rather than rising from the tensions that existed between different socio-economic layers of society. During the times of radical instability such as the Chinese Cultural Revolution, political ambiguity and contingency were the defining characteristics. In such unstable political environment, the basic elements of the movement changed so many times: each phase of the rebel movement projected itself by means of different actors, agendas, targets, and so on. Consequently, individual rebels observed their embedded local political environment, interpreted it, and subsequently chose a course of action in a dynamic process. In this regard, mass actors from identical social strata in the previous hierarchical structure would make different political choices and tactically choose their factional camp.

In this dissertation I explore the redistributive effects of second-dimensional identity politics in parliamentary democracies. Specifically, I focus on parties’ electoral incentives to manipulate the salience of the territorial-identity cleavage. My main argument is that a greater electoral salience of the second dimension distorts the nature of redistributive outcomes. Although the redistributive effects of second dimensions of political competition have been explored in majoritarian democracies, much less is known about their effects in democracies with proportional representation (PR). The dissertation brings “bad news” in that regard: when the territorial second dimension is salient, it is no longer true that parliamentary democracies with proportional electoral systems redistribute more –which is the prevalent view in the existing literature. In fact, the so called “left-bias” of PR systems vanishes when the territorial-identity cleavage is politically activated. This key insight therefore offers a fundamental qualification to the institutionalism literature, by making an effort to understand the way in which regional diversity interacts with institutions through multidimensional political competition. The dissertation is divided in two parts: one theoretical and one empirical. First, I develop a formal model that illustrates the way in which parties’ second-dimension electoral incentives affect both the electoral stage and the subsequent post-electoral coalition bargaining among parties in national parliaments. The reason is that both right-wing and regionalist parties have incentives to increase the salience of the second dimension at the electoral stage to attract voters, and subsequently the coalition bargaining among parties in parliaments offers new opportunities for legislative coalitions. In the second part of the dissertation, I test the empirical implications at the macro-level, the meso-level and the individual-level. The main empirical results can be summarised as follows. First, I present empirical evidence according to which the legislative salience of the second dimension induces a negative effect on redistribution and a positive effect on the regionalisation of public policy. Second, I provide evidence which shows that both right-wing and regionalist parties strategically increase the electoral salience of the second dimension when they are “losers” on the first dimension. Finally, I illustrate the way in which the salience of the second dimension affects the formation of individual preferences for redistribution. In sum, this dissertation provides new arguments and empirical evidence that demonstrates how second dimensional politics can have profound redistributive consequences in parliamentary democracies.