The boon of public goods to a society is its inclusive nature where no individual can be restricted from enjoying its fruits. However, this very feature generates proclivity among individuals in the society to escape paying their share towards creation of the public good, which is known as free-riding. Interestingly, contribution levels in reality surpass predictions suggested by theoretical findings. To understand and assuage the free-riding problem, we study a public good game where individuals in a society form small groups or coalitions to carry out collective decisions about contribution levels. Such cooperative action is further augmented when we account for social and other-regarding preferences in individuals, which make them care about well-being of others. While social preferences are well documented in other economic environments, their effect on the formation, likelihood and size of coalitions to provide public goods is not well understood. This dissertation uses both theoretical and experimental methods to incorporate social preferences into the study of coalition formation and how such coalitions affect the provision of the public good. In any public good provision problem, marginal per capita return (MPCR) is an important determinant. For every dollar a person spends on privately providing the public good, the MPCR measures how much the individual gets back. Conventional theory suggests an inverse relationship between coalition size and MPCR, which stands contrary to recent experimental evidences. My dissertation uses heterogenous social preferences to arrive at sufficient conditions which establishes a positive relationship between coalition size and MPCR. Chapter 2 theoretically investigates the conditions required to achieve a positive relationship between coalition size and MPCR when an individual's social preference is private information. The model is a two-stage public good game, where in the first stage individuals decide whether or not to join the coalition and then in the next stage, the coalition votes to contribute to public good. The results suggest that individuals with pro social preferences are more likely to join the coalition and upon joining always contribute to the public good. Higher MPCR further increase an individual's likelihood to join coalition and contribute to public good. The results hold true under different model specifications as well. Chapter 3 test the theoretical predictions of Chapter 2 by using an experiment. In the experiment, subject's payoff is determined by exogenously inducing social preferences into an individual's payoff function. The experiment validates the predictions of theoretical model and we find that individuals who have lower weight on their own payoff are likely to join the coalition and also vote to contribute to public good. Higher return from public good also results in larger coalition size and increases the likelihood to contribute to public good. Chapter 4 also tests the theoretical prediction, however, here the preferences are estimated by using an incentivized task based on how much money they are willing to give to someone else. The outcomes from the incentivized task suggest that individuals who give more money to others are more likely to join the coalition and also contribute to public good. High MPCR ensures larger coalition size and more individuals contributing to public good. We also find that coalition size have a positive impact on individual's decision to join the coalition and contribute. / Doctor of Philosophy / Public goods like healthcare services, free-vaccinations, cleaner environment is an important parameter to the development of a society. The primary features of these goods are non-excludability – no one can be excluded from enjoying the benefit of the good and non-rivalry such that multiple individuals can enjoy its benefits. These features allow many to free-ride and escape contribution towards the provision of the public good. In this dissertation, we study how coalitions amongst people in a society can potentially assuage the free-riding problem. International Environment Agreements (IEA) such as Kyoto Protocol, Paris agreement are some of the examples of existing coalitions. While in practice coalitions, i.e., subgroups of individuals who agree to act collectively to produce a public good exist, the conditions under which these coalitions are most likely to form are not well understood. In this dissertation we incorporate facets of Behavioral Economics to understand functioning of coalitions which will allow to incorporate various behavioral and other-regarding preferences to study economic outcomes. Other-regarding preferences assume that individuals also care about the well-being of others. The dissertation uses both theory and experiments to understand and test the conditions required for successful coalition formation through behavioral economics-based explanations. A society is comprised of heterogeneous individuals who value public good differently and so have different willingness to pay. For example, not everyone is equally willing to pay for the construction of a public park. We exploit such heterogeneity to understand how efficient coalitions can be formed such that it increases chances of public good provision. We construct a two-stage game where individuals choose whether or not to join the coalition in the first stage. Once individuals learn the size of the coalition they can determine whether it is desirable for them to contribute to the public good in the second stage. As a result, despite individual social preferences being private information, our mechanism increases the size of the public good and thus outcome efficiency. The design of our model also helps to test these predictions by using human subjects' experiments. We find that individuals who care more the well-being of others join the coalition and also contribute to the public good. An increase in benefit from public good also increases the likelihood of higher coalition size and higher contribution levels. In its scientific mission, the study aims to understand importance of heterogenous society in successful provisioning of public goods.

The thesis contains four chapters on the structure and predictability of individual differences Chapter 1. Re-analyses data from Holt and Laury's (2002) risk aversion experiments. Shows that big-stakes hypothetical payoffs are better than small-stakes real-money payoffs for predicting choices in big-stakes real-money gambles (in spite of the presence of hypothetical bias). Argues that hypothetical bias is a problem for calibration of mean preferences but not for prediction of the rank order of subjects' preferences. Chapter 2. Describes an experiment: Participants were given personality tests and played a series of dictator and response games over a two week period. It was found that social preferences are one-dimensional, stable across a two-week interval and significantly related to the Big Five personality traits. Suggestions are given about ways to modify existing theories of social preference to accommodate these findings. Chapter 3. Applies a novel statistical technique (spectral clustering) to a personality data set for the first time. Finds the HEXACO six-factor structure in an English-language five-factor questionnaire for the first time. Argues that the emphasis placed on weak relationships is critical to settling the dimensionality debate within personality theory, and that spectral clustering provides a more useful perspective on personality data than does traditional factor analysis. Chapter 4. Outlines the relevance of extraversion for economics, and sets up a model to argue that personality differences in extraversion may have evolved through something akin to a war of attrition. This model implies a positive relationship between extraversion and risk aversion, and a U-shaped relationship between extraversion and loss aversion.

The purpose of this study was to examine the awareness, perception and social preference of stuttering in children who do and do not stutter. Ten children who stutter and eleven children who do not stutter participated in this study. Each participant viewed a short DVD clip of two puppets taking turns talking. One puppet produced stuttering-like disfluencies, and the other produced typically fluent speech. The participants were then asked a series of questions formulated to examine awareness, perception, and social preference. Results indicated no significant differences between the children who stutter versus the children who do not stutter on any of the three factors examined. However, within the group of children who stutter, significant differences were discovered for two of the seven questions (“which puppet talks like you?” and “what do you call this type of talking?”) when time since onset of stuttering was considered, suggesting that the longer the child has been stuttering, the greater the awareness the child has of his/her disfluent speech both in terms of the behavior and the specific terminology used to describe the behavior. / text

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This dissertation comprises two essays. The unifying theme is the evaluation of non-pecuniary (information or norm based messages) conservation programs. These types of policies are widely applied in developing and developed countries to promote conservation, however, their empirical evidence and their effectiveness are not well documented. Each chapter examines some methodological facets of the heterogeneity of non-pecuniary conservation programs and the reliability of non-experimental methods (program evaluation and econometric techniques) to evaluate treatment effects in the context of non-pecuniary conservation programs.

Despite growing concerns for environmental crisis and the recent economic downturns, worldwide appetite for luxury goods has remained stable and has even grown dramatically in some countries. Luxury goods implicitly convey certain meanings and norms. What are psychological and behavioural consequences of exposure to luxuries? In this proposal, I argue that exposure to luxury goods increases cognitive accessibility of constructs relate to self-interest and subsequently affects social judgments and behaviour. I aim to establish a theoretical conjunction between (a) anthropology’s study of material culture, which focuses on material evidence in attributing human cultures, and (b) psychology’s priming technique, which examines the effects of activated cognitive representations on psychological responding. Accordingly, three studies were conducted to investigate the implicit link of luxury and self-interest. The results showed that exposure to luxury primes automatically activated mental associations relate to self-interest and subsequently increased one’s propensity to allocate more resources to oneself relative to another person (study 1), caused some harvesters to defect in a multi-stage N-person commons dilemma (study 2), but did not necessarily induce unethical behaviour aimed to harm others (study 3). Research about the psychological effects of luxury goods are important because luxuries are implicitly embedded in institutional settings and organizational environments in which negotiations are typically conducted and resource allocation decisions are made. / Graduate / 0621 / 0623 / 0451 / angelch@uvic.ca

Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008) develop a model of reciprocity, „Revealed Altruism‟, which posits that a „more generous than‟ (MGT) offer elicits a „more altruistic than‟ (MAT) response. A MGT ordering is defined by two conditions. Condition a) states that MGT is ordered by the maximum potential increase in income of the recipient, or that the more you stand to receive from an offer, the more generous it is to you. Condition b) states that the increase in maximum potential income of the recipient cannot be less than the maximum potential increase in income of the proposers. In other words, Condition b) states that an offer cannot be self-serving, but it is not specified in Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008) precisely how b) affects the MGT ordering. I propose that a violation of b) is considered self-serving and is less MGT than when b) is not violated. I then experimentally study the empirical relevance of b) using two designs that hold a) constant, comparing MGT differences implied by responses. The first design is a variant of the Lost Wallet Game (Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000) with a negative outside option, and the second design is a modified Investment Game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) with elements of the Dictator Game implemented by Andreoni and Miller (2002). I find no empirical support that b) affects the MGT ordering.

The first chapter reports experiments with payoff-equivalent public good and common pool games. Behavior of high-caste and low-caste Indian villagers is compared with behavior of American students in terms of economic surplus foregone or destroyed by failure of cooperation in the public good and common pool games. When information about caste is withheld no significant difference is observed in the efficiency of play between villagers and student subjects at American universities for both the public good game and the payoff-equivalent common pool game. Providing caste information leads to: (i) the lowest level of efficiency when low-caste first movers interact with a low-caste second mover, and (ii) the highest levels of efficiency when high-caste first movers engage with a high-caste second mover. Cross-caste play generates intermediate levels of efficiency. In my second chapter I examine competition and cooperation across genders and castes in India and compare the data with incentivized laboratory experiments across genders and races in the US. High-caste males (India) and White males (U.S.) choose to compete the most and are universally cooperative. In India females compete more and cooperate less when they are paired with other females but not with males. The level of cooperation among the females of either race (US) is lower than that of the White males but is insignificantly different from the level of cooperation among the African American males. In my third chapter I conducted artifactual field experiments in rural India with variations of dictator and ultimatum games. Eight treatments are played: in four we provide information that the other player is the spouse and in the remaining four variations spouse information is not provided. When subjects are unaware of playing with their spouses, they choose to keep the dictator role for themselves or not empower the other player. Male spouses make higher offers in general relative to female spouses. The divisions in these games (no spouse information) are far less equitable than in dictator games with student subjects. We find more concern for procedural fairness when subjects know they are playing with their spouses than when they do not have this information.

Debating over efficiency-enhancing but inequality-increasing reforms accounts for the routine business of democratic institutions. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) hold that anti-reform bias can be attributed to individual-specific uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses resulting from a reform. In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate that anti-reform bias arising from uncertainty is mitigated by social preferences. We show that, paradoxically, many who stand to lose from reforms vote in favor because they value efficiency, while many who will potentially gain from reforms oppose them due to inequality aversion. (authors' abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

THE AUSTRALIAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM has an overarching objective to improve the well-being of all Australians in an equitable and efficient manner. But like most developed economy health care systems, it has experienced a continual increase in demand for health care services along with increased pressure to improve efficiency, quality, and sustainability. To assist in health sector management, policy formulation, investment decisions and reform, the Australian government developed the National Health Performance Framework (NHPF). The NHPF employs performance indicators across nine dimensions of health care, including Effectiveness, Appropriateness, Efficiency, Responsiveness, Accessibility, Safety, Continuity, Capability, and Sustainability. While the National Health Performance Committee has recognised that performance indicators used within the NHPF are inadequate, this thesis argues that the solution is not a simple matter of collecting additional data and constructing new and ???improved??? indicators. Due to resource constraints within the health care system there is an implicit performance trade-off across dimensions. The NHPF must take into consideration the value individuals place on the health care dimensions to enable a shift of limited resources to those areas that are most valued. The starting point for the NHPF should be to determine what society wants out of a health system. The purpose of this thesis is to determine Australian society???s preferences for performance across the nine NHPF dimensions of health care. This is achieved using a choice modelling experiment, which describes the performance of the current health care system and alternative health care systems the government could work towards, and asks respondents to compare and choose which system they prefer. A mixed multinomial logit model is used to analyse respondent choices in order to incorporate alternative tastes across attributes, and correlation of tastes across alternatives and scenarios. Relative values attached to the nine NHPF dimensions of health care are calculated and preferences for the dimensions are ranked. The thesis concludes by exploring individual preferences derived form the choice modelling experiment in the context of social welfare theory. It also outlines the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology, provides suggestions for further research, and offers a use for social preferences in the development of performance frameworks within the Australian health care system.