This dissertation studies issues associated with various topics related to a worker’s effort. For example, I explore how different wage incentives affect a worker’s productivity. I explore how exogenous shocks, what we often refer to as “luck,” can affect a worker’s motivation. In addition, I explore how different wage contracts destroy cooperation and can lead to destructive activities such as cheating and sabotage, as well as how these activates, in turn, affect productivity. Finally, in the last chapter, I analyze behavioral issues related to fairness and altruism in tournaments, and how these behaviors affect worker’s effort.

This thesis uses laboratory and field experiments to examine the underlying motivations that drive biased and discriminatory behaviour. Its focus is on the differential treatment of others that stems from individuals’ preferences for particular social and ethnic groups. The unifying theme of this thesis is the exploration of how such discriminatory tastes can manifest themselves within individuals’ social and other–regarding preferences, determining the extent to which they care about the welfare of others. The prevalence and implications of these types of preferences are considered in both market and non–market settings.

Cette thèse se compose de trois chapitres constituant des contributions distinctes mais reliées au même centre d'intérêt, la théorie de la décision dans le risque. Le premier chapitre traite de préférences additivement séparable par rapport aux probabilités. Il en est déduit une axiomatisation simple de préférences variationnelles représentées par une fonctionnelle se décomposant en un terme d'espérance d'utilité et un terme entropique. Le second chapitre consiste en une fondation axiomatique de préférences interdépendantes en présence d'interactions sociales, sur la base du modèle initialement élaboré par Blume, Brock et Durlauf. Le troisième chapitre pose la question de l'apport du modèle probabiliste de la physique quantique à la théorie de la décision et de son application pour prendre en compte la perception subjective des évènements par les individus. / This thesis consists of three separate chapters related to economic decisions under risk. The first chapter presents axioms for an additively separable representation of preferences over probabilities. A simple axiomatization of variational preferences represented by the sum of an expected utility term and an entropic term is deduced. The second chapter consists of an axiomatic foundation of other-regarding preferences under social interactions, based on the model originally developed by Blume, Brock and Durlauf. The third chapter introduces the probabilistic model of quantum physics to decision theory. In this context, individuals have a private representation of the set of events.

This dissertation comprises two essays. The unifying theme is the evaluation of non-pecuniary (information or norm based messages) conservation programs. These types of policies are widely applied in developing and developed countries to promote conservation, however, their empirical evidence and their effectiveness are not well documented. Each chapter examines some methodological facets of the heterogeneity of non-pecuniary conservation programs and the reliability of non-experimental methods (program evaluation and econometric techniques) to evaluate treatment effects in the context of non-pecuniary conservation programs.

This dissertation studies models of belief-dependent motivations in three essays.The first essay studies the Koszegi-Rabin model of reference-dependent preferences in a laboratory experiment. The propose a model where the reference point to which consumption outcomes are compared is endogenously determined as a function of lagged, probabilistic beliefs. This paper presents an experiment designed to test some predictions of the Koszegi-Rabin model. The experimental design controls for potential confounds suggested by their theory. The experimental results support their prediction of an endowment effect but do not show the attachment effect predicted by their model.The second essay, coauthored with Martin Dufwenberg and Matt Van Essen, studies how revenge may mitigate the hold-up problem from contract theory. When contracts are incomplete or unenforceable, inefficient levels of investment may occur due to hold-up. If individuals care for negative reciprocity these problems may be reduced, as revenge becomes a credible threat. However, negative reciprocity has this effect only when the investor holds the rights of control of the investment proceeds. We explore this issue analytically, deriving predictions for hold-up games which differ as regards assignment of rights of control. We also test and support these predictions in an experiment.Revenge may be driven by anger. The third essay proposes two belief-dependent models of anger: frustrated anger and anger from blame, which correspond to differing views of the emotion in the psychology literature. Both models build upon the idea that anger occurs when outcomes differ from players expectations. They differ in that anger from blame also incorporates updated beliefs and a notion of other-responsibility. The models are compared with each other and with existing models of negative reciprocity in several examples.

Cette thèse contient trois essais sur la coopération, mesurée à travers les contributions dans le jeu du bien public.Dans le premier chapitre, je propose une revue de la littérature sur l’hétérogénéité dans les jeux de bienpublic linéaires. Je distingue deux types d’hétérogénéité : l’hétérogénéité en dotation et l’hétérogénéité en rendement du bien public (c’est-à-dire en MPCR). Malgré un conflit normatif exacerbé, les agents hétérogènes contribuent autant au bien public que des agents homogènes. Sont-ils en mesure d’utiliser des mécanismes pour atteindre l’efficience (une provision complète du bien public) ? Mes résultats sont nuancés. Les agents hétérogènes en dotation sont capables de "s’autogouverner" et d’atteindre l’efficiencetandis que les agents hétérogènes en MPCR ne parviennent pas parfaitement à surmonter le problème de la sous-provision du bien public.Dans le deuxième chapitre, co-écrit avec Adam Zylbersztejn, nous étudions les effets d’un risque environnemental sur la coopération. Nous appelons risque environnemental une situation dans laquelle le rendement du bien public est risqué au moment de la décision. Nous considérons, dans notre expérience, deux types de risque : un risque individuel (le MPCR est déterminé indépendamment pour chaque membre du groupe) et un risque collectif (le MPCR est le même pour chaque membre du groupe). Nous constatons que le risque n’affecte pas la coopération : les sujets ne contribuent pas différemment au bien public lorsque le MPCR est certain ou lorsqu’il est risqué.Dans le troisième chapitre, j’examine les effets d’un mécanisme fondé sur la compétition intragroupe pour financer des biens publics. Dans mon expérience, les agents sont en compétition pour obtenir un MPCR plus élevé. Le rang dans la compétition - et donc le MPCR - dépend de la façon dont la contribution d’une personne se classe au sein de son groupe. Je trouve que la compétition n’améliore la provision des biens publics que lorsqu’elle ne génère pas d’inégalités trop importantes. / This thesis contains three essays on cooperation, observed through the contributions in the Public Good Game. In the first chapter, I survey the literature on heterogeneity in linear Public Good Games. I distinguish two kinds of heterogeneity: heterogeneity in endowment and heterogeneity in return from the public good (i.e. MPCR). Despite a normative conflict exacerbated, heterogeneous agents contribute as much as homogeneous agents to the public good. Are they able to use mechanisms to reach efficiency (i.e. a full provision of the public good)? I find mixed evidence. Agents heterogeneous in endowment are able to govern themselves and to reach efficiency while agents heterogeneous in MPCR do not perfectly overcome the underprovision problem.In the second chapter, co-written with Adam Zylbersztejn, we investigate the effects of environmental risk on cooperation. We call an environmental risk a situation in which the return of the public good is risky at the time of the decision. We consider, in our experiment, two kinds of risk: an individual one (i.e. the MPCR is determined independently for each group member) and a collective one (i.e. the MPCR is the same for each group member). We find that risk does not affect cooperation: subjects do not contribute to the public good differently when the MPCR is certain or when it is risky.In the third chapter, I investigate the effects of a mechanism based on within-group competition to provide public goods. In my experimental treatments, agents compete for a higher MPCR from the public good. The rank in the competition - and therefore the MPCR - depends on how one’s contribution ranks within the group. I find that competition improves public goods provision only when it does not generate too large inequalities.

Climate policy has been mainly studied with economic models that assume representative, rational agents. However, it aims at changing behavior associated with carbon-intensive goods that are often subject to bounded rationality and social preferences, such as status and imitation. Here we use a macroeconomic multi-agent model with such features to test the effect of various policies on both environmental and economic performance. The model is particularly suitable to address distributional impacts of climate policies, not only because populations of many agents are included, but also as these are composed of different classes of households driven by specific motivations. We simulate various policy scenarios, combining in different ways a carbon tax, a reduction of labor taxes, subsidies for green innovation, a price subsidy to consumers for less carbon-intensive products, and green government procurement. The results show pronounced differences with those obtained by rational-agent model studies. It turns out that demand-oriented subsidies lead to lower unemployment and higher output, but perform less well in terms of carbon emissions. The supply-oriented subsidy for green innovation results in a significant reduction of carbon emissions with a slight reduction of unemployment. / Series: WWWforEurope

La présente thèse s'intéresse à l'évolution d'organisations à caractère démocratique ou ouvert, au travers de leur stabilité ainsi que d'autres caractéristiques comme leur capacité à fédérer, à satisfaire leurs membres ou pérenniser des situations de partage de risque entre agents hétérogènes. Les modèles proposés sont des modèles agents qui s'appuient sur une étude menée depuis 2004 par Juliette Rouchier sur les circuits courts agroalimentaires et particulièrement sur les Associations pour le Maintien d'une Agriculture Paysanne (AMAP) et leur structuration en réseaux d'AMAP à différentes échelles géographiques. La thèse suggère l'existence d'une tension entre la stabilité et la représentativité dans ce type d'organisations démocratiques et discute, dans plusieurs cas de figure, l'impact de différents facteurs sur cette tension comme le nombre de sujets discutés dans l'organisation, l'état d'esprit des membres, l'existence d'une communication structurée au sein de l'organisation, ou encore la répartition géographique des membres. Dans un second temps la thèse s'intéresse à des groupes de partage de risque entre agents hétérogènes, comme c'est le cas dans les AMAP entre producteurs et consommateurs. Elle suggère que l'apprentissage par les agents de leurs risques, c'est à dire de leurs préférences vis-à-vis des caractéristiques de leur organisation au cours du temps, pérennise un partage de risque complet entre des agents hétérogènes. De plus cet effet semble renforcé par l'introduction de préférences pour autrui, comme l'altruisme ou l'aversion aux inégalités. / This PhD thesis studies the evolution of organizations under democratic settings through their stability along with other characteristics like their representativeness, their capacity to satisfy their members or to ensure risk sharing agreement between heterogenous agents. Proposed models are agent based models grounded in a study, initiated by Juliette Rouchier in 2004, on short food chains and particularly on "Associations pour le Maintien d'une Agriculture Paysanne" (AMAP), the french equivalent of United States' Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) along with their structuration in AMAP' networks at different geographical levels. This PhD thesis suggests the existence of a tension between stability and representativeness under democratic settings and discusses, in different cases, the effect of several factors on this tension, like the number of topics discussed in the organization, the state of mind of members, the existence of structured communication, or the spatial repartition of members. In a second part, this Phd thesis deals with risk sharing groups between agents heterogenous in terms of risk exposures, as it is the case in AMAP between producers and consumers. It underlines how learning by agents of their risk exposures through times, which is equivalent here to constantly revise their preferences with respect to the characteristics of their organization, can stabilize risk-sharing groups mixing heterogenous agents and how this effect is strengthen by the introduction of other-regarding-preferences, like altruism or inequality aversion.