In contrast with the procedural orientation of Athenian law in his day, Aristotle thinks that the lawcode should include principles which explain the rules of the lawcode and guide the interpretation of these rules in difficult cases. It should be determined by majority vote whether the decisions and proposals of political experts are consistent with the principles of the lawcode. Aristotle's views on practical explanation support his views on political deliberation. Someone has a techne rather than mere empeiria if he can give an account of the principles of an art and is able to explain the results of his deliberations in the art in terms of the principles. Such explanation does not have the same status as apodeixis in the epistemai, in that such an explanation cannot demonstrate that a conclusion follows necessarily from the principles of the art. However, a person who has experience in the art is able to evaluate deliberative options based on such arguments. / Aristotle has an account of practical intellection which, like Plato's, is theory-based. Aristotle's account is an adjustment of Plato's account in the light of Isocrates' criticisms of Plato. Aristotle combines the accounts of Plato and Isocrates---the emphasis of the one on explanation and the emphasis of the other on practical principles. Aristotle's views on practical intellection allow him to solve a problem associated with Plato's proposals in the Laws, which resemble in important respects Aristotle's own proposals. Plato intends in the Laws to introduce an arrangement on which the polis is governed by non-philosopher citizens educated by the lawcode. However, because of his views on practical intellection, Plato is forced to put the 'Nocturnal Council' in charge of 'preserving the laws'. Because of his views on practical intellection, Aristotle can accept that the majority can be in charge of preserving the law. Aristotle's views on practical intellection also allow him to say that one ought to spell out the principles of the lawcode and privilege them in the interpretation of the law---which is different from the Athenian, procedural approach to the law---even though no universally true claims are possible on practical issues.

Research in social comparison conducted with male subjects, strangers, and acquaintances has shown that unfavourable comparisons between highly similar individuals result in a negative self-evaluation, dissatisfaction, and decreased liking for the comparison other. Two studies were conducted on comparisons between 16-18 year-old female friends who perceived each other as high or middle in similarity in order to test the generality of these findings for close friends. Subjects were given false feedback on a test of maturity and told that they were at level 4 out of 8 while their friend was at level 6. The first study indicated that social comparisons between highly similar, close friends resulted in less satisfaction, but in a more positive self-evaluation and no change in liking for the partner. A strong correlation was also found to exist between similarity and quality of friendship. It was hypothesised that this may account for the differences in comparisons between friends and strangers. The second study looked at high and low quality of friendship in addition to similarity and allowed subjects to interact with their partners. It was found that High-quality friends evaluated themselves more positively after the comparison and experienced an increase in satisfaction and liking for their partner who was found to be very supportive. The opposite was found for Low-quality friendships. This research establishes the nature of the relationship as a critical variable in social comparison research.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 103-114). / Also available by subscription via World Wide Web / xi, 114 leaves, bound 29 cm

Screening is generally considered a useful strategy in the prevention of chronic diseases. The notion is that early detection through the use of certain screening tests can facilitate effective preventive measures to be undertaken which can then lead to improved prognosis from or ultimate avoidance of serious clinical diseases. The enthusiasm for screening in the United States is high and can be seen by the size of public demand for it. Rapid technological advances and knowledge expansion in the past decade have further facilitated the introduction of new tests and screening opportunities. In the mean time, the concept of screening has undergone subtle changes. Previous emphasis on clear and demonstrable population health benefits has been slowly replaced by an emphasis on individual responsibility for the surveillance of personal health risks. Disease screening is frequently advocated as part of a health promotion programme. As a clinician who has worked in breast cancer screening and who is wary of the complexities and problems associated with disease screening, my contention is that the enthusiasm for screening may not ultimately be conducive to health and well-being. This thesis represents an effort to understand the popularity and enthusiasm for disease screening, how it has come about and, why it may not be conducive to health and well-being. The thesis begins with a description of the phenomenon to be followed by a detailed examination of the scientific principles behind disease screening. It then moves on to discover how the phenomenon might have come about by first considering the evolution of biomedicine over the centuries and then its present endeavour in the form of surveillance medicine as well as the latter�s relationship with today�s market economy. Using relevant case studies that involve, for example, cancer and prenatal genetic screening, this thesis explores different concerns relating to health and well-being, including such topics as the creation of health roles, the reconfiguration of human values and interpersonal relationships as well as medicalisation. A final chapter offers an account of health and well-being and sums up why the enthusiasm for screening may not be conducive to health and well-being. The enthusiasm for screening compels people to assume health as a moral virtue. Screening is turned into a ritual that people consume to attain salvation. Since diseases may lead to death, diseases must be avoided though screening. Yet health is not just about the absence of disease. Health and well-being can only be realised by the individual within the context of the individual�s life as a whole. The institution of biomedicine has undeniable responsibility to ensure that screening will not be used to the detriment of individuals� health and well-being. Without condemning disease screening as a potentially useful tool in the prevention of disease, this thesis advocates prudence in its utilisation. People must not be compelled to attend screening through programmes of promotion (commercially related or not). Rather, autonomous decisions must be facilitated as far as possible through the provision of clear, accurate and factual information.

Screening is generally considered a useful strategy in the prevention of chronic diseases. The notion is that early detection through the use of certain screening tests can facilitate effective preventive measures to be undertaken which can then lead to improved prognosis from or ultimate avoidance of serious clinical diseases. The enthusiasm for screening in the United States is high and can be seen by the size of public demand for it. Rapid technological advances and knowledge expansion in the past decade have further facilitated the introduction of new tests and screening opportunities. In the mean time, the concept of screening has undergone subtle changes. Previous emphasis on clear and demonstrable population health benefits has been slowly replaced by an emphasis on individual responsibility for the surveillance of personal health risks. Disease screening is frequently advocated as part of a health promotion programme. As a clinician who has worked in breast cancer screening and who is wary of the complexities and problems associated with disease screening, my contention is that the enthusiasm for screening may not ultimately be conducive to health and well-being. This thesis represents an effort to understand the popularity and enthusiasm for disease screening, how it has come about and, why it may not be conducive to health and well-being. The thesis begins with a description of the phenomenon to be followed by a detailed examination of the scientific principles behind disease screening. It then moves on to discover how the phenomenon might have come about by first considering the evolution of biomedicine over the centuries and then its present endeavour in the form of surveillance medicine as well as the latter�s relationship with today�s market economy. Using relevant case studies that involve, for example, cancer and prenatal genetic screening, this thesis explores different concerns relating to health and well-being, including such topics as the creation of health roles, the reconfiguration of human values and interpersonal relationships as well as medicalisation. A final chapter offers an account of health and well-being and sums up why the enthusiasm for screening may not be conducive to health and well-being. The enthusiasm for screening compels people to assume health as a moral virtue. Screening is turned into a ritual that people consume to attain salvation. Since diseases may lead to death, diseases must be avoided though screening. Yet health is not just about the absence of disease. Health and well-being can only be realised by the individual within the context of the individual�s life as a whole. The institution of biomedicine has undeniable responsibility to ensure that screening will not be used to the detriment of individuals� health and well-being. Without condemning disease screening as a potentially useful tool in the prevention of disease, this thesis advocates prudence in its utilisation. People must not be compelled to attend screening through programmes of promotion (commercially related or not). Rather, autonomous decisions must be facilitated as far as possible through the provision of clear, accurate and factual information.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Murdoch University, 2004. / Thesis submitted to the Division of Arts. Bibliography: leaves [260]-275.

Thesis--Cologne. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 241-265).

Habilitationsschrift-Hamburg. / Bibliography: p. [269]-288.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Northeastern University, 2008. / Title from title page (viewed Aug. 4, 2008). Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Law, Policy and Society Program. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis--Cologne. / Vita. Bibliography: p. 241-265.