Inaug.-diss.--Tübingen. / Lebenslauf. "Literatur" p. [vii]-ix.

Inaug.-diss.--Tübingen. / Lebenslauf. "Literatur" p. [vii]-ix.

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College Dept. of Classics, 2008. Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College Dept. of Philosophy, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references.

Auch im Buchh. - Tübingen, Phil. Diss. v. 11. Dez. 1936.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Committee on Social Thought, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

This thesis wants to say that Socrates was a teacher of his fellows. He engaged with them through dialogue because he cared for their wellbeing, or as he might have put it: for the state of their souls. He was an intellectual and he had an intellectualist view of people and reality. He felt that right-mindedness was reasonable; and thus he believed that learning and developing understanding brought people closer to being virtuous; to goodness; and so to mental health. Socrates was a philosopher, and he considered this to be the most prudent and exalted approach to life. He taught his fellows how to be philosophers, and he urged them as best he could to take up the philosophical stance. His form of care for others was ‘intellectualist’. He cared ‘for the souls of others’ and for his own with intellectual involvement because he believed that this was the most appropriate way. He had a view of the human soul that produced intellectualist views of what wellbeing is and how it is achieved. He himself was a humble and able thinker, and was fully devoted to being virtuous and to helping his fellows to do the same. This thesis addresses the question of what Socrates did in the agora (his aims) and how he went about doing it (his methodology). Our answer might seem obvious. One might wonder what is new about saying that Socrates was a philosopher, and that he cared for the souls of his fellows and that he urged them to become virtuous. Perhaps nothing of this is new. Nevertheless, we find that making this ‘simple’ statement about Socrates is not that simple at all. We find that in Socratic scholarship there exist a plethora of contrasting voices that make it rather difficult to formulate even such a basic description of what Socrates did. We do not wish to create a novel and different reading of Socrates. We do not think that this is even possible after civilization has been interpreting Socrates for millennia. We do not see innovation for its own sake as desirable. We prefer clear understanding to the eager ‘originality’. Therefore rather, our aim with this work is to defend and clarify a very basic picture of Socrates as an educator. We see this work as clearing away clutter so as to begin our life-long study of Socratic thought and action: by laying a foundation with which we can read Socratic works and discern their meaning.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2006. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 204-208). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Much modern moral philosophy has conceived of its interpretative and critical aims in relation to an entity it sometimes terms 'common-sense morality'. The term was influentially used in something like its canonical sense by Henry Sidgwick in his classic work The Methods of Ethics (1874). Sidgwick conceived of common-sense morality as a more-or-less determinate body of current moral opinion, and traced his ('doxastic') conception through Kant back to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and the practice of Plato's Socrates before him. The Introduction to this thesis traces the influence of Sidgwick's conception both on subsequent (mis)understandings of Socratic practice as well as on the practice of moral philosophy in the twentieth century. The first essay offers a challenge to Sidgwick's understanding of Socratic practice. I argue that Socrates' questioning of his interlocutors, far from revealing some determinate body of pre-existing beliefs, is in fact a demonstration of the dynamic and partially indeterminate quality of common-sense morality. The value for the interlocutor of engaging in such conversation with Socrates consisted primarily in its forcing him to adopt what I term a deliberative stance with respect to his own practice and dispositions, asking himself not 'what is it that I believe?' but rather, 'what am I to believe?' This understanding of Socratic practice gives us a way of reconciling the often puzzling combination of conservative and radical elements in Plato's dialogues. The second essay is a discussion of the reception of Sidgwick's conception of ethics in twentieth-century Oxford, a hegemonic centre of Anglophone philosophy. This recent tradition consists both of figures who accepted Sidgwick's picture of moral philosophy's aims and those who rejected it. Of the critics, I am centrally concerned with Bernard Williams, whose life's work, I argue, can be fruitfully understood as the elaboration of a heterodox understanding of Socratic practice, opposed to Sidgwick's. Ethics, on this conception, is a project directed at the emancipation of our moral experience from the many distortions to which it is vulnerable. Williams's writings in moral philosophy, disparate and not entirely systematic, are unified by these emancipatory aims, aims they share with strains of psychoanalysis except in that they do not scorn philosophical argument as a tool of emancipation: in this respect among others, I claim, they are fundamentally Socratic.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / The history of Western civilisation is generally demarcated into three broad epochs: ancient, Christian and modern. These eras are usually defined in political terms, but they may also be differentiated in terms of fundamental differences in the nature of the organisations that constitute civil society in each age, how they defined the public good, and even what they consider philanthropic. In the nineteenth century, for instance, 'Scientific philanthropy' displaced 'Christian charity' as the dominant model for charitable giving; a development accompanied by a number of other secularising trends in Western civil society, generally understood as a broad cultural shift in conceptions of public good, from religious to scientific. From the fourth to the sixth century CE, by comparison, another broad cultural shift, from paganism to Christianity, also led to fundamental changes in the nature and composition of ancient civil society. A central premise of this dissertation is that fundamental historical transformations in Western civilisation – from pagan to Christian, to modern, to post-modern – may be traced to the influence of some of the most important philosophers in the Western philosophical tradition, among them: Protagoras, Socrates, Plato, Francis Bacon and Friedrich Nietzsche. Each of these philosophers may be seen to have promulgated their teachings in a consciously Promethean manner; as gifts of fire, understood as philosophical teachings intended to be promulgated for the wider benefit of humankind. In Greek myth, Prometheus, whose name is traditionally thought to have literally meant 'forethought', is the one who steals fire from the gods and gives it to humans. Prometheus is also the first figure in history to be described as "philanthropic" (Prometheus Bound, 11 & 28). Plato, Bacon and Nietzsche all employ significant variants of the Promethean mũthos in their philosophical works, and may be seen to personally identify with the figure of Prometheus, as an allegorical figure depicting the situation of the wise, particularly in relation to political power. This dissertation thus closely analyses the Promethean mũthos in order to cast light on the philosophical philanthrôpía and Promethean ambitions of Protagoras, Socrates and Plato, and to provide the basis for consideration of the same in Bacon and Nietzsche.