Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of South Carolina, 1993. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 268-279).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Central Florida, 2008. / Adviser: Waltraud Q. Morales. Includes bibliographical references (p. 106-119).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Queensland, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 312-337).

This thesis examines the diplomatic strategy adopted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in response to the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the subsequent shift in the regional distribution of power with regard to the security of the ASEAN nations. I argue that ASEAN has demonstrated considerable success in preventing a collapse of regional order in Southeast Asia. It is important to understand that ASEAN is a product and tool of its members' foreign policy and should therefore be assessed in the foreign policy, rather than in the regional integrationist, context. This will be examined from the point of view of a group of relatively weak, insignificant states within the international arena, historically plagued by conflict and intervention by external powers, exacerbated by a history of intra-regional enmity rather than cooperation, military weakness, and no collective tradition of diplomatic expertise. Yet, despite these shortcomings and ASEAN's previous inability to come together on issues of economic integration, ASEAN's response to the Third Indochina conflict has allowed its member nations to maintain their independence, preserve their freedom of action, rally international support, and confront the great powers involved in this issue through the use of a regional organization. This thesis will also counter the prevailing view that existing intra-ASEAN differences regarding the primary external threat in the issue (namely Vietnam, China or the Soviet Union) have seriously divided its members to the point of potentially threatening the organization's existence. Instead, I will argue that the combination of ASEAN's curious mode of "conflict resolution" through "conflict avoidance", as well as its diplomatic "division of labour," have effectively incorporated existing intra-ASEAN differences as bargaining assets for the organization's political viability. These internal cleavages have been far from resolved or reconciled, but rather skirted over by a web of unwritten laws, implicit rules and mutual understandings regarding one another's accepted role within the organization. This implicit "regime" has served several purposes: it has allowed ASEAN to sustain its image of unity, boosted its political visability in the international forum, and prevented the "loss of face" of fellow members on points of contention. Research for this thesis was conducted in part at the ASEAN Secretariat and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

Given increasing problems in the availability, affordability and deliverability of commercial primary and secondary energy resources, coupled with growing macroeconomic uncertainties, the use of renewable, non-commercial energy resources has been actively promoted in rural areas of developing countries. This, in addition to the fact that conventional, 'state-of-the-art' energy facilities present technical problems, are inequitable and pose potential environmental hazards, has led to proposals for instituting alternative, intermediate or 'appropriate' technologies in rural settlements. This thesis identifies technical, economic, social, cultural and institutional barriers to the introduction of intermediate or 'appropriate' technologies in rural areas. The cases of solar and biogas technologies in Korea, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea the Philippines and Thailand are considered. Policy and planning process recommendations are made on the roles of government, voluntary aid-agencies and the rural user, to overcome the obstacles to implementing these technologies. These recommendations cover the micro (village) and macro (regional and national) levels over two time horizons, and stress the need for a comprehensive approach to discerning rural needs, followed by integrated technology diffusion through effective program and project implementation. In addition, this thesis identifies the need for a continuous collection of information on rural socio-economic conditions and potential for rural interfuel substitution and finally, recommends research into improving technical efficiencies of alternative energy technologies such as solar and biogas. Alternative or intermediate energy technologies such as solar and biogas can play an important role in augmenting rural energy supply. Unless steps are taken to remove the identified barriers to implementation in future technology diffusion efforts, this potential will not be realized. Policy and planning process recommendations made in this thesis present means through which these barriers could be removed. / Applied Science, Faculty of / Community and Regional Planning (SCARP), School of / Graduate

On July 21, 1954, Canada was asked to assume, with Poland and India, the supervision of the Cease Fire Agreements (CFA) in what had been French Indochina. The CFA marked the end of French rule in Indochina, a rule that had never been unquestioned, and that, since December of 1946, had involved France in a bitter and costly war. At the end of 1953 a series of events led to a decision to seek a negotiated peace in Indochina. After eight years of fighting that had drained away manpower and resources, France had lost control of large areas of Vietnam. The death of Stalin in Russia brought new leaders to power who were anxious to secure a lessening of international tensions so that they could turn their attention to improving the lot of the average Russian. The Chinese were about to embark on their first Five Year Plan, and wished to be free of the heavy burden that supplying the Vietminh war machine entailed. The Vietminh and the Americans, on the other hand, seem to have come to the conference table only on the insistence of their allies. The Vietminh considered that final victory was within their grasp and did not wish to stop short of their objective - control over the whole of Vietnam. The new Republican administration in the U.S. was committed to "rolling back" Communism, and foresaw another victory for Communism in the proposed peace conference. Proceedings at the Geneva Conference soon showed the diversity and conflict of aims among the participants. The U.S. soon retired for all practical purposes from active participation, and for quite long periods there was not even an official head of the U.S. Delegation present in Geneva. The Laniel Government fell in France during the negotiations, and Laniel was replaced by Mendès France, largely on the strength of his promise to conclude a peace within thirty days. Britain and the USSR acted as co-chairmen of the Conference and were active in moving their allies closer together; they share the responsibility for the eventual successful outcome of the Conference. Of the differences that developed between the two sides at Geneva, the most significant was the difference of opinion over the composition of an International Control Commission (ICC) to supervise the Cease Fire. A compromise was finally reached on India, Poland and Canada. During the first two years of the Commission's existence it supervised the withdrawal and regroupment of forces provided for in the Geneva Agreement. Particularly in the evacuation of Haiphong and Hanoi the ICC was able to render valuable service. By the end of this two year period, however, the French Union Forces (FUF) had left Vietnam, leaving the South Vietnamese to continue to enforce the Cease Fire Agreement, and the RVN had of course refused to consider itself bound by the Agreements. The Diem Government refused to contemplate the holding of elections that would have re-unified the country and brought to an end the ICC's task in Vietnam. Of all the members of the ICC, it was India's foreign policy that most affected the decisions and the work of the Commission. Indian policy was non-aligned, and must even more importantly be clearly seen to be non-aligned. At the same time India had an almost instinctive dislike of Communism, a dislike that appeared in India's lukewarm support for anti-colonial struggles in Asia that were dominated by Communists. Although the Indian Delegation sided with the Poles more often than with the Canadians during the life of the Commission, on important decisions that affected the South's ability to maintain its security, India sided with the Canadians. After 1956, the Commission became increasingly ineffective. Its freedom to investigate was eroded, financial support was lacking, and eventually the increasing tempo of the war in Vietnam swept the ICC aside as largely irrelevant. The ICC is only one of many peacekeeping operations in which Canada has been involved. UN missions have tended to be popular within Canada, while service on the ICC has not been generally approved. In fact Canada has not been as neutral or as partisan as public opinion has assumed. Certain conditions tend to ineffectiveness in peacekeeping missions, and these conditions have been present in other missions as well as in the ICC. In recent years, Canada has been increasingly reluctant to take on peacekeeping duties where it is judged the chance for effective action has not been great. But Canada has not been involved in peacekeeping simply because it has suited her to be involved. In future dangerous and difficult situations the pressures on us to participate might well be too strong to resist. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

This project is concerned with examining the impact of colonial administrations on post-independence state behavior in Southeast Asia. Despite a similar historical context, the region exhibits broad variation in terms of policy preferences after independence. Past literature has focused, largely, upon pre-colonial or independence era factors. This project, however, proposes that state behavior is heavily determined by a combination of three colonial variables: indigenous elite mobility, colonial income diversity, and institutional-infrastructure levels. It also constructs a four-category typology for the purposes of ordering the broad variation we see across post-colonial Southeast Asia. Utilizing heavy archival research and historical analysis, I examine three case studies in the region, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, that share a common colonial heritage yet exhibit markedly different post-independence preferences. Vietnam's colonial legacy is characterized by high indigenous elite mobility, medium colonial income diversity, and medium-high levels of institutional-infrastructure. This creates a state where the local elites are capable and socially mobile, but lack the fully developed skill sets, institutions and infrastructure we see in a Developmental state such as South Korea or Taiwan. As a result, Vietnam is a Power-Projection state, where elites pursue security oriented projects as a means of compensating for inequalities between their own social mobility and acquired skills, institutions and infrastructure. In Cambodia, indigenous elite mobility and colonial income diversity are both low, creating an entrenched, less experienced elite. Medium levels of institutional-infrastructure enables the elite to extract wealth for class benefit. As a result, the state becomes an instrument for elite enrichment and is thus classified as Self-Enrichment state. Laos' colonial history is characterized by low levels of indigenous elite mobility, colonial income diversity, and institutional-infrastructure levels. Laos' elite are deeply entrenched, like their counterparts in Cambodia. However, unlike Cambodia, Laos lacks sufficient institutional-infrastructure levels to make wealth extraction worthwhile for an elite class. Laos' inability to execute an internal policy course, or even enrich narrow social class, categorize it as a Null state. The theory and typology presented in this project have broad applications to Southeast Asia and the post-colonial world more generally. It suggests that the colonial period, counter to more recent literature, has a much greater impact on states after independence. As most of the world is a post-colonial state, understanding the mechanisms for preferences in these states is very important. / Political Science